我國於民國77年放鬆進入航空業的管制，在國內線造成群雄爭戰的局面；在國際線，長榮集團挾其龐大的財力，所屬長榮航空於民國80年7月1日進入航空業，在短短數年間發展至與華航併立抗衡。
　　解除管制措施對我國國際民航空運事業有何影響？航空公司產生甚麼樣的競爭局面？航空公司相互間競爭如何採取班機座位策略？機位最多化與報價值間的關係如何？對旅客有無損益？本研究嘗試將對局理論應用於公共政策由下而上的執行評估，來解答這些問題。
　　本研究運用科納特（Cournot）模型，結果發現，航空公司採用「背離」策略並非最佳抉擇，航空公司機位策略的變移，和「機隊能量指標」及「航線優勢指揮」的達成有關。

　　China Airlines, the flag carrier of Republic of China before 1995, may have to evaluate its belief that "We treasure each encounter," when it encouners EVA Air, which roared into the sky to become its major competitor after the deregulation of commercial aviation industry had been put into practice in 1988.
　　What are their strategies to share this island market? What is the relation between maximized seats and payoff? How the benefits of passengers are affected by their discretion? Aiming at these questions, this research applies game theory to the seats they provide to carry out the bottom-up implementatin evaluation of deregulation.
　　The Cournot model enables this study to discover "defection" is not the best choice for both of them. Frequently, only can of "capacity" and "superiority."