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研究生:邱錦妮
研究生(外文):Chin Ni Chiu
論文名稱:高階主管風險承擔在獎酬制度、融資政策與公司績效間之關係所扮演之角色
指導教授:李怡宗李怡宗引用關係
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中正大學
系所名稱:會計學研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2001
畢業學年度:89
語文別:中文
論文頁數:85
中文關鍵詞:高階主管風險承擔融資政策權益基礎獎酬制度公司績效
外文關鍵詞:Executive''s Risk TakingFinancing PolicyStock-Based CompensationCorporate Performance
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過去的二十年間,在美國,公司運用股票選擇權作為高階主管激勵制度之比例,已躍升為最重要的一環。因為對高階主管而言,股票選擇權所創造的高報酬比現金年薪更吸引人!就財務會計理論的角度觀之,股票選擇權的價值佔高階主管的總報酬之比例愈高,就愈能緩和經理人與股東間的代理問題,亦即高階主管個人的財富與公司股東利益結合的程度愈高,愈能趨使高階主管做出對公司有利的決策。因此本研究主要在探討高階主管風險承擔在權益基礎獎酬制度、融資政策與公司績效間之關係所扮演之角色。本研究係以美國S & P之ExecuComp 資料庫之高階主管獎酬資料及美國S & P之Compustat資料庫之財務資料進行分析,樣本期間為1993年至1999年,研究對象為名列美國ExecuComp 資料庫之高階主管。
本研究結果彙總說明如下:
一、經理人持有普通股或股票選擇權時,則其財富與公司股價表現就存在相依關係,而且,隨著股票選擇權佔權益基礎獎酬之比率愈高,運用股票選擇權可誘使高階主管偏好標的證券的高波動性,而在其個人財富增值之誘因下,將有助於提升高階主管風險之承擔。
二、高階主管風險承擔愈高,愈有動機運用舉債的方式從增加公司風險以求個人股票選擇權的增值,以遂其自利的動機。
三、高階主管風險承擔有助於提升公司會計面績效之結論,惟對於公司市場面績效,在運用最小平方法分析之結果,較傾向於負相關。但是,Wiseman & Gomez-Mejia (1998)從行為代理模式( Behavioral Agency Model, BAM)的角度,認為經理人會根據其對公司績效的預期而有不同的風險承擔誘因。因此,進一步考慮兩者可能存在相互影響的關係,由聯立方程式法分析的結果,則較支持兩者之間具有正向關係。
四、權益基礎獎酬制度、高階主管風險承擔、融資政策及公司績效兩兩之間存在者相互影響的關係。亦即,權益基礎獎酬制度與高階主管風險承擔存有正向關係;融資政策與高階主管風險承擔存有正向關係;高階主管風險承擔與會計面公司績效存有正向關係,與市場面績效亦具有關聯性,惟方向未定;權益基礎獎酬制度與融資政策存有正向關係;權益基礎獎酬制度與公司績效存有正向關係;而融資政策對公司績效具有負向關係,公司績效對融資政策具有正向關係。
目 錄
第一章緒論 ……………………………………… 1
第一節 研究動機 ……………………………… 1
第二節 研究目的與貢獻 ……………………… 4
第三節 論文架構 ……………………………… 6
第二章理論基礎與相關文獻 …………………… 7
第一節 代理理論 ……………………………… 7
第二節 高階主管獎酬的決定因素 …………… 9
第三節 高階主管選擇權的管理誘因 ………… 21
第四節 公司融資政策之決定因素 …………… 26
第五節 高階主管風險承擔與融資政策 ……… 31
第三章研究設計 ...…………………………… 34
第一節 研究假說 ……………………………… 34
第二節 變數定義與實證模型 ………………… 38
第三節 樣本篩選與資料來源 ………………… 46
第四節 研究方法 ……………………………… 47
第四章實證研究結果 …………………………… 54
第一節 基本統計分析 ………………………… 54
第二節 多元迴師分析 ………………………… 58
第五章結論與建議 ……………………………… 74
第一節 研究結論 ……………………………… 74
第二節 研究限制與後續研究建議 …………… 75
參考文獻 …………………………………………… 77
圖目錄
圖2-1-1 高階主管獎酬之一般架構 ............. 21
圖2-2-1 代理行為模式下之管理者風險承擔 ..... 25
圖2-3-1 投資不足之無謂損失...................28
圖3-1-1 觀念性架構 ..........................37
表目錄
表3-2-1 彙整分析因素之可能代理變數................ 44
表3-3-1 研究樣本數 ............................... 47
表4-1-1 變數敘述統計量--綜合資料(pooled data) 樣本數:2953............................................55
表4-1-2 皮爾森相關分析--綜合資料(pooled data) 樣本數:2953............................................57
表4-2-1 高階主管風承擔對於公司績效之關係(績效以資產報酬率表示)............................................62
表4-2-2 高階主管風險承擔對於公司績效之關係(以綜合資料進行分析)............................................62
表4-2-3 高階主管風險承擔對於公司績效之關係(績效以股票報酬率表示,並納入公司規模作為控制變數) .....................62
表4-2-4 最小平方法分析結果-權益基礎獎酬方程式........67
表4-2-5 最小平方法分析結果-高階主管風險承擔方程式....68
表4-2-6 最小平方法分析結果-負債水準程式..............69
表4-2-7 最小平方法分析結果-公司績效方程式............69
表4-2-8 二階段最小平方法分析結果-權益基礎獎酬方程式..70
表4-2-9 二階段最小平方法分析結果-高階主管風險承擔方程式............................................70
表4-2-10二階段最小平方法分析結果-負債水準程式........71
表4-2-11 二階段最小平法分析結果-公司績效方程式.......71
表4-2-12 三階段最小平方法分析結果-權益基礎獎酬方程式.72
表4-2-13 三階段最小平方法分析結果-高階主管風險承擔方程式.............................................72
表4-2-14 三階段最小平方法分析結果-負債水準程式.......73
表4-2-15 三階段最小平方法分析結果-公司績效方程式.....73
中文文獻
石孟國,民國80年6月,主要影響資本結構的因素─台灣地區股票上市公 司的研究,國立交通大學管理科學研究所未出版碩士論文。
李佳珍,公司融資決策、投資決策與公司成長之研究,國立中正大學財務金融研究所未出版碩士論文,民國86年6月。
李芳倖,民國87年6月,會計方法選擇與負債比率及高階主管報酬之關連性研究,國立成功大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
邱淑芳,民國81年6月,以代理成本觀念探討資本結構決定因素,國立交通大學管理科學研究所未出版碩士論文。
林峰成,民國85年6月,台灣上市公司高階主管酬勞、公司績效與控制權型態之關連性實証研究,國立中正大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
郎咸平,劉玉珍,民國83年6月,財務管理,雙葉書廊有限公司。
陳慧娟,民國84年6月,我國上市公司資本結構、成長與Tobin’s Q關連之研究,私立東吳大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
陳麗文,民國83年6月,公司成長,融資政策與公司價值之相關性研究-以臺灣地區上市製造業為例,私立大葉工學院事業經營研究所未出版碩士論文。
晁群祥,民國82年6月,台灣上市公司成長機會對融資及股利政策影響之研究,國立中山大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
曾玉潔,民國89年6月,我國高階主管薪酬決定因素之實証研究,國立中正大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。
楊燿禎,民國89年6月,管理者持股、風險與財務決策關聯性之研究,國立東華大學企業管理學研究所未出版碩士論文。
鄭為庠,民國81年6月,高階主管薪酬計畫與薪酬決定因素之研究,國立政治大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
謝明翰,民國89年6月,企業成長機會與融資政策、股利政策及高階主管酬勞酬之關聯性研究,國立台灣大學會計學研究所碩士論文。
蕭弘毅,民國83年6月,高階管理薪酬計畫與企業營運績效關係之研究, 私立東吳大學商學院管理學研究所未出版碩士論文。
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