臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究採用2006-2016年間全球69個國家，共1,219家商業銀行為樣本，探討銀行規模與股利政策的關係，並將銀行規模分為系統規模及絕對規模兩類，進一步分析規模不同對股利發放的影響。本文實證結果顯示：第一，規模較大的銀行傾向多發放股利。第二，該家銀行總資產占該國GDP比率較大的銀行，對股利發放有顯著且正面影響。第三，預期高成長的銀行會減少股利的發放。第四，第一級資本占總資產較高的銀行，會減少發放股利。第五，及時糾正措施愈高，股利發放較高。第六，銀行系統性規模會影響獲利能力對股利發放的影響，且大多呈現顯著正向關係，而傳統絕對規模不受大型銀行對獲利能力之影響股利支付率。研究結果顯示，當系統規模愈大，將減緩獲利能力對銀行股利支付率的負向效果，未來將發放較多的股利。總結本文研究結果，該家銀行總資產占GDP比重愈大的銀行，確實會對銀行股利政策有顯著正向影響，所以當我們使用系統性規模來衡量銀行規模大小時，比較能符合“大到不能倒”的政策效果。

The data of this paper is from Bankscope, ranging from 2006 to 2016. We use a global sample of 69 countries. The sample contains 13,409 observations and a total of 1,219 commercial banks. We study the impact of bank systemic size and dividend policy across countries. The bank size is divided into two types: systemic size and absolute size, and the impact of different size on the dividend payouts is further analyzed. Our main findings indicate the following points. First, larger banks appear to be more positive impact of dividend payout on bank. Second, bank’s assets to GDP ratio have a significant and positive effect of dividend payout on bank. The results of the study show that systemic size has positive impact of dividend payout on bank than absolute size. Our results therefore confirm that there is relative importance of the systemic size that support for policies that are “too-big-to-fail”.

第一章 緒論
第一節 研究動機及背景
第二節 研究目的
第三節 研究架構
第二章 文獻探討
第一節 銀行規模
第二節 股利政策
第三章 研究設計與方法
第一節 研究模型
第二節 變數定義
第四章 資料與基礎分析
第一節 資料來源
第二節 資料分析
第三節 相關係數
第五章 實證結果與分析
第一節 基本模型
第二節 考量銀行規模影響
第六章 結論與建議
第一節 研究結論
第二節 研究建議
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