臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

由於購併逐漸成為企業獲得成長的重要方式，對於主併公司股東而言，購併是否能帶來正向的財富效果為其關心的焦點。由於管理者和股東之間存有代理問題，購併活動的採行可能基於管理者自身的目的，而非股東利益的考量。此外，主併公司過去經營績效可能會影響投資人對於購併活動的評價。因此本文之研究目的在於探討主併公司之購併宣告效果、股權結構，以及主併公司過去的績效表現對購併宣告之影響。本研究以民國80年至89年間台灣上市主併公司之購併宣告樣本為研究對象，樣本共計132件，其中高科技產業之購併事件為46件，非高科技產業有86件。在探討主併公司購併宣告效果部份，採用事件研究法。而過去績效部份，利用因素分析法萃取出六項財務績效構面。探討股權結構和財務績效對購併宣告效果之影響部份，採用迴歸模式。
研究結果顯示：
1. 整體樣本之主併公司，尤其是高科技樣本，其從事購併活動時能為股東創造正向之財富效果。
2. 總樣本、高科技和非高科技樣本中皆不存在適度的內部股權。在非高科技樣本中，內部持股比例與宣告效果之間有區段關係存在。
3. 機構總持股比例不具有顯著之負向關存在。總樣本以及非高科技樣本之公司法人持股比例與購併宣告效果呈顯著負相關，符合Pound(1988)之利益衝假說和Duggal and Millar(1999)之效率降低假說。
4. 獲利能力在總樣本和非高科技樣本中具有顯著正向關係；流動性不論是在總樣本、高科技或非高科技樣本中皆不具有顯著性；經營效率在總樣本和高科技樣本中皆為顯著負相關，但在非高科技樣本中有顯著正向關係；成長性對於總樣本和非高科技樣本有顯著影響性，其影響方向為正向；經營風險在高科技樣本中有顯著正相關存在；長期償債能力則在總樣本和非高科技樣本中具有顯著負向關係。

As mergers and acquisitions (M&A) becomes an important way for companies to grow, shareholders more concern whether it can bring positive effect on their wealth. Agency problem might be exit between managers and shareholders, so the activities of M&A might be taken above manager’s objective, rather than in shareholders’ interests. Moreover, the past performance of acquiring firms would affect investors’ evaluation about M&A. Thus, this study investigates the effect of M&A announcement on shareholder wealth of acquiring firms, and the impact of ownership structure and financial performance on shareholder wealth. The sample was obtained from acquiring firms of stock listed company in Taiwan during the period from 1991 to 2000,which contained 132 observations in totality, 46 high-tech ones and 86 non high-tech ones. Event study was applied to find the effect of M&A announcement on shareholder wealth of acquiring firms. Six financial performance criteria were extracted by using factor analysis. The impact of ownership structure and financial performance on shareholder wealth was explored by using regression models.
The empirical results of this study suggest：
1. Total sample has positive abnormal returns, especially high-tech ones.
2. We can’t find that moderate level of insider ownership exits in total , high-tech, and non high-tech samples. In non high-tech sample, there is a piecewise linear relationship between insider ownership and abnormal returns.
3. Institutional ownership doesn’t have significantly negative impact on abnormal returns. Corporate institutional ownership has significantly negative impact on abnormal returns in total and non high-tech samples, which coincides with Pound’s conflict -of-interest hypothesis and Duggal and Millar’s efficiency abatement hypothesis.
4. Profitability is significantly positive to abnormal returns in total and non high-tech samples. Fluidity has non significant impact on abnormal returns in total, high-tech, and non high-tech samples. Operation Efficiency is significantly negative to abnormal returns in total and high-tech samples, but is significantly positive in non high-tech sample. Growth is significantly positive to abnormal returns in total and non high-tech samples. Risk is significantly positive to abnormal returns in high-tech sample. Long-term solvency is significantly negative to abnormal returns in total and non high-tech samples.

第一章 緒論………………..……………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究動機…………………………………………………………………..1
第二節研究目的…………………………………………………………………..3
第三節 研究範圍…………………………………………………………………..4
第四節 研究限制…………………………………………………………………..4
第五節研究架構…………………………………………………………………..4
第二章 文獻探討………………………………………………………………………..7
第一節 相關理論之探討…………………………………………………………..7
第二節實證文獻探討……………………………………………………………15
第三章 研究設計………………………………………………………………………38
第一節 研究假說…………………………………………………………………38
第二節 資料來源與樣本…………………………………………………………39
第三節 研究變數之衡量…………………………………………………………40
第四節 研究方法…………………………………………………………………43
第四章 實證結果分析…………………………………………………………………48
第一節 基本資料分析……………………………………………………………48
第二節 因素分析結果……………………………………………………………51
第三節 主併公司之購併宣告效果………………………………………………54
第四節 迴歸分析………………………………………………………………....64
第五章 結論與建議……………………………………………………………………77
第一節 研究結論…………………………………………………………………77
第二節 建議………………………………………………………………………78
參考文獻…………………………………………………………………………………79
附錄………………………………………………………………………………………84
一

一、英文部份
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二、中文部份
杜曉君，「購併事件宣告時主併公司特質對股東財富影響之研究─以台灣上市公司為例」，東吳大學企業會計學研究所未出版碩士論文，民國89年
洪麗惠，「購併宣告對股東財富的影響－Jensen閒餘現金流量與Tobin’Q兩假說之驗證」，東吳大學企業管理學研究所未出版碩士論文，民國84年
孫梅瑞，「國內上市公司從事公司購併活動對經營績效影響之研究」，政治大學企業管理學系未出版博士論文，民國89年
張訓華，「股權結構、董事會組成與企業當年財務績效─以77年度會計報酬率為準」，東吳學管理研究所未出版碩士論文，民國80年
陳匯中，「上市公司購併宣告對股東財富影響之研究」，政治大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文，民國84年　
黃蘭霙，「管理決策與資本結構關係之研究－負債監督理論應用於台灣地區上市公司合併之實證分析」，東吳大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文，民國83年
黃俊英，「多變量分析」，華泰書局，6版，民國87年8月
葉秋美，「台灣企業購併宣告對股東財富之影響」，政治大學國際貿易研究所未出版碩士論文，民國82年
鄭至宏，「從內部化理論與代理理論探討台灣企業併購活動之股價效果」，輔仁大學管理學研究所未出版碩士論文，民國84年
潘隆正，「企業購併支付方式影響因素之研究-臺灣上市主併公司之實證」，淡江大學國際貿易學系國際企業學未出版碩士論文，民國86年
蕭惠元，「購併活動對股價行為與會計資訊之影響--以上市公司為例」，東吳大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文，民國85年
謝劍平、張竣傑，「臺灣企業購併決策與Tobin’Q比率之相關性研究」，臺灣銀行季刊第47卷第3期，頁35-55
謝惠貞，「購併活動對國內上市主併公司價值影響之研究」，台灣大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文，民國86年
簡秀薇，「股權結構與購併宣告對股價之影響」，淡江大學國際貿易學系國際企業學未出版碩士論文，民國87年
羅素良，「購併支付方式之理論探討與實證研究」，成功大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文，民國80年
羅明敏，「台灣企業海內外購併宣告對主併公司股東財富影響之實證研究」，朝陽大學財務財務金融研究所未出版碩士論文，民國87年
蘇育生，「所有權結構與決策績效之研究─以購併為例」，成功大學國際企業研究所未出版碩士論文，民國89年