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研究生:
研究生(外文):WANG CHIEH
論文名稱:多瑪斯自然法學之當代意義--菲尼斯的評估與演繹
論文名稱(外文):The Modern Significance of Aquinas' Theory of Natural Law-Finnis' Evaluation and Explanation
指導教授:關永中關永中引用關係
指導教授(外文):KWAN WING CHUNG ,CARLO
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:哲學研究所
學門:人文學門
學類:哲學學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2000
畢業學年度:88
語文別:中文
中文關鍵詞:多瑪斯菲尼斯自然法「實然」\「應然」的區分實踐理性第一原理自明命題基本善不可共量性
外文關鍵詞:Thomas AquinasFinnisnatural lawis-ought distinctionthe first principles of practical reasonself-evident propositionbasic goodsincommensurability
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英國當代法律哲學家菲尼斯以多瑪斯法律理論為基礎,提出了一套堪稱當代最具代表性的自然法法律哲學體系,本文探討菲尼斯關於自然法倫理學之看法。菲尼斯以多瑪斯《神學大全》Q.94, a.2.中對自然法內涵的說明為基礎,加以增補解釋後,提出了七種基本善作為自然法第一原理的內容;他認為,基本善間沒有價值等級之分,具有不可共量性,必須參酌個人所處之主、客觀條件並依照九項實踐合理性之基本要求加以選取。另一方面,菲尼斯接受當代後設倫理學與分析法學界普為採納的實然\應然區分之命題,因此認為自然法第一原理,不能由任何形上學、本體論或人性論等實然命題為前提推論而來,並主張多瑪斯亦持此看法(但菲尼斯未否認此等實然命題與自然法第一原理之內容相符應)。菲尼斯並提到,自然法雖不由實然命題演繹出,但自然法具有客觀性與普遍性是不容置疑的,他以實踐理性對自然法第一原理作為自明命題的認知加以說明。
筆者認為:(1)菲尼斯基本善在內容方面與多瑪斯本性善有近似處,但多瑪斯主張本性善間有價值等級之分,並以幸福為人生至高之實質目的,多瑪斯不是如菲尼斯所聲稱的,支持基本善具有不可共量性之說。(2)菲尼斯雖然成功地批判效益主義之盲點,但他無法明確說明在排除了效益主義、幸福論與謝勒式之價值等級說之思考方式後,人如何運用九項實踐合理性之基本要求於實踐生活中下判斷。(3)菲尼斯只願由實踐理性對自然法第一原理具有自明認知以肯定自然法之存在及其客觀性,這樣的解釋,不能完全令人滿意:一方面是對此種非推論式認知之確定性的保留;另一方面,我們會進一步追問,為何實踐理性對人生基本善之認知恰好符應於人性論及心理學等思辨知識之內容?菲尼斯忽略了多瑪斯思辨理性與人性論進路,因此未能替上述之符應提供適當的證成與說明。(4)多瑪斯目的傾向式的人性論使其能因此推論出自然法及基本價值,其人性論中已蘊含價值及應然色彩,此點是菲尼斯所忽略的。但多瑪斯所要面對之問題是其關於人性論之說明能否成立。
關鍵字:多瑪斯,菲尼斯,自然法,「實然」\「應然」的區分,實踐理性第一原理,自明命題,基本善,不可共量性。

Among the modern English legal philosophers, the most prominent advocate of natural law theory is arguably John Finnis ,who was self-consciously writing in the tradition of Aquinas’ legal theory. This thesis discusses his “natural law ethics”. Finnis uses Aquinas’ Summa Theologica as basis to develop and claim a number of “first principles of natural law”, which include seven distinct but equally valuable basic goods. For Finnis, there is no hierarchy among these basic goods. To the contrary, they are incommensurable and shall be chosen according to nine “basic requirements of practical reasonableness”. The process of selection is also subject to one’s subjective and objective conditions. In addition, Finnis adopts the “is-ought distinction”, which has been maintained by modern meta-ethics and analytical school of law. He considers that the first principles of natural law cannot be inferred from any “is”-proposition such as metaphysics, ontology, or anthropology. He also insists that this viewpoint is in accordance with Aquinas’ natural law theory. On the other hand, Finnis does not deny the agreement between this type of “is”-propositions and the first principles of nature law. He suggests that although natural law cannot be inferred from “is”-propositions, it is unquestionable that natural law possesses objectiveness and certainty. Finnis maintains that the first principles of natural law are self-evident propositions and can be understood via practical reason.
The author argues:
1. In general, Finnis’ “basic goods” are similar to Aquinas’ “bonum honestum”, but there are still some differences. Aquinas claims the hierarchy of bonum honestum and views happiness as the ultimate substantial end of human life. Finnis, however, insists the incommensurability and equality of basic goods.
2. Finnis succeeds in pointing out the weaknesses of utilitarianism. Yet he fails to explain how people can make judgements according to nine “basic requirements of practical reasonableness” without utilitarianism, eudaemonism, or Scheler’s “hierarchy of value”.
3. Based on the argument of practical reason’s underived understanding of first principles of natural law, Finnis concludes the existence of natural law and its objectiveness. Besides being doubtful about such non-inferential understanding, the validity of this argument would be weakened by the following questions: Why does practical reason’s recognition of basic goods correspond to the complexities of human nature? How is this possible? What Finnis fails to do is to provide a justification for the connection between the human goods and the human person.
4. Finnis ignores that Aquinas’ theory of human nature implies “ought” and evaluative meaning. It was Aquinas’ teleological disposition theory of human nature which enabled him to establish his theory of natural law and basic values. Yet Aquinas has to face the challenge against his explanation regarding the ontological analysis of human person.
Key Word: Thomas Aquinas, Finnis, natural law, is-ought distinction, the first principles of practical reason, self-evident proposition, basic goods, incommensurability.

目 錄
中文摘要 i
英文摘要 iii
目錄 v
本文使用之著作略語表 ix
引言 1
第一章 導論7
第一節 二十世紀對多瑪斯自然法學的重新關注7
第二節 自然法的含意及多瑪斯、菲尼斯對自然法的界定12
 一、「自然法」的含意12
 二、多瑪斯、菲尼斯對自然法的界定15
第三節 研究對象介紹19
 一、菲尼斯新自然法學與多瑪斯自然法學的關係19
 二、菲尼斯及新自然法學背景簡介21
 三、菲尼斯本人及其理論重要性介紹24
第四節 問題意識、研究材料、論文架構28
第二章 實然/應然的區分與自然法的客觀性33
第一節 自然法的第一原理與人類基本善35
 一、「Bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum」35
 二、自然法的等級36
第二節 實然/應然區分的提出及對自然法理論的衝擊45
 一、“休姆分叉”45
 二、非認知主義與分析實證法學47
第三節 菲尼斯對形上學式倫理化約論的批判59
 一、菲尼斯對實然/應然區分的接受61
 二、菲尼斯論一般學者對多瑪斯的詮釋62
第四節 菲尼斯論人對自然法第一原理的認知及其客觀性65
 一、思辨理性及實踐理性之區分66
 二、對自然法第一原理的認知70
第五節 本體論、人性論、思辨知識與自然法81
 一、自然法自然傾向與人性的符應關係81
 二、思辨知識對實踐思考的助益83
第六節 本章小結87
第三章 基本價值與實踐合理性的基本要求89
第一節 基本價值的種類89
 一、概念澄清89
 二、多瑪斯自然法第一原理的內容90
 三、菲尼斯論人生的七種基本價值92
第二節 基本價值的不可共量性及主觀選取之必要102
 一、善的其他概念或種類102
 二、基本價值的不可共量性110
 三、承諾、計劃與行動113
第三節 實踐合理性的基本要求115
 一、一貫的生活計劃116
 二、對各種價值不專橫地偏愛117
 三、對人不專橫地偏愛119
 四、超脫120
 五、承諾121
 六、有效性之考量124
 七、在每一行為中尊重每一基本價值129
 八、共同善的要求131
 九、跟隨良心132
第四節 本章小結134
第四章 對菲尼斯自然法倫理學的批判137
第一節 實然命題與應然規範的連繫─多瑪斯的人性論與自然法論138
第二節 自然法第一原理在認知上是否以思辨知識為必要前提?158
第三節 幸福、善與自然法-多瑪斯自然法中之善有無價值等級?161
第五章 結論165
主要外文參考書目/期刊論文171
中文參考書目/期刊論文173
其他外文參考書目/期刊論文175

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Waluchow, W.:
Inclusive Positivism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.
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