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研究生:陳建宏
研究生(外文):Chien-Hung Chen
論文名稱:公司經理人異動對股東財富與公司經營績效影響之研究
論文名稱(外文):The effects of Top Management Turnover on Wealth of Stockholders and Corporate Performance
指導教授:黃旭輝黃旭輝引用關係
指導教授(外文):Hsu-Huei Huang
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:朝陽科技大學
系所名稱:財務金融系碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2001
畢業學年度:89
語文別:中文
論文頁數:134
中文關鍵詞:經理人異動代理問題自願意動非自願意動
外文關鍵詞:top management turnoveragency problemvoluntary turnoverforced turnover
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:56
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  • 下載下載:113
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論 文 摘 要
總經理在公司組織的經營管理上扮演著舉足輕重的地位,公司的經營管理政策都會透過他來完成,也因此對於政策施行的成果會造成影響,而對於公司所表現出來的經營成果,他應該要負起責任,如果公司經營績效的表現不理想時,該經理人可能必須面臨被撤換的命運。而也因為他所處的重要地位,所以經理人異動宣告對市場而言是一項重要消息,而在公司經理人更迭的時候,市場的反應將會是如何?另外在經理人更迭之後,公司的經營績效又會呈現何種變化?本研究以上述各議題為研究重心,以瞭解台灣上市公司的經理人異動對於股東財富與公司的經營績效的影響。
研究中我們將各類異動原因分別探討,另外也將這些異動原因分成自願異動與非自願異動。而實證結果發現,在經理人異動的宣告效果方面,自願的經理人異動宣告,市場對該消息的反應為負向,而非自願的經理人異動宣告,市場則比較偏向於正面的反應。這也表示在不同的異動原因之下,市場的預期也會跟著改變。
另外在有關於經理人異動之前與之後的經營績效研究方面,發現在經理人異動之前,非自願經理人異動公司的相對經營績效比自願經理人異動公司來的低,表示非自願的經理人異動比較有可能是因為其經營績效不佳而遭受到內外控制機制的處罰,因而造成其職位上的更迭。而在公司經理人異動之後的經營績效方面,發現無論自願異動與非自願異動的公司在經理人異動之後的兩年,其相對經營績效都是呈現負向反應,亦即公司經營績效並沒有因為公司更換經理人而獲得改善,反而落後於同產業的經營績效,就經理人異動之後的經營績效的三個理論來看,本研究所得到的結果比較支持惡性循環理論(vicious-circle theory)。
關鍵詞:經理人異動、代理問題、自願異動、非自願異動
Abstract
The top management plays an important role in the field of operation and management of the corporation. The policies he carries out will turn into corporate performance. Based on this viewpoint, he must be responsible for the corporate performance. The top management will be likely to change if the performance is poor. How the stock market reacts to the turnover? After the turnover, how the corporate performance goes on? Our research focuses on the top management turnover, and we want to understand the effects of top management turnover on the wealth of shareholders and corporate performance.
In our research we divide our sample into ten groups, and also divide it into forced and voluntary groups. In the effects on the wealth of shareholders, we found that the reaction of the stock market is negative after voluntary turnover announcement. But it’s positive after forced turnover announcement. The results indicate that the reaction of stock market changes for the different turnover groups.
In the research of corporate performance before and after top management turnover, we found that the relative performance of forced turnover group is more negative than voluntary group before top management turnover. It means that the top managements of forced turnover group are more likely to be forced departure because of their poor performance. And in the research of corporate performance after turnover, we found that the relative performance after turnover is negative in both forced departure group and voluntary group. It means that corporate performance doesn’t be improved when the top management changed and falls behind the industrial average performance. In the three theories of corporate performance after turnover, our result supports vicious-circle theory.
Keywords: top management turnover, agency problems, voluntary turnover, forced turnover
目 錄
頁次
第壹章 緒論…………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究動機……………………………………………………1
第二節 研究目的……………………………………………………3
第三節 全文架構……………………………………………………4
第貳章 文獻探討……………………………………………………6
第一節 經理人異動與公司績效的關係……………………………8
第二節 經理人異動原因……………………………………………13
第三節 代理問題與解決方法………………………………………15
第參章 研究方法……………………………………………………22
第一節 研究分析架構與假說………………………………………22
第二節 資料來源與樣本選擇………………………………………24
第三節 變數操作性定義……………………………………………26
第四節 實證分析方法………………………………………………29
第肆章 實證分析結果………………………………………………37
第一節 經理人異動的基本統計敘述………………………………38
第二節 經理人異動事件對股東財富影響之實證分析……………42
第三節 經理人異動前後經營績效之比較…………………………92
第四節 公司經理人異動時累積超常報酬率之迴歸………………101
第伍章 結論…………………………………………………………122
第一節 研究結論……………………………………………………122
第二節 建議…………………………………………………………124
參考文獻……………………………………………………………126
中文部分……………………………………………………………126
英文部分……………………………………………………………127
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