臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本篇論文探討康德範疇超驗推證的第一項前提──統覺原則。康德在第一版純粹理性批判（1781年）中，主張統覺原則先驗綜合命題（A117n）；然而，卻在第二版純粹理性批判（1787年）中，主張其為分析命題（B135；138）。本篇論文將探討基於對統覺原則的不同解釋而支持分析命題或綜合命題的論證，並評估何者較能恰當地擔任範疇超驗推證的第一項前提。
本篇論文的討論焦點乃集中在愛立森、亨利希與蓋爾所提供的論證。前兩位學者支持統覺原則為分析命題，而最後一位學者則支持統覺原則為綜合命題。愛立森提出，統覺原則的分析性乃基於認知主體其本質為「單一邏輯主體」，然而，亨利希卻認為由於統覺原則本身具有「笛卡兒式確定性」因此為分析命題。蓋爾批評前兩位學者並指出，如果以「分析的自我意識」作為第一項前提，則恐怕無法完成範疇超驗推證。他因而建議應以「經驗綜合的自我意識」作為範疇超驗推證的第一項前提。
作者嘗試指出上述論證的困境。一方面，支持統覺原則為分析命題的學者仍然不能就「如何可能從分析的前提（即作為分析命題的統覺原則）推導出先驗綜合的結論（即範疇具有客觀有效性）」這個問題提供令人滿意的回答；而另一方面，支持統覺原則為綜合命題的學者亦將導致更多的難題。其中包括，第一，康德的超驗統覺這個概念並不包含時間成分，也因此不能被理解為「經驗綜合的自我意識」。第二，蓋爾為「經驗的自我意識」所提供的論證，恐怕混淆了康德的「分析方法」與「綜合方法」。

This thesis studies Kant’s Principle of Apperception, the first premise of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories. In the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant holds that the Principle of Apperception is an a priori synthetic proposition (KrV, A117n), whereas in the second edition he holds it to be analytic (KrV, B131-132). Now this thesis discusses and evaluates arguments for these opposing interpretations of the Principle of Apperception with a view to determining which of them would yield a principle more suitable for playing the role as the first premise of the Transcendental Deduction.
The thesis focuses on the arguments provided by Henry Allison, Dieter Henrich, and Paul Guyer. The former two scholars construe the Principle of Apperception as an analytic proposition, whereas the last construes it as synthetic. Allison asserts that the analyticity of the principle is based on the nature of the subject of cognition as a logically simple subject. However, Henrich considers the principle analytic because of its Cartesian certainty. Guyer criticizes the above two scholars and points out that the Transcendental Deduction would not succeed if it starts from an analytic claim to self-consciousness. He then suggests an empirical-synthetic claim to self-consciousness as the first premise of the Transcendental Deduction.
The author would explore the following difficulties facing the two interpretations. On the one hand, interpreting the Principle of Apperception as analytic still cannot enable us to provide a satisfying answer to the question how it is possible to derive the synthetic conclusion (i.e., that the categories have objective validity) from an analytic premise. On the other hand, interpreting the principle as synthetic would lead to more problems. First, Kant’s transcendental apperception does not contain temporary elements so that it could never be expressed by an empirical-synthetic claim to self-consciousness. Second, the argument that Guyer provides for such a claim to empirical self-consciousness may have confused Kant’s analytic method with his synthetic method.

第一章 提出問題 1
第一節 兩版範疇超驗推證的不一致 2
第二節 這個問題為什麼重要？如何進行思索？ 3
第三節 論證重構的研究方法 7
第二章 何謂統覺原則？ 9
第一節 區分經驗統覺與超驗統覺 9
第二節 超驗統覺 13
第三節 何謂統覺原則？ 18
第三章 論證統覺原則是分析命題 27
第一節 愛立森論證統覺原則是分析命題 29
第二節 亨利希論證統覺原則是分析命題 46
第三節 檢討與批評 55
第四章 論證統覺原則應為綜合命題 63
第一節 關於範疇超驗推證的主流詮釋及其問題 65
第二節 蓋爾論證統覺原則不應為先驗命題──
我們沒有理由去接受「吾人擁有關於自
我持續同一的先驗知識」這項命題 67
第三節 蓋爾提出從「吾人對於自我持續同一擁
有經驗知識」出發的範疇超驗超驗推證 87
第四節 檢討與批評 91
第五章 回應、評估與結論 101
第一節 回應各批評 102
第二節 評估與結論 118
附錄 125
論證結構圖示 127
名詞對照 131
參考文獻 133

一、 康德著作
Kant, Immanuel,
Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
1. Auflage, 1781, in: KGS, Bd. IV;
2 .Auflage, 1787, in: KGS, Bd. III.
Prolegomena zu einer künfitigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können, 1783, in KGS, Bd. IV.
Antropologie in pragmatischer Absicht, 1798, in: KGS, Bd. VIII.
Logik. Ein Handbuch zu Vorlesungen, 1800, in: KGS, Bd. IX.
二、 其他參考文獻：專文、專書或期刊
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