臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

近年來，隨著客戶要求簽證會計師提供非審計服務的需求提高，非審計服務的提供也逐漸成為會計師業務的主要收入來源，因而造成財務報表使用者對於會計師的審計作業是否獨立產生疑慮，同時也引發了主管機關對於查核會計師與客戶之間經濟約束程度之關切。再者，追溯美國安隆案與臺灣博達案的發生，可以發現均是公司治理出現問題，因此，為了避免類似的弊案再度發生，近年來公司治理的議題才逐漸受到重視。另一方面，審計委員會或獨立監察人的設置，向來被視為是公司治理的重要機制。因此，基於上述幾個原因，本研究針對了審計與非審計公費佔總公費之比例，探討其分別與審計委員會或獨立監察人設置之間的關係。
本研究採用縱橫資料迴歸模型(Panel Data Regression Model)，作為研究分析的方法。根據Hausman檢定的結果，判斷本研究的樣本較適合採用固定效果模型或隨機效果模型。至於在研究對象方面，本研究的研究對象為寶來台灣電子科技ETF中的34家上市公司。研究期間則為2006年與2007年，共計2年。本研究針對審計公費與非審計公費，分別與審計委員會或獨立監察人設置之間的關係進行探討。進一步地，再針對不同公費下，對照影響審計委員會或獨立監察人設置的因素之間是否具有差異性。
最後在實證結果方面，得到審計委員會或獨立監察人的設置與非審計公費之間的關係為負相關。另外，針對審計委員會或獨立監察人的設置與審計公費之間的關係，則得到了二者之間為正向關係。同時，上述兩個實證結果均與本研究的預期相同。

In recent years, as the demand for non-audit services from auditors increases, the proportion of revenue from other than audit services has increased tremendously. As a result, regulators and investors concern about the increased percentage of non-audit fees relative to audit fees and that reduces auditor independence. More than ever, spurred by Enron’s collapse and financial mis-statements by several large corporations, the regulators have an increased interest in the impact of non-audit fees on the economic bonding between auditors and their clients. On the other hand, the audit committee or independent supervisors plays one of the most important roles in strengthening corporate governance. Therefore, this research examines the relationship between audit (or non-audit) fee ratio and audit committee (or independent supervisor).
This research uses panel data regression model to investigate 34 listed firms of P-Shares Taiwan Electronics Tech ETF. The research period covers from 2006 to 2007. The result of the Hausman test is applied to determine the choice of fixed effect model or random effect model as the one suitable for the research.
Finally, the research finds that there is a negative association between non-audit fee ratio and audit committee (or independent supervisor). Audit committee (or independent supervisor) also shows a positive association with audit fee ratio. The empirical results are consistent with expectations of the research.

目 錄
頁次
目錄 I
圖目錄 III
表目錄 IV
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 研究背景 1
1.2 研究動機與目的 3
1.3 研究流程 5
第二章 文獻探討 6
2.1 非審計服務之相關研究 6
2.1.1 非審計服務與盈餘管理 6
2.1.2 非審計服務與查核會計師出具意見之型態 7
2.1.3 非審計服務與查核會計師獨立性 8
2.2 審計委員會組成及其影響之相關文獻 9
2.2.1 審計委員會的特色與功能 9
2.2.2 審計委員會組成與查核會計師查核意見 11
2.2.3 審計委員會與查核會計師辭職 12
2.3 董事會之相關文獻研究 13
2.3.1 董事會組成與公司績效 14
2.3.2 董事會成員的特質及其影響 15
2.3.3 董事會規模與公司經營績效 16
第三章 研究方法 18
3.1 研究對象與研究期間 18
3.2 資料來源與變數定義 18
3.3 假設檢定 23
3.4 縱橫資料迴歸模型(Panel Data Regression Model) 25
3.4.1 基本模型 26
3.4.2 固定效果模型(Fixed Effect Model) 27
3.4.3 隨機效果模型(Random Effect Model) 29
3.4.4 模型設定之檢定 33
第四章 實證結果與分析 35
4.1 變數之說明與敘述統計之分析 35
4.2 審計委員會(或獨立監察人)的設置與非審計公費比例之關係 36
4.3 審計委員會(或獨立監察人)的設置與審計公費比例之關係 40
4.4 對照不同公費下，影響審計委員會(或獨立監察人)設置的情況 44
第五章 研究結論與建議 46
5.1 研究結論 46
5.2 研究建議 47
參考文獻 49

圖 目 錄
頁次
圖1- 1 研究流程圖 5

表 目 錄
頁次
表3- 1 預期自變數與應變數之間的關係 25
表4- 1 實際樣本家數代碼與名稱 35
表4- 2 敘述性統計資料 36
表4- 3 適用研究模型檢定之實證結果 37
表4- 4 變異數分析表 38
表4- 5 審計委員會(或獨立監察人)的設置與非審計公費比例的迴歸模型 39
表4- 6 適用研究模型檢定之實證結果 41
表4- 7 變異數分析表 41
表4- 8 審計委員會(或獨立監察人)的設置與審計公費比例的迴歸模型 42

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二、中文部分
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15.馮震宇，(2004)。從博達案看我國公司治理的未來與問題，月旦法學雜誌，第一百一十三期，215-235。
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