臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

論文名稱：不對稱複佔下之研發 頁數：67
校（院）所組別：國立暨南國際大學管理學院經濟學系碩士班
畢業時間及提要別：九十學年度第二學期碩士論文提要
研究生：蔡　友　光 指導教授：龔治齊博士
論文提要內容：
　　由於大部分經濟文獻中探討研究發展，皆假設廠商型態為對稱。然而，在實際經濟社會中不對稱的廠商較對稱的廠商普遍。因此，本文以d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)模型為基礎，建構研發和生產兩階段賽局模型，先用倒推法求解子賽局完美均衡，再透過此均衡結果分析起始邊際成本不對稱和研發外溢率不對稱，對均衡研發投入的影響，並且探討起始邊際成本不對稱是否會影響廠商在研發階段的合作誘因。
　　由本文分析，可歸納以下結論：
一、 大廠商研發投入較小廠商為多。
二、 當廠商研發成果外溢給對手愈多時，廠商減少研發投入。
三、 當對手研發成果外溢給廠商愈多時，在外溢率比較小時，廠商愈會增加研發投入，在外溢率比較大時，則結果不確定。
四、 大廠商沒有誘因選擇研發聯盟（RJV）的研發合作型式。此點和d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)成本對稱情況的結論
不同。
五、 當成本差距夠大時，大廠商沒有誘因選擇研發卡特爾聯盟（RJV Cartel）的研發合作型式。此點也和d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988)成本對稱情況結論不同、 。

Title of Thesis:R&D in asymmetric duopoly page:67
Name of Institute:Graduate Institute of Economics,
National Chi-Nan University
Graduate Date: July, 2002
Name of Student:You-Kuang Tsai Adviser:Dr. Jyh-Chyi Gong
Abstract：
Owing to most of the economic papers assumed the symmetric model for firm on research and development, but in the actual economic society, asymmetric firm is more popular than symmetric firm. Therefore, in this study, the model of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) is based on to construct and produce two-stage game. First, use of backward induction to solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE), and then through this equilibrium result to study and analyze the affection of equilibrium study with asymmetric firm of initial marginal cost and spillover rate. Also, this study is to research on if is cooperation incentive at R&D stage affected by asymmetric firm of initial marginal cost?
This result of this study is concluded below:
(1)Larger firm is invested in much more than smaller firm.
(2)If R&D result of the firm is spillover more to the competitor, then the firm will reduce the investment for R&D.
(3)If R&D result of the competitor spillover more to the firm, at smaller spillover rate, then the firm will increase investment in R&D. However, if the spillover rate is larger, then the result is uncertain.
(4)Larger firm has no incentive to choose R&D cooperation model of Research and Development Joint Venture (RJV). This point is different from the result of the cost symmetry of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).
(5)When cost gap is larger, larger firm has no incentive to choose R&D cooperation model of Research and Development Joint Venture Cartel (RJV Cartel). This point is also different from the result of the cost symmetry of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988).

目　錄
第一章 緒論
第一節　前言與研究目的 1
第二節　論文研究方法和結構 2
註　釋　 3
第二章　文獻回顧
第一節　對稱性 5
第二節　不對稱性 10
註　釋 12
第三章　研發之不合作賽局
第一節　模型設定 14
第二節　模型結果 17
註　釋 23
第四章　研發合作之誘因
第一節　研發競爭(R & D Competition)
和各種研發合作型式 25
第二節　比較結果 38
第五章 結論 51
參考文獻 54
附錄(一) 57
附錄(二) 60
附錄(三) 62
附錄(四) 64
附錄(五) 66

參考文獻
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2.謝登隆（2000）《個體經濟理論與3. 應用》（第二版）。台北：智勝出版社。
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