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研究生:黃偉傑
研究生(外文):Wei-Chieh Huang
論文名稱:投資抵減好或產量補貼好?環境政策之比較
論文名稱(外文):Tax-credit or subsidy? Environment Policy Analysis
指導教授:葉金標葉金標引用關係
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:僑光科技大學
系所名稱:財務金融研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2017
畢業學年度:105
語文別:中文
論文頁數:34
中文關鍵詞:環境政策、投資抵減、補貼
外文關鍵詞:Environment tax、Subsidy、Environment restraining
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本文主要參考D’Asprement and Jacquemin(1988)、Chiou and Hu(2001)與葉金標(2004)建立一環境政策模型。稅收以補貼方式鼓勵廠商從事環境污染防治改良,將補貼方式分為產量補貼與污染防治補貼兩種,因此可得此兩種不同補貼方式下的最適產出、防治污染改良量、社會福利等,進一步比較何種補貼政策最佳。(1)廠商的污染防治改良量、產出與社會福利和稅率成反比,但與產量補貼率及污染防治投資抵減率成正比。(2)政府若以環境改良污染防治為主要導向,應讓污染防治的投資抵減率較高,此時污染防治改良效果較大。(3)政府執行環保政策的目標不論為社會幅利最大或以管制污染總量,若稅後投資抵減率較產量補貼優惠,污染防治投資抵減政策相對產量補貼有效(4)污染防治投資抵減下的單位污染量相對產量補貼的污染量低。(5)政府不論採取何種環境政策,提高污染稅率將使污染量減少。
This paper which base on Chiou and Hu (2001) framework encourage firm improve pollution-prevention-cure through subsidy of Tax. Besides, from Chin-Piao Yeh Tax policy model, it quotes quantity subsidy and pollution-prevention-cure subsidy. Therefore, the subsidies can yield respectively optimum quantity, quantity of improve pollution-prevention-cure, and social welfare. Furthermore, the better subsidy is found. This paper’s model follows a multi-stage game. In first stage, government decides the tax policy to maximum social welfare. In second stage, firm decides their respectively pollution through tax policy. In third stage, firms go into the quantity competition on product market.

Major findings of the model are (1) Quantity, social welfare, and quantity of pollution-prevention-cure are inverse proportion to tax rate, but subsidy rate of quantity and subsidy rate of pollution-prevention-cure are direct proportion to tax rate. (2) Government should increase Tax-credit rate for higher pollution-prevention-cure, when the improvement is the main environment policy. (3) Tax-credit is more operative than subsidy policy, when the pas-tax-credit rate is more preferential than subsidy rate. (4) Quantity of pollution is lower under tax-credit of pollution-prevention-cure than ubsidy of quantity. (5) Pollution is always decreased by a rise tax rate.under s
一、前言
二、文獻回顧
三、研究方法
四、模型設立
五、模型分析
六、結論
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