臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

自1997年亞洲金融風暴至2016年樂陞案等公司舞弊案件發生，許多舞弊事件皆與公司董事、獨董及監察人等管理階層有關，而受害者往往是公司的股東及利害關係人。因此，政府主管機關已日漸重視企業公司治理與投資人權益之保障。另一方面，董事會是企業之公司治理的核心所在，其所扮演的監督角色極其重要。本研究之目的以公司購買董監事暨重要職員責任保險(簡稱D&O保險)為焦點，探討其對於盈餘資訊性之影響。
本研究選取2012年至2016年台灣上市公司，共5個年度，3515個觀察值，採用Heckman兩階段修正估計法，控制自我選擇偏誤的影響後，探討購買D&O保險與盈餘資訊性之關係。實證結果發現，公司購買D&O保險與盈餘資訊性呈顯著正相關，顯示購買D&O保險的公司，其盈餘資訊的可靠性較高，有助於投資人在制定股票投資決策時，能正確評估公司的價值。

The occurrence of corporate frauds such as Asian financial crisis in 1997 to XEPC Entertainment case in 2016. Many frauds incidents are related to the corporate directors, independent directors and supervisor. The victims are often shareholders and stakeholders of the company. Therefore, government regulators have increasingly paid attention to corporate governance and the protection of investors’ rights. Besides, the composition of the company’s board of directors is the core of corporate governance and plays an important role in supervisory. As the result, the purpose of this study is to analyze the association between director and officer’s liability insurance (referred to as D&O insurance) and the informativeness of earnings.
This study selects the listed companies which contain 3515 observations from 2012 to 2016 and uses Heckman’s two-step procedure. We employ an endogenous binary treatment model control self- selection bias on the estimation of relationship between D&O insurance and informativeness of earnings. Our empirical results show that, D&O insurance is significant positive with the informativeness of earnings.

摘要…………………………………………………………………………………………..I
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………...Ⅱ
致謝辭………………………………………………………………………………………Ⅲ
目錄…………………………………………………………………………………………Ⅳ
表目錄………………………………………………………………………………………..V
圖目錄……………………………………………………………………………………....Ⅵ
第壹章 緒論…………………………………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究背景與動機…………………………………………………………..1
第二節 研究目的…………………………………………………………………..6
第三節 研究流程…………………………………………………………………..7
第貳章 文獻探討……………………………………………………………………………9
第一節 公司治理…………………………………………………………………..9
第二節 董監事暨重要職員責任保險……………………………………………10
第三節 盈餘資訊性………………………………………………………………13
第四節 董監事暨重要職員責任保險與盈餘資訊性之關係……………………15
第參章 研究設計…………………………………………………………………………..16
第一節 觀念性架構………………………………………………………………16
第二節 研究假說…………………………………………………………………18
第三節 變數之定義與衡量………………………………………………………20
第四節 實證迴歸模型……………………………………………………………23
第五節 研究樣本………………………………………………………………....26
第肆章 實證結果與分析………………………………………………………………..…27
第一節 敘述性統計……………………………………………………………....27
第二節 相關性分析……………………………………………………………....32
第三節 多元迴歸分析…………………………………………………………....35
第四節 敏感性分析……………………………………………………………....38
第伍章 結論、限制與建議………………………………………………………………..46
第一節 研究結論………………………………………………………………....46
第二節 研究限制………………………………………………………………....47
第三節 研究建議……………………………………………………………..…..48
參考文獻…………………………………………………………………………………....49

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