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研究生:高婕倫
研究生(外文):Chieh-Lun Kao
論文名稱:家族企業與財務報導
論文名稱(外文):Family Firms and Financial Report
指導教授:曹壽民曹壽民引用關係
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中央大學
系所名稱:企業管理學系
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2016
畢業學年度:104
語文別:中文
論文頁數:53
中文關鍵詞:家族企業盈餘管理自願性揭露社會情感財富
外文關鍵詞:family firmsearnings managementvoluntary disclosuresocioemotional wealth
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:1
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  • 下載下載:6
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以往研究在分析家族企業之盈餘管理與自願性揭露主要都是以代理理論的觀點進行,而這次的研究則是利用社會情感財富(Socioemotional Wealth,簡稱SEW)做為分析的架構,去探討家族企業在SEW中家族認同感或家族控制力為優先考量時,在盈餘管理與自願性揭露上如何操作。研究結果顯示家族企業比起非家族企業較不會去操作盈餘管理,不論是實值盈餘管理亦或是應計項目盈餘管理皆是如此,此外也較不會召開法說會,因此推斷家族企業較注重家族認同感大於家族控制力。
Prior studies primarily used agency theory to explain the effect of family firms on earnings management and voluntary disclosure. However, this research use socioemotional wealth as theoretical framework to consider the implication of earnings management and voluntary disclosure on family firms’ dominant dimension of SEW , referring to Family control or Family identification. We find that compared to non-family firms, family firms are less likely to make earnings management whether REM or AEM. In addition, family firms also less often held the conference call. Overall, our finding suggest that family firms use family identification as the main reference more than family control.
摘要i
Abstract ii
目錄 iii
表目錄iv
第一章 緒論1
1-1 研究動機與目的 1
1-2 研究貢獻 3
第二章 文獻探討與假設建立5
2-1 家族企業與代理理論 5
2-2 家族企業與 SEW 理論7
2-3 家族企業之盈餘管理 10
2-4 家族企業之自願性揭露 12
2-5 假說發展 14
第三章 研究方法16
3-1 資料來源與樣本選擇 16
3-2 研究模型與研究方法 16
3-2-1REM 的衡量 16
3-2-2 AEM 的衡量 19
3-3 家族定義 19
3-4 研究設計 20
第四章 實證結果分析24
4-1 敘述性統計 24
4-2 相關係數 29
4-3 迴歸分析 31
第五章 結論與建議39
5-1 研究結論 39
5-2 研究限制與建議 40
參考資料41
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