臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

中文摘要
本文的主要目的在探討，在國際雙佔競爭及不完全資訊下，政府的環保政策對外國廠商的影響。本文發現：數量競爭下，若本國政府訂定的數量限制對高成本廠商類型不具約束力時，外國廠商之進口量在數量限制下較實施庇古稅下增加。若數量限制對高成本廠商類型具拘束力時外國廠商產量不變；對外國廠商生產成本具不完全資訊時，政府的政策對外國廠商的產量無影響；價格競爭下，若價格限制對國內高成本類型廠商的價格具拘束力，則外國廠商進口量不變；若不具約束力，外國廠商進口量減少。

ABSTRACT
This paper discusses an international duopoly model that is related by asymmetric information, and demonstrates that how do government’s environmental policies affect foreign firm’s imports. We show: under Cournot competition, when quantity restriction is non-binding for high-cost domestic firm, foreign import will be higher than under Pigouvian taxes policy; when quantity restriction is binding for high-cost domestic firm, foreign import quantities are equalized under Pigouvian taxes policy. When there is asymmetric information on foreign firm, government’s environmental policies will not affect foreign firm’s import quantities. Under Bertrand competition, while quantity restriction is non-binding for high-cost domestic firm, foreign firm’s import quantities will be lower under Pigouvian taxes; while quantity restriction is binding for high-cost domestic firm, foreign import quantities are equalized under Pigouvian taxes .

目錄
封面內頁
簽名頁
授權書 iii
中文摘要 iv
英文摘要 v
致謝 vi
目錄 vii
圖目錄 ix
第一章 緒論
1.1 研究背景 1
1.2 研究動機與目的 2
1.3 研究方法 3
1.4 本文架構 4
第二章 文獻探討
2.1 污染的定義 5
2.2 污染控制的主張 5
2.3 政府控制污染的工具 6
2.4 相關文獻之探討 7
第三章 庇古稅與數量限制之比較
3.1 基本假設 10
3.1.1 產業特性 10
3.1.2 政府環保政策 11
3.2 對本國廠商具不完全資訊 11
3.2.1 貝氏-那許均衡 12
3.2.2 本國政府對本國廠商課徵庇古稅 13
3.2.3 庇古稅與數量限制之比較 16
3.3 對外國廠商具不完全資訊 21
3.3.1 政府對本國廠商課徵庇古稅 21
3.3.2 庇古稅與數量限制之比較 24
3.4 小結 25
第四章 Bertrand價格競爭
4.1 基本假設與產業特性 26
4.2 對本國廠商具不完全資訊 27
4.2.1 本國政府對本國廠商課徵庇古稅 27
4.2.2 庇古稅與價格限制之比較 30
4.3 小結 34
第五章 結論 35
參考文獻 37
圖目錄
圖3.1 貝氏-那許均衡 12
圖3.2 數量限制對高成本廠商類型不具拘束力 17
圖3.3 數量限制對高成本廠商類型具拘束力 17
圖4.1 價格限制對高成本廠商類型不具拘束力 31
圖4.1 價格限制對高成本廠商類型具拘束力 31

參考文獻
中文部分：
1. 張帆，2000，環境與自然資源經濟學，五南圖書出版公司。
2. 郭虹瑩＆黃鴻，2000，關稅政策與進口品的品質，經濟論文叢刊，第28輯，第3期，43-72
3. 巫和懋＆夏珍，2002，「賽局高手－全方位策略與應用」。時報出版社。
英文部分：
1. Abrego, L. & C. Perroni, 1999, “Free-riding, Carbon Treaties, and Trade Wars： the Role of Domestic Environmental Policies.” Journal of Development Economics 58, 463-483.
2. Ballard, C.L. & S.G. Medema, 1993, “The Marginal Efficiency Effects of Taxes and Subsidies in the Presence of Externalities.” Journal of Public Economics 52, 199-216.
3. Baumol, W.J. & W.E. Oates, 1992, The Theory of Environmental Policy, Cambridge University Press.
4. Barrett, S., 1994, “Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade.” Journal of Public Economics 54, 325-338.
5. Bovenberg, A.L. & R.A. de Mooij, 1997, “Environmental Tax Reform and Endogenous Growth.” Journal of Public Economics 63, 207-237.
6. Copeland B.R., 1996, “Pollution Content Tariffs, Environmental Rent Shifting, and the Control of Cross-border Pollution.” Journal of International Economics 40, 459-476
7. Eaton, J. & Grossman G.M., 1985, “Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly.” Quarterly Journal Economics 101, 383-406
8. Gibbons, R., 1991, Game Theory for Applied Economist, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.
9. Hwang, H. & C.C. Mai, 1988, “On the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas under Duopoly: A Conjecture Variation Approach.” Journal of International Economics 24, 373-380.
10. Lai, P.Y., 1996, “Three Essays on Duopolistic Competition under Asymmetric Cost Conditions.” Ph.D. Dissertation, SUNY Buffalo.
11. Ludema, R.D. & I. Wooton, 1997, “International Trade Rules and Environmental Cooperation under Asymmetric Information.” International Economic Review 38, 605-625.
12. Markusen, J.R., J.R. Melvin, W.H. Kaempfer, & K.E. Maskus, 1995, International Trade Theory and Evidence, McGraw-Hill, Inc.
13. Moomaw, W., K. Ramakrishna, K. Gallagher & T. Fred, 1999, “The Kyoto protocol：A Blueprint for Sustainable Development.” Journal of Environment & Development 8, 82-90