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研究生:林華彬
研究生(外文):Lin Hua-bin
論文名稱:同盟內的談判行為研究:希、土關於塞普路斯衝突之談判,一九七四∼一九九三
論文名稱(外文):Negotiation Within Alliance: A Case Study of Negotiations Between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus Conflict, 1974-1993.
指導教授:劉必榮劉必榮引用關係
指導教授(外文):Liu Bih-rong
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:淡江大學
系所名稱:國際事務與戰略研究所
學門:社會及行為科學學門
學類:國際事務學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:1994
畢業學年度:82
語文別:中文
論文頁數:281
中文關鍵詞:同盟理論談判塞普路斯衝突調停
外文關鍵詞:alliance theorynegotiationCyprusconflictmediation
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本論文主要之研究目的,係從希、土在塞普路斯衝突之談判過程,探討在
同盟關係的結構下,國與國間的談判行為會有什麼不同﹖同盟關係對談判
結果有何影響﹖因此,本文採取個案研究法,對希臘和土耳其在塞普路斯
衝突的歷史事件進行資料整理,並以同盟理論及盟國談判特性的命題對個
案進行分析。而在個案談判行為分析方面,則以結構分析途徑及戰術研究
途徑作為本文最主要的研究架構。本論文之研究結構共分為六章︰第一章
︰導論。第二章︰盟國間談判的理論與實際。第三章︰希、土在塞普路斯
衝突的歷史發展。第四章︰希、土關於塞普路斯問題談判評析。第五章︰
美國對希、土衝突的調停。第六章︰結論。本論文之研究,包括以下幾點
結論︰一、同盟內發生衝突時,同為盟國之第三者積極介入調停,因為考
慮同盟關係的維持,必須表現出絕對公正的態度,而限制了調停戰術的運
用,使衝突更不易調停。二、不平等同盟內,權力不對稱的兩盟國在談判
時,會以同盟組織做為戰術運用的場所,而較不易達成協議。三、第三者
介入調停,如果不夠謹慎,便可能傷害與衝突雙方間的盟國關係,導致雙
方皆不理性,反而使衝突更凸顯。四、盟國間的關係,若不符合「正面感
情、高度承諾、互動範圍廣闊」的命題,則雙方談判時,國家本身的利益
考量將凌越同盟利益。
This disseration is attempted to discuss the difference of
negotiation behavior under alliance structure, by the study of
negotiation between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus conflict, and
to find out how the allied relationship will influence the
outcome of the negotiation. Case study method is used to get
the aims. In this study, the history of Greek-Turkish conflict
over Cyprus is sorted, and analyzed with alliance theory
and the characteristics of negotiation under allied
relationship. Besides," structure analysis " approach and "
tactics analysis " approach are also used to analyze it. The
structure of this disseration is composed of six chapters
as following: Chapter 1:Introduction. Chapter 2:The theory and
practice of the negotiation within allies. Chapter 3:The
history of Greek-Turkish conflict over Cyprus . Chapter
4:Analysis and comments on the negotiations between Greece and
Turkey over Cyprus conflict. Chapter 5:U.S. mediation between
Greek-Turkish conflict. Chapter 6:Conclusion. There are some
conclusions drawn from this disseration: 1.When a third party
within alliance intervenes in mediation actively, it will have
less room for maneuver tactics because it has to exhibit
absolute impartiality for maintaining the cohesion of alliance.
2.When two power asymmetrical allies enter into negotiation,
they will tend to view the alliance organization as an arena
for employing tactics, then it is difficult for them to reach
an agreement. 3.If the third party dose not mediate prudently,
the relation- ship between it and the two conflict allies will
be damaged, make both sides act unreasonably, and escalate the
conflict. 4.If the relationship between allied nations dose not
accord with the " positive affect, high commitment, and broad
inter- action scope " propositions, they will pursue more
interests of themselves than alliance collective interests in
negotiation.
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