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研究生:劉若韶
研究生(外文):Edward Yeuk Siu LAU
論文名稱:普蘭廷格的自由意志辯護、自由逆實條條件句與中間知識
論文名稱(外文):Alvin Plantinga''s Free Will Defence, Counterfactuals of Freedom and Middle Knowledge
指導教授:關永中關永中引用關係
指導教授(外文):Carlo Wing-chung KWAN
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:哲學研究所
學門:人文學門
學類:哲學學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2000
畢業學年度:88
語文別:中文
論文頁數:139
中文關鍵詞:自由意志辯護自由逆實條件句中間知識惡的問題
外文關鍵詞:Free Will DefenceCounterfactuals of FreedomMiddle KnowledgeProblem of Evil
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  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:2
普蘭廷格的自由意志辯護在當代神義學的討論中佔有重要的地位,許多學者都同意普蘭廷格的自由意志辯護是至今為止對惡的邏輯問題最有力的反駁。普蘭廷格的自由意志辯護嘗試描述一種可能情況,在這種情況下,上帝具有全能、全知和全善等屬性與世界上有惡存在皆是事實。既然「上帝是全能、全知與全善的」和「世界上有惡存在」這兩個命題在某種情況下可能同時為真,就可以證明這兩個命題不是互相矛盾的,有神論信念並不是非理性的。普蘭廷格指出,上帝的能力或許受限於某些描述受造物如何抉擇的自由逆實條件句,以致雖然祂是全知和全能的,卻不能實現一個包含道德善但不包含道德惡的可能世界。
普蘭廷格相信自由逆實條件句是存在的,而且相信這些條件句是有真假值的述句,他也相信上帝擁有這些自由逆實條件句的知識。基於這個原因,普蘭廷格被稱為莫林納主義者。莫林納是十六世紀的耶穌會思想家,他把上帝關於自由逆實條件句的知識稱為中間知識。本論文分析莫林納的中間知識理論,指出普蘭廷格被稱為莫林納主義者,只是因為他相信有些自由逆實條件句是真的,而且上帝擁有這些條件句的知識,但是對於莫林納派關於天佑、神聖支助等問題的看法並無明顯立場。
雖然普蘭廷格被稱為莫林納主義者,他卻嘗試不把自由意志辯護建立在自由逆實條件句和中間知識的預設上。但是我們透過分析,指出普蘭廷格的自由意志辯護雖然不必預設某些自由逆實條件句為真,但是仍然預設逆實條件句可能是真的,也涵蘊上帝可能擁有中間知識。因此,如果自由逆實條件句不可能為真,或者上帝不可能擁有中間知識,那麼普蘭廷格的自由意志辯護便不能成立。本論文就反對自由逆實條件句和中間知識的論證加以討論,指出反莫林納主義者未能證明自由逆實條件句和中間知識不可能,因此普蘭廷格的自由意志辯護可以化解惡的邏輯問題。但是,我們也指出有神論者不能自限在純粹的辯護層次,需要進一步把自由意志辯護發展為一套神義論。如此一來,他們就需要就自由逆實條件句與中間知識提出一套可信的說明。莫林納主義者充其量只能證明自由逆實條件句和中間知識的可能性,卻未能對其可信性提出證成。因此,自由意志神義論仍待進一步發展,或者為自由逆實條件句提出說明,或者提出非莫林納主義的新理論。
Alvin Plantinga’s free will defence has been widely recognized as a powerful response to the logical problem of evil. Though responsible for the reinvention of the concept of middle knowledge and thus declared a Molinist, Plantinga does not think that his free will defence rests on the presuppositions of true counterfactuals of freedom and middle knowledge. I argue that Plantinga’s argument does presuppose possible truth of counterfactuals of freedom. In that case, Plantinga and his fellow free will defenders have to respond to the objections of anti-Molinists on true counterfactuals of freedom and middle knowledge. I examine several arguments proposed by anti-Molinists and argue that these arguments can be refuted. However, I suggest that free will defence needs to be developed into a theodicy, and that for the plausibility of the latter coherent accounts of true counterfactuals of freedom and of middle knowledge are required. Such accounts are still to be put forward by Molinists or free will theodicists.
封面
序言
第一章 惡的問題
第一節 惡的問題之不同形式
第二節 惡的邏輯問題
第三節 基本語詞
第四節 自由意志辯護
第二章 普蘭廷格的自由意志辯護
第一節 消極辯護
第二節 積極辯護的基本結構
第三節 對相容論者詰難的反駁
第四節 可能位格與不確定性質
第五節 萊布尼茲的失誤
第六節 對萊布尼茲常誤的批判(一)
第七節 對萊布尼茲常誤的批判(二)
第八節 對萊布尼茲常誤的批判(三)
第九節 跨世界墮落
第三章 中間知識與莫林納主義
第一節 天佑理論與預知問題
第二節 未來適然事態
第三節 多瑪斯的波埃修斯式解決方案
第四節 對上帝知識的分類
第五節 中間知識理論
第六節 超瞭解理論
第七節 莫林納主義
第四章 對中間知識和自由逆實條件句的討論
第一節 自由逆實條件句的實例
第二節 反對自由逆實條件句的觀點
第三節 從「或許會」條件句否定自由逆實條件句
第四節 「基礎」詰難
第五節 「循環」詰難
第六節 「相容性」詰難(一)-赫斯克的論證
第七節 「相容性」詰難(二)-亞當斯的論證
結論
其他
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