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研究生:邱鼎
研究生(外文):Ting Chiu
論文名稱:工程契約資訊不對稱問題之研究-以監督機制為例
論文名稱(外文):A Study of Problems in Construction Contracts under Information Asymmetry-Example of Monitoring Mechanisms
指導教授:王明德王明德引用關係
指導教授(外文):Ming-Teh Wang
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:土木工程學研究所
學門:工程學門
學類:土木工程學類
論文種類:學術論文
畢業學年度:87
語文別:英文
中文關鍵詞:資訊不對稱工程契約監督賽局理論
外文關鍵詞:Information AsymmetryConstruction ContractMonitoringGame Theory
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North曾提出「制度乃是一個社會中的遊戲規則。更嚴謹地說,制度是人為制訂的限制,用以約束人類的互動行為。因此制度構成人類交換的動機。此處所為的交換包括了政治的、經濟的以及社會的行為。」在營建業中,規範營造廠與業主間行為的,主要是透過契約。業主與營造廠間簽訂契約,營造廠替業主施工,並取得工程款。而契約,則規範了營造廠與業主雙方的權利與義務。在理想狀態下,完美契約能針對日後可能發生的問題,預先予以規範。但與工程契約有關的爭議仍曾出不窮,在這之間,是不是有什麼問題產生?
工程契約爭議的起源,主要可以分成三個方面探討:營建組織、契約、資訊。營建專案的參與者眾多,因此營建組織複雜度高。且組織參與者原本大多是各自獨立的組織,為了專案臨時組成。此類組織型態在管理控制上,有極大的缺陷。營建組織的組成,主要是透過一連串的契約。業主聘僱營造廠,營造廠聘僱下包…,形成所謂的代理關係。雖然營造廠與業主的行為受到契約的約束,但在代理關係中,無可避免地存在目標衝突,尤其在業主監督能力差時,營造廠可能會有道德投機行為,而產生嚴重的問題。加上營建業資訊低標準化、低擴散性,在代理關係的架構下,營造廠有更大的誘因,利用資訊不對稱,以進行投機行為。總結來說,工程契約參與者的行為雖然有契約架構規範,但在資訊不對稱的情況下,投機行為可能會產生。
因此,本研究主要目的在瞭解在契約下,工程契約參與者的行為。並探討工程契約監督機制如何規範參與者的行為?在此機制下,契約參與者擁有何種資訊?若參與者擁有某特定資訊,則會做出什麼行為?本研究的範圍主要限定在工程營造階段,以工程契約為主。並選擇內政部營建署工程契約範本為契約主要分析對象。
Information asymmetry often arises from the contractual
principal-agent relationship. An owner (principal) delegates a contractor (agent) to perform a building task. While acting, the contractor learns the task-specific information, which is unobserved by the owner. Thus the information asymmetry comes into being. It usually generates many problems in construction contractual institutions, such as worker’s shirk, contractor’s jerry-building, construction cost overrun…etc. Monitoring can be the means for the owner to prevent the previous problems. The objective of this research is to analyze the monitoring mechanism specified in the construction contract ,and to identify the strategies of the contractual participants (i.e. owner and contractor) under information asymmetry. It can be helpful to give an explanation to the disputes in construction contracts.
The research focuses on the standard form of construction contract as a representative. The monitoring mechanisms are classified into two categories: simultaneous and ex-post monitoring mechanisms. The simultaneous monitoring mechanism is that the owner supervises while contractor constructs at the same time. On the contrary, the ex-post monitoring mechanism is that contractor sends a report after periodic works, and the owner audits the report. The two models are built up for the two monitoring mechanisms respectively. In each model, game theory is adopted to identify the participants’ strategies.
In the model of simultaneous monitoring, the probabilities of contractor’s shirking and owner’s monitoring are identified. In the model of ex-post monitoring, the equilibrium strategies of participants are identified binding with some conditions. The result of this research can help the project participants to predict the actions of others.
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW
1. INTRODUCTION
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Disputes in Contract
2.2 Game Theory
CHAPTER 2 THE TRANSACTION MECHANISM OF CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT
1. INTRODUCTION
2. ITEMS SPECIFIED IN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT
3. MECHANISM DESIGN IN ITEMS OF CONTRACT
4. THE GENERAL MECHANISMS IN CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS
CHAPTER 3 ANALYSIS OF SIMULTANEOUS MONITORING
1. INTRODUCTION
2. ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODEL
2.1 Assumptions of Decision Orders
2.2 Assumptions of Participants
3. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
4. REMARKS
CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS OF EX-POST MONITORING
1. INTRODUCTION
2. ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODEL
2.1 Assumptions of Decision Orders
2.2 Assumptions of the Participants
3. EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
3.1 Separating Equilibrium
3.2 Pooling Equilibrium
3.3.Semi-Separating Equilibrium
4. REMARKS
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION
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