臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文探討台灣上市櫃公司的控股集中度與單一家族主導、共治型態、專業經理人治理、公股主導這四種不同的控制型態對分析師追蹤意願的影響。在討論控股集中度與控制型態對分析師追蹤意願的影響上，本文從兩個角度切入問題：第一，控股集中度與控制型態是否會影響公司受追蹤的可能性?第二，控股集中度與控制型態是否會影響公司的受追蹤程度(分析師人數)?實證結果顯示公司無論在何種控制形態下，只要控股集中度過大，就會使公司受追蹤的可能性降低，然而控制持股對於公司受追蹤程度的影響卻因控制型態而異，當公司為共治型態時，控制持股與公司受追蹤程度正向顯著。此外，單一家族主導的公司會降低公司受追蹤之可能性，共治型態的公司會降低公司的受追蹤程度，而專業經理人治理的公司則是同時增加公司受追蹤之可能性與受追蹤程度。綜合上述結果，分析師對資訊透明度低的單一家族主導公司與共治型態公司的追蹤意願較低，而對資訊透明度較高之專業經理人治理公司的追蹤意願較高。

This paper investigates how analysts’ willingness of following a firm is affected by the concentrated shareholding and ownership structures. The study analyzes whether concentrated shareholding and ownership structures affect the possibility of the company being followed by analysts and the number of analysts who follow the firm. Empirical results show that the possibility of being followed reduces as the controlling ownership is too high. This is true no matter under what form of ownership structures. The number of analysts following, however, depends on the structure of controlling ownership. When structure of controlling ownership is widely held, higher controlling ownership have more analysts following. Besides, the possibility of being followed reduces as the firm’s ownership structures is family control；the number of analysts following increases as the firm’s ownership structures is widely held；the possibility of the firm being followed and the number of analysts following both increase as the firm’s ownership structures is professional managers control. Based on the results, the firm with low information transparency, like family control、widely held will reduce analysts willingness of following. However, the firm with high information transparency, like professional managers control firms will increase analysts willingness of following.

一、緒論 1
1.1 研究背景 1
1.2 研究動機與目的 2
1.3 研究流程與架構 3
二、研究假說 4
2.1 名詞與變數解釋 4
2.2 最終控制者之控股集中度與分析師人數假說 5
2.3 控制型態以及各控制形態下控股集中度與分析師人數之假說 6
三、樣本說明 8
3.1 樣本資料來源 8
3.2 樣本篩選方法 9
3.3 樣本敘述統計 9
四、單變數檢定 11
4.1 影響公司受分析師追蹤與否之因素的單變數檢定 11
4.2 影響公司受追蹤程度之因素的單變數檢定 12
五、多變數檢定 15
5.1 迴歸模型介紹 15
5.1.1 股集中度、控制型態與公司受追蹤之可能性的模型介紹 15
5.1.2 控股集中度、控制型態與公司之受追蹤程度的模型介紹 16
5.1.3 控制變數說明 17
5.2 變數敘述統計與相關係數 20
5.3 控股集中度、控制型態與分析師人數之迴歸結果 25
5.3.1 控股集中度、控制型態與公司受追蹤之可能性的分析 25
5.3.2 控股集中度、控制型態與分析師追蹤度之分析 28
六、結論 31

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