臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究從獎酬計畫與公司治理的觀點出發，探討台灣上市公司經理人不同獎酬結構與公司治理對經理人採取投機性盈餘管理之影響。本研究之目的在發現不同的薪酬結構下，企業的董事會特性與股權結構是否能夠有效監督經理人，使管理階層與股東的利益趨於一致，以降低代理成本並維持財報品質之穩定與資本市場之健全。本研究以2004年到2006年在台灣證劵交易所掛牌上市之公司為研究樣本，並利用敘述性統計分析、相關性分析、VIF 值及複迴歸分析等方法驗證各項變數之關係。而本研究結果發現(1)不論現金獎酬或是股票獎酬，當經理人獎酬越高時，經理人可能運用更多的異常應計數以追求自身財富的極大化。因此，當薪酬計畫的設置標準過度依賴財務報表時，薪酬計畫之設置美意將被扭曲，反成為經理人進行盈餘管理之誘因，導致經理人將追求自身的財富。(2)當經理人持股比例提高後，將使得經理人財富與企業價值更緊密連，並利用高持股來掌控董事會以執行投機性的盈餘管理行為與制定有利於自身的決策，將導致代理問題更加嚴重。

The purposes of this study are to investigate how do the structure of managers’ compensation, the characteristics of direct board and the proportion of ownership affect the managers’ behaviors in opportunistic earning management. This study will discuss the hypothesis by using the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient, the Spearman rank order correlation coefficient, the statistics of description, the regression analysis, t-test, VIF etc. to verify the relations between all those variables.
The conclusions of this study are: (1) the relationship between compensation and earning management is positive. It means that if managers’ compensation plan is based on accounting numbers, managers will be more likely to manipulate discretionary accrual to earn more returns. So, managers’ compensation plan is unable to mitigate agency costs and becomes one of earning management incentives.(2) in order to let the managers be more consistent with shareholder's benefits, directors of boards will issue stocks to managers. But based on the results, when managerial ownership become higher, managers will become more easier to control directors of boards and pursue their self-interests. Consequently, agency costs will become more seriously.

目錄
第壹章 緒論…………………………………………………………… 1
第一節 研究背景與動機……………………………………………… 1
第二節 研究問題與目的……………………………………………… 4
第三節 研究架構與流程……………………………………………… 7
第貳章 文獻探討與假說建構………………………………………… 9
第一節 盈餘管理……………………………………………………… 9
第二節 獎酬計畫與盈餘管理…………………………………………19
第三節 公司治理與盈餘管理…………………………………………23
第参章 研究設計………………………………………………………33
第一節 研究期間與資料來源…………………………………………33
第二節 變數衡量………………………………………………………35
第三節 實證模型………………………………………………………43
第四節 研究方法………………………………………………………45
第肆章 實證結果………………………………………………………47
第一節 敘述性統計及相關性分析……………………………………47
第二節 實證結果………………………………………………………53
第三節 穩固性測試……………………………………………………60
第伍章 結論與建議……………………………………………………67
第一節 討論與結論……………………………………………………67
第二節 研究限制與建議………………………………………………72

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