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研究生:歐怡岑
研究生(外文):I-Tsen Ou
論文名稱:高階主管獎酬、公司投資與公司價值關係之研究─以臺灣上市公司為例
指導教授:張清福張清福引用關係李怡宗李怡宗引用關係
指導教授(外文):Ching-Fu ChangYi-Tsung Lee
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中正大學
系所名稱:會計學研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2001
畢業學年度:89
語文別:中文
論文頁數:118
中文關鍵詞:高階主管獎酬公司投資公司價值內生性
外文關鍵詞:CEO CompensationInvestmentCorporate ValueEndogeneity
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過去文獻對高階主管獎酬、公司投資與公司價值三者間關係的探討,都採用一般多元迴歸模型,利用「一般最小平方法」(OLS)的估計方式,探討三者間兩兩之關係,亦即探討高階主管獎酬與公司投資、公司投資與公司價值、或公司價值與高階主管獎酬間各別存在的關聯性。依據過去利用迴歸分析所作的研究,高階主管獎酬、公司投資與公司價值三者間似乎尚隱含著同時交互影響的關係,亦即存在三者具有互為「內生性」(endogeneity)的可能。模型若忽略了某些變數間存在的「內生性」,而僅以一般多元迴歸模型來考量變數間的關係,將可能產生「定式化問題」(specification error)。
本研究先以一般多元迴歸模型,利用最小平方法探討影響高階主管獎酬、公司投資與公司價值三者兩兩間的關係外,進一步採用「聯立方程式迴歸分析模型」,以「三階段最小平方法」(3SLS)建構一更完整的模型,探討高階主管獎酬、公司投資與公司價值三者間同時存在的內生性關係。
本研究以民國88年臺灣上市公司為研究對象,將高階主管獎酬區分為總經理獎酬、董事長獎酬及公司高階主管平均獎酬三類;同時依投資活動型態與效益期間,將公司投資區分為資本支出、研究發展費用與廣告費,以深入探討不同高階主管、不同投資型態與公司價值間的關係。
實證結果發現,使用OLS估計方法的一般多元迴歸模型時,總經理獎酬與資本支出、研發費用間存在互為內生的正向關係;資本支出與公司價值間,存在互為內生的負向關係;不論公司投資採用何種型態,高階主管獎酬與公司價值間,皆存在互為內生的正向關係。此外,當進一步使用「三階段最小平方法」(3SLS) 的聯立方程式迴歸模型時發現,以「資本支出」或「廣告費」作為公司投資的代理變數時,高階主管獎酬、公司投資與公司價值間存在互為內生的關係;但以「研發費用」作為公司投資的代理變數時,高階主管獎酬與研發費用間並不存在互為內生的關係。整體而言,使用三階段最小平方法(3SLS) 的聯立方程式迴歸分析,除可發現高階主管獎酬、公司投資與公司價值間的單向的內生關係外,尚可發現較少受到注意的互為內生的關係,而避免使用一般多元迴歸模型時,所得到的偏誤結論。
第壹章 緒論………………………………………………1
  第一節 研究動機……………………………………………1
  第二節 研究目的……………………………………………4
  第三節 研究貢獻……………………………………………6
  第四節 論文架構與流程……………………………………8
第貳章 文獻探討……………………………………………10
第一節 代理問題……………………………………………10
第二節 解決代理問題的機制─高階主管獎酬及其與公司投資、 公司價值之關係……………………………15
第三節 高階主管獎酬與公司投資之關係…………………17
第四節 公司投資與公司價值之關係………………………25
第五節 公司價值與高階主管獎酬之關係…………………29
第六節 高階主管獎酬、公司投資與公司價值之內生關係33
第參章 研究設計………………………………………… 35
第一節 理論架構……………………………………35
第二節 研究假說…………………………………………36
第三節 研究變數定義與衡量………………………………41
第四節 研究方法與實證模型………………………………49
第五節 研究樣本選取與資料來源…………………………52
第肆章 實證結果分析………………………………………54
第一節 敘述性統計分析…………………………………54
第二節 OLS之實證結果分析………………………………64
第三節 三階段最小平方法之實證結果分析………………88
第伍章 結論與限制……………………………………….108
第一節 研究結論……………………………………………108
第二節 研究限制……………………………………………110
第三節 研究建議……………………………………………111
參考文獻…………………………………………………………113
一、中文部分………………………………………………113
二、英文部分………………………………………………114
一、中文部份
李芳倖,民國87年6月,會計方法選擇與負債比例及高階主管報酬之關連 性研究,國立成功大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。
林燈煤,民國89年6月,股權結構、投資與公司價值之關係─以台灣上市公司為例,國立中正大學財務金融研究所未出版碩士論文。
洪美蘭,民國89年6月,所有權結構、投資與公司價值之實證研究 ,國立高雄第一科技大學金融營運系未出版碩士論文。
俞海琴、周本鄂,民國83年1月,台灣地區上市公司董監事、關係人持股比率和公司托賓Q關係之研究,管理評論,第十三卷,第一期,頁79-98。
曾玉潔,民國89年6月,我國高階主管薪酬決定因素之實證研究,國立中正大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。
黃楚淵,民國85年6月,臺灣上市公司宣告海外直接投資訊息對股東財富之影響--異質條件變異數分析法,國立政治大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
蕭燕錫,民國83年4月,管理會計第五波─代理理論,會計研究月刊第一0三期,頁122-130。
謝明翰,民國89年,企業成長機會與融資政策、股利政策與高階主管酬勞之關連性研究,國立臺灣大學會計研究所未出版碩士論文。
謝劍平,民國82年,閒於現金流量與托賓Q對資本投資決策中股東財富效果的影響,中國財務學會八十二年年會論文,頁509-529。
蘇薇,民國87年6月,高階主管薪酬所有權結構對公司經營績效之影響,國立雲林科技大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。
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