臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本篇研究以台灣上市、櫃資料做實證研究，分析超額公司治理對於現金股利發放的影響，並參考La Porta et al. (2000)提出的結果模型、替代模型來討論臺灣股利政策是否為解決代理人問題。有別於傳統的公司治理指標，本研究在控制公司變數之下，計算出不同公司在不同年份之下的超額公司治理指數，再以此超額公司治理指標去看其對公司發放現金股利的影響為何。實證結果顯示，超額公司治理與現金股利發放為負向關係，當超額公司治理指標越高，現金股利發放越少，反之亦然，與La Porta et al. (2000)所提出的替代模型較為符合。故由此可知，臺灣的股利發放政策並非是為了解決代理人問題，而與投資機會較為相關。公司治理較優的公司通常擁有較低的代理成本，經理人傾向會利用多餘的現金流來為公司產生更大的效益，因此現金股利發放的會相對較少，而使公司有較多的投資機會。反之，公司治理較差的公司，經理人傾向支付股利來消除股東認為經理人剝奪公司資源的疑慮。

This paper investigates the relationship between abnormal corporate governance and dividend policy by using the sample of Taiwan’s public firms. Based on the agency theory proposed by La Porta et al. (2000), we consider two controversial hypotheses: the outcome and substitute hypotheses to discuss whether Taiwan’s dividend policy is used to solve agency problem. Different from the traditional corporate governance, we create an “abnormal corporate governance index” by controlling the characteristics of CEOs and firms and see how it affects dividend policy. Our empirical findings show that abnormal corporate governance is negatively correlated to cash dividend policy, which means that our results are consistent with “substitute model”. It can be seen that Taiwan’s dividend policy is more relevant to investment opportunities. The firms with better corporate governance often have lower agency cost and managers tend to use retained earnings to gain more benefit; thus, they will have less dividend payout but more investment opportunities. On the contrary, the firms with worse corporate governance, managers tend to pay dividends to relieve shareholders’ concerns of expropriation.

口試委員會審定書 i
誌謝 ii
摘要 iii
Abstract iv
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究範圍與方法 2
第二章 文獻探討與假說建立 4
第一節 與公司治理制度相關的文獻探討 4
第二節 有關公司治理品質與股利政策的文獻探討 5
第三節 其他控制變數之效果 6
第三章 研究方法及樣本 9
第一節 實證模型與變數衡量 9
第二節 樣本選取與資料來源 11
第三節 樣本統計敘述與相關係數 12
第四章 實證結果與分析 15
第一節 超額公司治理指數與公司股利發放政策關係 15
第二節 超額公司治理變數個別組成因子之實證結果 16
第三節 分群樣本之實證結果 17
第四節 加入股份盈餘偏離衡量指標之實證結果 19
第五章 結論 21
參考文獻 22
一、國內文獻 22
二、國外文獻 22

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