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研究生:彭國財
研究生(外文):Peng, Guo-tsai
論文名稱:美國聯邦準備制度獨立性之研究
論文名稱(外文):A Study in the Independence of the Federal Reserve System
指導教授:柯大衛柯大衛引用關係
指導教授(外文):David Kleykamp
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:淡江大學
系所名稱:美國研究所
學門:社會及行為科學學門
學類:區域研究學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:1996
畢業學年度:84
語文別:中文
論文頁數:143
中文關鍵詞:獨立性聯邦準備制度中央銀行
外文關鍵詞:independencefederal reservecentral bank
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  • 被引用被引用:2
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一九一三年美國國會通過「聯邦準備法案」,翌年根據該法案建立聯
邦準備 制度,正式宣告美國中央銀行體制的誕生。在過去八十個年頭當
中,聯邦準備制 度為了適應內外環境的變遷,歷經許多重大變革,才有
今天的面貌。美國是今日 世界最大的經濟體,聯邦準備制度主導下的美
國貨幣政策,不但對美國經濟本身 的影響至深且鉅,也與全球景氣的榮
枯息息相關。由於這個因素,聯邦準備制的 種種,長期以來吸引不少專
家學者的研究。本文選擇聯邦準備制度的獨立性,作 為研究的主題。

美國中央銀行體制今天的獨立性,係經過歷史沿革而逐步獲得得升。早在
一 九一四年聯邦準備制度建立以前,便曾經在一七九一年和一八一六年
,分別出現 過「第一美國銀行」和「第二美國銀行」,兩者可稱作聯邦
準備制度的前身,由 於憲法授權的爭議,導致兩家早期的央行,皆只享
有短短廿年的生命。不過,因 為有此前車之鑑,使其後建立的聯邦準備
制度,能以前車為鑑,而建立更完備的 中央銀行體制。

本文從聯邦準備制度與行政部門和立法部門的關係中,去分析和研究美國
央 行的獨立性。行政部門基於政治因素的考量,而具有偏好寬鬆貨幣政
策的傾向, 這與聯邦準備制度視防範和打擊通貨膨脹為天職的想法,經
常會有出入,因而兩 者之間難免發生爭執。所以本文在介紹了美國央行
體制的歷史沿革,將行政部門 與聯邦準備制度的關係,列為討論的重點
。 聯邦準備制度擁有獨立性的
主要原因之一,係它享有獨立自主的財源,不必 仰賴國會撥款。不過,
聯邦準備制度畢竟是國會立法下的產物,必須接受國會的 監督。在民主
政治中,利益團體經常透過國會遊說向政府施壓,希望取得符合他 們願
望的政策。執掌貨幣政策的的聯邦準備制度,因而必須面對來自國會的壓
力 。本文將聯邦準備制度如何與國會週旋列為討論綱目。此外,聯邦準
備制度處於 行政與立法部門之間,可以在兩部門意見相左之時,尋求與
自己立場一致之一方 的支持,排除來自另外一方的壓力,這種聯邦準備
制度與國會和行政部門之間的 三角關係,構成本文另一個討論要項。



In 1913, the U.S. Congress passed the Federal Reserve
Act, according to which the Federal Reserve System was
established in the following year. Over the past eighty
plus years, the FRS has gone through a lot of changes and
evolved into its present form. The United States of America
is the largest economy in the world today. Being in charge of
the conduct of the monetary policy of America, the FRS not only
exercises much influence over the U.S. economy, but on that of
the whole globe as well. Because of this, the FRS has long
been one of the major subjects of academic research in and
out of America. This thesis is to make a study of the
independence of the FRS.

The FRS did not achieve its current independence in one day
but over time. As early as in 1791 and 1816, two quasi central
banks--the First Bank of America and the Second Bank of
America--were founded respectively. But both of these two
banks lasted no more than twenty years as their initial charters
expired on account of constitutional controversy about whether
Congres had the right to grant the charters.

In studyint the independence of the FRS, this thesis looked
at the relationships between the FRS and the executive and
legislative branches both individually and altogether. Too
often taking the political factors into consideration, the
Executive tended to prefer the adoption of an accommodative
monetary policy, which was usually opposed to the FRS regarding
preventing inflation as its fundamental responsibility. The
President and the members of his cabinet would frequently try
to interfere with the monetary policy for political reasons,
easily sparking conflicts between the Administration and the
FRS.

One main reason that the FRS enjoys more independence than
any other quasi independent agencies in the government is
dut to its independence of Congressional appropriation. The FRS
was, after all, an creature of Congress and came under
Congressional supervision. The FRS faced many kinds of pressure
from Congress, which was the result of lobby by certain interest
groups for their hopeful policy. In the meantime, when there
was a dispute over monetary policy between the Executive and
the Legislative, the FRS could sometimes take the advantage
by winning the support from one side sharing the same goal with
it against the pressure from the other side. The triangular
relationship among the FRS, the Administration and
Congress constituted another analytical focus of this thsis.


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