臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

當公司發生財務危機時，由於總經理為主要決策者，所以總經理在發生財務危機時，擔任著牽一髮動全身的重要角色，因此本篇論文主要探討發生財務危機的公司，將總經理減薪或換總經理是否為好的政策?且替換的總經理是否為專家總經理。樣本為2000年到2015年在美國發生財務危機的上市公司，426間公司。將總經理政策分成三類(1)被大幅減薪(2)被撤換(3)未被大幅減薪，並針對被撤換是否替換成專業總經理，進一步進行探討。結果顯示在公司發生財務困境的情況下，若總經理被被撤換，會使公司的績效變好；若總經理被大幅減薪，公司會較能解決財務困境。

CEOs is important in financial distress because CEOs play a role of the main decision maker in their firms. If they make wrong decisions, they will cause their companies are in crisis. Therefore, I would like to know whether CEO pay cuts and force to turnover are good policies or not when firm is in financial distress. The sample of my study is 426 public listed companies in the USA from 2000 to 2015 which are in financial distress. And I divide the policies of CEOs into three types:(1)pay cuts,(2)forced turnover,(3)no action. Further, I focus on the sample of CEOs force to turnover. The results show that if CEOs are forced to turnover, the company's performance will be better; if totalpay of CEOs is significantly decreasing , the company will be better able to solve financial distress.

書名頁 i
論文口試委員審定書 ii
授權書 iii
中文摘要 iv
英文摘要 v
誌謝 vi
目錄 vii
表目錄 viiii
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 研究背景及動機 1
第二章 文獻回顧 3
2.1陷入財務危機的問題公司 3
2.2總經理替換 5
2.3總經理的特質 8
第三章 資料來源與樣本敘述 10
3.1資料來源及樣本取得 10
3.2樣本定義 13
3.3敘述統計 14
第四章 計量模型與實證研究 16
4.1在總經理減薪及撤換後，有助於提高公司的績效嗎? 16
4.2在總經理被減薪及撤換後，公司政策會改變嗎? 17
4.3在總經理被減薪及撤換後，有助於公司從財務困境中脫離嗎? 18
4.4新上任專業總經理有助於提升績效及解決困境嗎? 19
第五章 結論與研究建議 22
5.1結論 22
5.2研究建議 23
References 24
附錄一 27

1. Almeida, Heitor, and Thomas Philippon. "The risk‐adjusted cost of financial distress." The Journal of Finance 62.6 (2007): 2557-2586.
2. Bharath, Sreedhar T., and Tyler Shumway. "Forecasting default with the Merton distance to default model." The Review of Financial Studies 21.3 (2008): 1339-1369.
3. Brunello, Giorgio, Clara Graziano, and Bruno M. Parigi. "CEO turnover in insider-dominated boards: The Italian case." Journal of Banking & Finance 27.6 (2003): 1027-1051.
4. Clayton, Matthew C., Jay C. Hartzell, and Joshua Rosenberg. "The impact of CEO turnover on equity volatility." The Journal of Business 78.5 (2005): 1779-1808.
5. Cust#westeur052#dio, Cl#westeur034#udia, and Daniel Metzger. "Financial expert CEOs: CEO׳ s work experience and firm׳ s financial policies." Journal of Financial Economics 114.1 (2014): 125-154.
6. Cust#westeur052#dio, Cl#westeur034#udia, and Daniel Metzger. "How do CEOs matter? The effect of industry expertise on acquisition returns." The Review of Financial Studies 26.8 (2013): 2008-2047..
7. Cust#westeur052#dio, Cl#westeur034#udia, Miguel A. Ferreira, and Pedro Matos. "Generalists versus specialists: Lifetime work experience and chief executive officer pay." Journal of Financial Economics108.2 (2013): 471-492.
8. Demiroglu, Cem, and Christopher James. "Bank loans and troubled debt restructurings." Journal of Financial Economics118.1 (2015): 192-210.
9. Eckbo, B. Espen, Karin S. Thorburn, and Wei Wang. "How costly is corporate bankruptcy for the CEO?." Journal of Financial Economics 121.1 (2016): 210-229.
10. Ellis, Jesse. "Are turnaround specialists special? An examination of CEO reputation and CEO succession." Working paper(2012).
11. Evans III, John Harry, Shuqing Luo, and Nandu J. Nagarajan. "CEO turnover, financial distress, and contractual innovations." The accounting review 89.3 (2014): 959-990.
12. Gao, Huasheng, Jarrad Harford, and Kai Li. "CEO pay cuts and forced turnover: Their causes and consequences." Journal of Corporate Finance 18.2 (2012): 291-310.
13. Gilson, Stuart C. "Bankruptcy, boards, banks, and blockholders: Evidence on changes in corporate ownership and control when firms default." Journal of Financial Economics 27.2 (1990): 355-387.
14. Gilson, Stuart C. "Management turnover and financial distress." Journal of financial Economics 25.2 (1989): 241-262.
15. Gilson, Stuart C., and Michael R. Vetsuypens. "CEO compensation in financially distressed firms: An empirical analysis." The Journal of Finance 48.2 (1993): 425-458.
16. Gilson, Stuart C., Kose John, and Larry HP Lang. "Troubled debt restructurings: An empirical study of private reorganization of firms in default." Journal of financial economics 27.2 (1990): 315-353.
17. Goto, Naohisa, and Konari Uchida. "How do banks resolve firms’ financial distress? Evidence from Japan." Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 38.4 (2012): 455-478.
18. Jostarndt, Philipp. "Financial distress, corporate control, and management turnover: A German panel analysis." Journal of Banking&Finance 32 (2008):2188-2204.
19. Kahl, Matthias. "Economic distress, financial distress, and dynamic liquidation." The Journal of Finance 57.1 (2002): 135-168.
20. Lehn, Kenneth M., and Mengxin Zhao. "CEO turnover after acquisitions: are bad bidders fired?." The Journal of Finance61.4 (2006): 1759-1811.
21. Li, Yan, Ruichang Lu, and Anand Srinivasan. "Relationship bank behavior during borrower distress." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis (JFQA), Forthcoming (2017).
22. May, Don O. "Do managerial motives influence firm risk reduction strategies?." The Journal of Finance 50.4 (1995): 1291-1308.
23. Merton, Robert C. "On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest rates." The Journal of finance 29.2 (1974): 449-470.
24. Milbourn, Todd T. "CEO reputation and stock-based compensation." Journal of Financial Economics 68.2 (2003): 233-262.
25. Opler, Tim C., and Sheridan Titman. "Financial distress and corporate performance." The Journal of Finance 49.3 (1994): 1015-1040.
26. Pang, Jiaren, Sheri Tice, and Lingling Wang. "CEO Backgrounds and Stock Performance: Evidence from the Great Recession." University of Connecticut School of Business Research Paper No. 18-06 (2015).
27. Parrino, Robert. "CEO turnover and outside succession a cross-sectional analysis." Journal of financial Economics 46.2 (1997): 165-197
28. Weisbach, Michael S. "CEO turnover and the firm's investment decisions." Journal of Financial Economics 37.2 (1995): 159-188.
29. Xuan, Yuhai. "Empire-building or bridge-building? Evidence from new CEOs’ internal capital allocation decisions." The Review of Financial Studies 22.12 (2009): 4919-4948.