臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究旨在探討舞弊公司與正常公司兩者從事避稅行為之程度是否有所差異以及發生財務危機可能性較高之企業與可能性較低之企業兩者從事避稅行為之程度是否有所差異。以2001年至2011年上市櫃之曆年制公司為研究對象，本文以有效稅率和財稅差異作為避稅行為之代理變數，有效稅率與財稅差異分別各採用三種不同的衡量方式加以計算。舞弊公司是以「知識贏家」新聞資料庫合併台灣經濟新報資料庫進行檢索，將舞弊公司與正常公司配對進行實證研究，財務危機是以Altman(1968)所建構的財務危機模型進行實證研究，並放入公司治理之變數以了解公司治理對公司避稅之影響。實證研究發現，舞弊公司與正常公司相比較之下，舞弊公司從事避稅活動的程度較低，公司不會同時採取激進且不保守的財務報導以及稅務報導，而財務危機方面，發現當財務危機指標愈小之公司其避稅程度愈低，此外，本文將財務危機指標樣本分割成財務危機公司與非財務危機公司發現當企業為財務危機公司時，從事避稅行為的程度較高。

The purpose of this study is to compare the tax aggressiveness between fraud firms and non-fraud firms. Furthermore, as for the extent of tax aggressiveness, is there any difference between the firms with high potential of financial distress and the firms with low potential of financial distress? This study relies on six proxies to measure tax aggressiveness of the firms：three representing effective tax rates（ETR）and another three for book-tax differences （BTD）. The sample consists of observations selected from listed and over-the-counter companies in Taiwan from 2001to 2011.
The empirical results show the level of tax aggressiveness between fraud and non-fraud firms is different. Fraud firms are less tax aggressive, implying that more aggressive in their financial reporting exhibit less tax aggressiveness. Furthermore, the firms with low potential of financial distress are more tax aggressive. In additional tests, the sample is divided into financial distress firms and non-financial distress firms, and the result shows that the firms with financial distress are more tax aggressive.

表次
第一章 緒論
第一節 研究動機
第二節 研究目的
第三節 論文架構
第二章 文獻探討
第一節 舞弊與財務危機的定義
第二節 舞弊和財務危機與公司治理之關係
第三節 公司治理和避稅之關聯性
第四節 舞弊和避稅之關聯性
第五節 財務危機與避稅之關聯性
第三章 研究方法
第一節 資料來源及樣本選取
第二節 實證模型及變數定義
第四章 實證結果與分析
第一節 敘述性統計與相關係數分析
第二節 實證結果分析
第三節 敏感性分析
第五章 結論與建議
第一節 結論
第二節 研究限制及建議
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附錄

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