臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究主要探討審計公費、非審計公費與董監事責任保險之聯立方程組，以2008年至 2015年間台灣上市櫃公司資料進行實證觀察，並探討董監事責任保險、審計公費及非審計公費之間可能存在的內生性關係，因以傳統最小平方法所估計之參數可能會產生偏誤及不一致，故本文以二階段最小平方法（2SLS）解決變數間的相互影響，以便能取得正確的估計參數。
實證結果顯示，審計公費、非審計公費與董監事責任保險互為內生變數，即董監事責任保險與審計公費與非審計公費亦為正向影響關係，此一實證結果顯示三者間之非單向關係。本文進一步以不同的樣本分群並採用不同的變數定義等方式，進行堅實性驗證，皆得到類似結論。
在過去文獻中，大多探討單方向影響的觀點，而本研究於學術上首次運用聯立方程式探討內生性的問題且觀察其關係，並可提供國內主關機關對董監事責任保險之策略提升改進之依據，也可做為投資人於投資上的風險考量，因此需注意公司購買高額的D&O保險，以避免傷害到投資人的權益。

The purpose of this empirical study is aimed to investigate the relationships within audit fees, non-audit fees, and directors and officers liability insurance (D&O) by simultaneous equations approach. Empirical examination of public listed companies between 2008 and 2015 was carried out, specifically probing into potential endogenous relationships among D&O, audit fees, and non-audit fees.
The results revealed that audit fees, non-audit fees, and D&O were mutually endogenous. That is, D&O is positive with audit fees and non-audit fees. A further robust examination was carried out with different clustered samples and different variable definitions, and similar results were yielded.
While previous research mainly focused on unidirectional relationship, the current study pioneers into the relevant fields with the use of simultaneous equations to examine endogeneity and relationships within variables. The results serve as references not only for administrative organizations to improve strategies of D&O, but also for investors to evaluate investment risks. Therefore, it is advised that extra attention be paid to a company’s purchase of high volume of D&O to avoid damaging investors’ rights.

摘要 i
ABSTRACT ii
目錄 iii
表目錄 iv
圖目錄 v
第壹章緒論 1
第一節研究背景與動機 1
第二節研究問題 3
第三節研究方法 4
第貳章文獻探討與研究假說建立 5
第一節董監事暨重要職員責任險發展近況 5
第二節董監事暨重要職員責任險、審計公費與非審計公費 6
第參章研究設計 10
第一節樣本來源與樣本期間 10
第二節變數之操作性定義與模型建立 12
第三節實證模式 19
第肆章實證結果與討論 20
第一節敘述性統計 20
第二節相關係數分析 23
第三節實證結果 27
一、logistic實證結果分析 27
二、OLS實證結果分析 29
三、2SLS實證結果分析 34
四、OLS與2SLS結果之比較 37
五、敏感性分析 38
第伍章結論 40
第一節結論 40
第二節研究建議與貢獻 41
第三節研究限制 42
參考文獻 43

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