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研究生:蘇潤馨
研究生(外文):Soo June Hsing
論文名稱:併購活動之競標設計對目標公司股東利益的影響
論文名稱(外文):Will Takeover Auction Design Affect the Target Firm Owner's Profit?
指導教授:陳其美陳其美引用關係曾郁仁曾郁仁引用關係
指導教授(外文):Chyi-Mei ChenLarry Y. Tzeng
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:財務金融學研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2000
畢業學年度:88
語文別:英文
論文頁數:35
中文關鍵詞:併購活動競標設計
外文關鍵詞:mergetake-overauction design
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  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
併購活動的競標設計是否會影響目標公司的股東利益呢? 在這篇論文中,我嘗試建構一個理論模型來探討這個問題;並分析在競標活動結束後,目標公司股東是否應該公佈競標者之標金。
整篇論文將分成「完全訊息」與「不完全訊息」兩方面進行討論。在完全訊息的情況下,由於競標者雙方均能正確地預期併購活動所帶來的利潤,他們將在互相競爭的情況下,以相同的價格競標。而在這個狀況裡,標金是否在競標完成後公開,將不會對併購活動與目標公司股東利益造成任何的影響。另外,在不完全資訊的情形下,由於競標者對於目標公司的真實狀態並不完全明瞭。在其雙方高度的互動關係影響下,目標公司股東應在(1)競標者對目標公司預期偏向較佳狀況,且(2)競標公司可得情報正確度較高的兩個條件下,將標金於競標結束後公開,以提高競標者競標的意願,進而增進自己的利益。
此外,本文也指出:存在於競標者與目標公司間的資訊不對稱問題和競標公司間密切的競爭狀況,將是造成併購報酬為負之可能因素。

This thesis examines a specific example of a takeover contest between two competing bidders and derives the conditions under which the target firm owner should announce the bids after the auction. The bid announcement is irrelevant when information is complete, but with asymmetric information, it improves the target firm owner's profit when the probability that the target firm is in good state is sufficiently high and the signals bidders receive before the auction are precise enough.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chinese Abstract ……………………………………………... Ⅴ
English Abstract ……………………………………………… Ⅵ
Table of Contents …………………………………………….. Ⅶ
Section 1 Introduction …………………………………….. 1
Section 2 Literature Review ……………………………… 6
Section 3 Complete Information Model …………………. 10
Section 4 Incomplete Information Model ………………... 15
Section 5 Discussions ……………………………………... 24
Section 6 Conclusion …………………………………….. 27
References ……………………………………………………. 28

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