一、中文部份
1.王志誠,民國八十四年,〝論股份有限公司之監察機關 - 兼評我國監察人制度之立法動向〞,證券管理,第十三卷第一期,頁1-20。2.王麗玉,民國八十一年,〝公司法上企業管理組織系統之制度缺失〞,輔仁法學,第十一期,頁255。
3.毛念劬,民國八十六年,〝家族企業內部控制之研究 - 以國內上市公司為例〞,東吳大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。4.中華徵信所,民國八十五年,〝台灣地區集團企業研究:民國八十五/八十六年版〞,中華徵信所企業股份有限公司出版。
5.沈大白與賴怡文,民國八十二年,〝文化差異與實證會計初探(一) 家族企業從事更多的盈餘管理嗎?〞第五屆會計理論與實務研討會。
6.吳明儀,民國八十六年,〝管理當局股權結構與盈餘管理相關性之研究〞,中興大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。7.周行一、陳錦村、陳坤宏,民國八十五年,〝家族持股、聯屬持股與公司價值之研究〞,中國財務學刊,第四卷第一期,頁115-139。8.林峰成,民國八十五年,〝台灣上市公司高階主管酬勞、公司績效與控制權型態之關聯性實證研究〞,中正大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。9.林育雅,民國八十三年,〝我國上市公司董事會特性與盈餘操縱現象之研究〞,台灣大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。10.侍台誠,民國八十三年,〝董事會特性中家族因素與經營績效之實證研究-兼論法人董事的影響〞,台灣大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。11.柯君衛,民國八十六年,〝台灣上市公司現金增資前盈餘操縱之研究〞,淡江大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。12.范揚松,民國七十六年,〝家族企業的病理分析〞,現代管理月刊,第一二六期,頁16-38。
13.許士軍與陳光中,民國七十八年,〝台灣家族企業發展與家族結構關係〞,行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計劃成果報告。
14.馬秀如,民國八十五年,〝非法事項、錯誤及舞弊〞,會計研究月刊,第一二九期,頁112-123。
15.陳文美,民國八十二年,〝家族企業的專業管理程度與專業化管理類型之研究-以紡織業為例〞,台灣大學商學研究所未出版碩士論文。16.陳坤宏,民國八十四年,〝家族企業、聯屬持股與經營績效之研究〞,中央大學財務管理研究所未出版碩士論文。17.陳明璋,民國七十三年,〝家族文化與企業管理〞,中國式管理研討會論文集。
18.孫秀蘭,民國八十五年,〝董事會制度與經營績效之研究〞,台灣大學財務金融學研究所未出版碩士論文。19.黃光國,民國七十三年,〝儒家倫理與企業組織型態〞,中國式管理研討會論文集。
20.黃湘綺,民國八十四年,〝家族企業與盈餘操縱現象的關聯性研究〞,中正大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。21.黃鈺光,民國八十二年,〝我國上市公司董事會特性與經營績效之研究〞,台灣大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。22.郭淑芬,民國八十五年,〝董監事特性與盈餘操縱現象及盈餘品質之關連性研究〞,中正大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。23.陳金鈴,民國八十六年,〝台灣上市公司股權結構之研究分析〞,成功大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。24.曾維茂,〝企業獨立董監事制防杜大股東濫權〞,經濟日報,民國八十七年十一月十五日頭版。
25.楊政泉,民國八十五年,〝影響我國企業會計政策選擇因素之探討〞,成功大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。26.葉銀華,民國八十二年,〝國內上市公司代理問題之理論與實證研究〞,台灣大學商學研究所未出版博士論文。27.葉銀華,民國八十七年,〝家族控股、董事會組成與經營績效一臺灣家族企業管治機制之研究〞,行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計劃成果報告。
28.葉麗如,民國八十六年,〝公股股權管理之績效分析〞,中山大學財務管理學研究所未出版碩士論文。29.蔡玉真,民國八十八年,〝 暫停交易股選股策略 〞,財訊,四月號,頁232-236。
30.劉連煜譯,民國八十三年,美國模範商業公司法,五南圖書出版公司,頁55。
31.戴淵明,民國七十五年,〝台灣控制型態與其經營績效關係之研究 — 台灣地區上市公司之實證分析〞,中興大學企業管理研究所碩士論文。32.魏早啟,民國八十六年,〝上市公司董監事特性與經營績效之研究〞,東吳大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。33.蘇裕惠,民國八十八年,〝歐美及東亞各國審計委員會制度之分析探討〞,會計研究月刊,第一六三期,頁155-161。34.顧聲虹,民國八十八年,〝大亨掏空一千億追追追〞,財訊, 四月號,頁227-231。
二、英文部份
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