會計報表的揭露是否能代表公司真實營運績效一直是投資人關切的問題，銀行業由於受到政府法規高度管制，因此以盈餘管理隱藏真實盈餘的行為有可能與其他產業不同，故本文想瞭解各國銀行業是否有為了「避免盈餘損失」及「避免盈餘下降」而進行盈餘管理的現象。其次，各國對投資人保護的程度有所不同，從而在盈餘管理程度上形成差異，因此本文進一步探討法律對投資人的保護是否會影響銀行進行盈餘管理的動機。而「展望理論」是否為盈餘管理的推論性動機，過去學者並未加以實證，所以本文亦將對此進行實證分析。期望透過深入的剖析，有助於投資人評估各國銀行業之真實經營績效。
本研究以1993~1999年為研究期間，首先瞭解銀行業是否有為了「避免盈餘損失」及「避免盈餘下降」而進行盈餘管理的現象。其次從法律起源、反董事會權利、法規執行力、會計報表品質、內線交易程度，探討各國法律對投資人保護程度差異是否對盈餘管理產生影響。並分析「法律對投資人保護」愈高時，銀行內部人員是否會因為「愈難以移轉利益」而減少盈餘管理，還是會「預期盈餘表現不佳將招致愈高的懲罰」而增加盈餘管理。最後，透過風險報酬模型及絕對風險規避值觀點探討展望理論是否為盈餘管理的內在動機。
研究結果顯示：
1.銀行業會為了避免盈餘損失及盈餘下降而進行盈餘管理，且避免盈餘損失的現象較避免盈餘下降而進行盈餘管理的現象更為顯著。
2.小額盈餘獲利及小額盈餘增加的組別（實驗組）較小額盈餘損失及小額盈餘下降的組別（對照組）更能看出盈餘管理現象。
3.從法源系統來看，在投資人保護高的英屬國家，其政府對銀行「盈餘發生損失」會給予嚴厲懲罰，因此銀行會為了規避懲罰而進行「避免盈餘損失」的盈餘管理行為（符合懲罰假設）。但在投資人保護低的法屬國家則沒有顯著差異，這是因為法律對銀行是否進行盈餘管理沒有嚴密監理控制，因此銀行不會因為「預期懲罰」或「移轉活動難易」而在盈餘管理行為上有顯著差異。
4.「法規執行力」來自政府當局，結果顯示：
(1)當「法規執行力」愈高，銀行愈會去「避免盈餘損失」。此種結果可能反映出：政府通常不希望銀行發生「盈餘損失」，因此，當政府的「法規執行力」愈高，銀行發生「盈餘損失」時愈可能遭受到政府的懲罰，從而銀行愈會在事前進行「避免盈餘損失」的盈餘管理行為（符合懲罰假設）。
(2)當「法規執行力」愈高，銀行愈不會去「避免盈餘下降」。此種結果可能反映出：政府通常不會要求銀行盈餘必須呈現成長，反而會為了要求銀行降低經營風險而增提壞帳準備，而讓銀行可能發生「盈餘下降」的情況。從而，當銀行發生「盈餘下降」時，政府給予懲罰的可能性相對較低。因此，在探討銀行「避免盈餘下降」的盈餘管理行為時，懲罰假設的重要性會低於移轉假設的重要性。亦即當「法規執行力」愈高，銀行內部人員愈難透過「避免盈餘下降」的盈餘管理行為以移轉利益（符合移轉假設）。
5.「反董事會權利」來自外部投資人，結果顯示當「反董事會權利」愈高，銀行愈會去「避免盈餘下降」，但愈不會去「避免盈餘損失」。此意味著投資人比較在乎銀行盈餘的成長，而較不在乎銀行盈餘的正負。從而銀行為了規避因「盈餘下降」而受到投資人反董事會的懲罰，會進行「避免盈餘下降」的盈餘管理行為（符合懲罰假設）；當盈餘發生損失時，懲罰假設的重要性會低於移轉假設的重要性，從而在移轉假設之下，「反董事會權利」愈高，會使銀行內部人員愈難以移轉利益，而降低「避免盈餘損失」的盈餘管理行為。
6.「會計品質」代表會計報表被揭露程度的多寡。「會計品質」愈高，表示外部人員愈能夠瞭解銀行內部真實績效，外部人員受到的保護也愈高，因此銀行較無法藉由盈餘管理隱瞞利益移轉行為，盈餘管理的動機會減少（符合移轉假設）。
7.「內線交易品質」愈低 (亦即內線交易愈嚴重)，銀行為了「避免盈餘下降」而進行盈餘管理的動機愈低。此代表著內線交易愈嚴重的國家，其投資人愈不相信盈餘數字，因此銀行沒有必要為了「避免盈餘下降」而進行盈餘管理。
8.就銀行業而言，展望理論確實為「避免盈餘損失」之盈餘管理門檻效果的內在動機。但不一定為「避免盈餘下降」之盈餘管理門檻效果的內在動機。

Many past literatures have addressed earnings management in the banking industry, but not from meeting earnings thresholds─to avoid earnings decreases and losses. This research provides evidences that there exists earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses in the banking industry across 48 countries in the period between 1993 and 1999, and we find that avoiding earnings losses is more significant than avoiding earnings decreases.
Furthermore, we discuss whether outside investor protection (legal origin, anti-director rights, legal enforcement, accounting standard and insider trading) would be the incentive of earnings management in the banking industry. We consider two competing hypotheses: "diversion hypothesis" and "penalty hypothesis" of how investor protection affects insiders'' incentive to manage reported earnings. The major conclusions are as follows:
1.As to "legal origin", we find the "penalty hypothesis" to avoid earnings prevails in common law countries with the strongest protection of investors. But in the region with weakest protection of investors, such as French civil law countries, wouldn''t show significant differences.
2."Legal enforcement" comes from the government. We find the government would pay more attention to earnings losses than to earnings decreases. If legal enforcement were stronger, banks would expect the penalty is higher and would avoid earnings losses (penalty hypothesis). But banks wouldn''t avoid earnings decreases since the government usually asks banks to have loan loss provision to lower the operating risk.
3."Anti-director rights" belongs to outside investors. We find outside investors would pay more attention to earnings decreases than earnings losses. Therefore, if anti-director rights were stronger, banks would expect penalty is higher and would avoid earnings decreases (penalty hypothesis). But banks wouldn''t avoid earnings losses (diversion hypothesis).
4.If "accounting standard" were higher, the financial reports would reveal more information. Thus insiders would be hard to hide their diversion activities, and earnings management would be less (diversion hypothesis).
5.If "insider trading" were more serious, the outside investors wouldn''t trust the earnings numbers. Thus banks don''t have to manage earnings.
6.Finally, we discuss whether prospect theory would be the incentive of earnings management in banking industry. According to risk-return model and absolute risk aversion, our evidence supports the prospect theory is the strong incentive to avoid earnings losses, but not the significant incentive to avoid earnings decreases.

第壹章 序論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第三節 研究範圍 5
第四節 研究架構與流程 5
第貳章 文獻探討 7
第一節 盈餘管理概念與衡量 7
第二節 以盈餘門檻進行盈餘管理 14
第三節 銀行業以盈餘門檻進行盈管理 17
第四節 盈餘管理的動機 18
第五節 展望理論 21
第參章 研究設計 26
第一節 資料來源與樣本選取 26
第二節 研究假設 28
第三節 研究步驟與研究方法 35
第肆章 實證結果與分析 41
第一節 盈餘門檻現象 41
第二節 「投資人保護」與盈餘管理 44
第三節 「展望理論」與盈餘管理 54
第四節 結論 61
第伍章 研究結論與建 63
第一節 研究結論 63
第二節 研究限制 66
第三節 建議與未來研究方向 66
參考文獻 68
附錄 72

1.吳淳渼, 民89, “我國銀行業盈餘管理行為、工具與還原之分析,” 中原大學會計研究所碩士論文.
2.洪佑玲, 民85, “台灣商業銀行壞帳決策與買賣有價證券損益影響因素之實證研究,” 台灣大學會計研究所碩士論文.
3.陳育成, 民86, “商業銀行資本適足率資訊內涵與資本調控問題之研究,” 政治大學會計研究所博士論文.
4.陳淑玲, 民87, “我國銀行業裁量性決策與資本、盈餘、租稅目的間關係之研究,” 東吳大學會計研究所碩士論文.
5.郭慧民, 民88, “金融業預期盈餘差異與盈餘管理關連性之實證研究,” 東海大學管理研究所碩士論文.
6.張智凱, 民84, “美國商業銀行壞帳承認影響因素之實證研究,” 國立台灣大學會計學研究所碩士論文.
7.葉旭偉, 民85, “資本、盈餘與租稅目的下美國商業銀行會計決策之研究,” 台灣大學會計學研究所碩士論文.
8.廖佳璿, 民88, “營業稅率調降對金融業營收管理之影響,” 政治大學會計學研究所碩士論文.
9.劉啟群, 民88(7月), “我國金融業會計損益項目季別分析: 盈餘管理間接測試法,” 會計評論, 31, 63-79.
10.蘇逸穎, 民88, “本期盈餘、預期未來盈餘和盈餘操縱之關聯性,” 台灣大學會計學研究所碩士論文.
11.魏文勤, 民88, “強制性財測誤差門檻與盈餘管理--營收與其他盈餘組成份子之探討,” 彰化師範大學商業教育學系碩士論文.
12.Arkes, Hal. R., and C. Blumer, 1985, “The Psychology of Sunk Cost,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 35, 124-140.
13.Avi Fiegenbaum, and Thomas, H., 1988, “Attitudes toward risk and the risk-return paradox: Prospect theory explanations,” Academy of Management Journal, 31,no.1, 85-106.
14.Avi Fiegenbaum, 1990, “Prospect Theory and the risk-return Association — an empirical examination in 85 industries,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 14, 187-203.
15.Barberis, N., M. Huang, and T. Santos, 2001, “Prospect Theory and Asset Prices,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116, 1-53.
16.Barth, M., Elliot, J., Finn, M., 1995, “Market rewards associated with increasing earnings patterns,” Working paper, Cornell University.
17.Beatty, A., Chamberlain. S., Magliolo, J., 1995, “Managing financial reports of commercial banks: the influence of taxes, regulatory capital and earnings,” Journal of accounting Research, 33(2), 195-212.
18.Beaver, W. H., McNichols, M. F., 1998, “The characteristics and valuation of loss reserves of property casualty insurers,” Review of Accounting Studies, 3(1-2), 73-95.
19.Bowen, R., DuCharme, L., Shores, D., 1995, ”Stakeholders’ implicit claims and accounting method choice,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20(3), 255-295.
20.Burgstahler, D., and Dichev, I., 1997, “Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24, 99-126.
21.Cahan, S., 1992, “The Effect of antitrust investigations in discretionary accruals: A refined test of the political cost hypothesis,” The Accounting Review, 67, 77-95.
22.Conlisk, J., 1996, “Why Bounded rationality? ” Journal of Economic Literature, June, 669-700.
23.Conrad, G. R. and I. H. Plotkin, 1968, “Risk return: U.S. industry pattern,” Harvard Business Review, 46(2), 90-99.
24.Cootner, P. H., Holland, D. M., 1970, “Rate of Return and business Risk,” Bell Journal of Economics, 1(2), 211-226.
25.Cornell, B., Shapiro, A., 1987, “Corporate stakeholders and corporate finance,” Financial Management, spring, 5-14.
26.DeAngelo, L. E., 1986, ”Accounting Numbers as Market valuation Substitutes: A Study of Management Buyouts of Public Stockholders,” The Accounting review, 41(July), 400-420.
27.DeAngelo, L. E., 1988, “Managerial Competition, Information Costs, and Corporate Governance: The User of Accounting Performance Measures in Proxy Contests,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, January, 3-36.
28.Dechow, P. M., Sloan, R.G., Sweeney, A. P., 1995, “Detecting earnings management,” The Accounting Review, 70(2), 193-225.
29.Dechow, P. M., Skinner, D. J., 2000, “Earnings Management: Reconciling the Views of Accounting Academics, Practitioners, and Regulators,” Accounting Horizons, 14(2), 235-250.
30.Degeorge, F., Patel, J., Zeckhauser, R., 1999, ”Earnings Management to Exceed Thresholds,” Journal of Business, 72(1), 1-33.
31.Fisher, I. N., Hall, G. R., 1969, “Risk and corporate rates of return,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 83, 79-92.
32.Hayn, C., 1995, “The information content of losses,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20, 125-153.
33.Healy, P., 1985, “The Impact of Bonus Schemes on the Selection of Accounting Principles,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7, 85-107.
34.Healy, P., and Wahler, J., 1999, “A review of the earnings management literature and its implications for standard setting,” Accounting Horizons, 13,365-383.
35.Jegers, M., 1991, “Prospect theory and the risk-return relation: some Belgian evidence,” Academy of Management Journal, 34(1), 215-225.
36.Jones, J. J., 1991, “Earnings management during import relief investigation,” Journal of accounting Research, 29(2), 193-228.
37.Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A., 1979, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” Econometrica, 47 (March), 263-291.
38.La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silances, A. Schleifer, R. Vishny, 1998, “Law and Finance,” Journal of Political Ecoomy, 106, 1113-1155.
39.Laughhunn, D. J., and Payne, J. W., 1984, “The Impact of Sunk Outcomes on Risky Choice Behavior,” INFOR (Canadian Journal of Operational Research and Information Processing), 22, 151-181.
40.Leone, A. J., and L. V. Horn, 1999, “Earnings Management in not- in -profit: Evidence from hospital,” Working Paper: Rochester of University.
41.Leuz, C., Nanda, D., Wysocki, P. D., “Investor Protection and Earnings Management: an international comparison,” Working Paper: MIT Sloan School of Management.
42.Matsunaga, S. R., Park, C. W., 2001, “The Effect of Missing a Quarterly Earnings Benchmark on the CEO’s Annual Bonus,” Accounting Review, 76(July), 313-332.
43.Maureen F. McNichols, 2000,“Research design issues in earnings management studies,” Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 19, 313-345.
44.McNichols, M., Wilson, G. P., 1988, ”Evidence of earnings management from the provision for bad debts,” Journal of Accounting Research, 26(September), 1-31.
45.McNichols M., 2000, “Research Design Issues in Earnings Management Studies,” Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 19, 313-345.
46.Moyer, S. E., 1990, “Capital adequacy ratio regulations and accounting choices in commercial banks,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 13(2), 123-154.
47.Myers, L. a., Skinner, D. J., 1999, ”Earnings Momentum and earnings management,” Working paper, University of Michigan.
48.Nelson, K., 2000, “Rate regulation, Competition, and Loss Reserve Discounting by Property-Casualty Insurers,” The Accounting Review, 75(1), 115-138.
49.Neumann, M., I. Bobel and A. Haid, 1979, “Profitability, risk, and market structure in West German industries,” Journal of Industrial Economics, 27, 227-242.
50.Penalva, F., 1998, “Loss reserves and accounting discretion in the property-casualty insurance industry,” Working paper, Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley.
51.Petroni, K., 1992, “Optimistic reporting in the property-casualty insurance industry,” Journal of Accounting and Economics, 15(4), 485-508.
52.Petroni, K. R., Ryan, S. G., Wahlen, J. M., 2000, "Discretionary and Non-Discretionary Revisions of Loss Reserves by Property-Casualty Insurers: Differential Implications for Future Profitability, Risk and Market Value," Review of Accounting Studies, 5(2), 95-125.
53.Schipper, K., 1989, “Commentary on earnings management,” Accounting Horizons, 3(4), 91-102.
54.Schoemaker, P. J., 1982, “The expected utility model: Its variants, purpose, evidence and limitations,” Journal of Economic Literature, 20, 529-563.
55.Scholes, M., Wilson, G. P., Wolfson, M., 1990, “Tax planning, regulatory capital planning, and financial reporting strategy for commercial banks,” Review of Financial Studies, 3, 624-650.
56.Staw, B. M., 1981, “The Escalation of Commitment to a Course of Action,” Academy of Management Journal, 577-587.
57.Stein, J. C., 1989, ”Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(November), 655-669.
58.Thaler, R. H., 1980, “Towards a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 1, 39-60.
59.Thaler, R. H., and E. J. Johnson, 1990, “Gambling with the House Money and Trying to Break Even: The Effect of Prior Outcomes on Risky Choice,” Management Science, 36, 643-660.
60.White, H., 1980, “A Heteroscedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroscedasticity,” Econometrica, 48, 1980, 817-838.