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研究生:陳昭宜
研究生(外文):Chao-Ei Chen
論文名稱:紅利比例與權利金比例對連鎖企業組織之影響
論文名稱(外文):The Impacts of Bonus and Royalty Fees on the Development of Chain Stores Organization
指導教授:吳偉銘吳偉銘引用關係
指導教授(外文):Wei-Ming Wu
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立高雄第一科技大學
系所名稱:運輸倉儲營運所
學門:運輸服務學門
學類:運輸管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2002
畢業學年度:90
語文別:中文
論文頁數:65
中文關鍵詞:權利金比例紅利比例連鎖企業
外文關鍵詞:Chain Stores OrganizatioBonusRoyalty Fees
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  • 被引用被引用:3
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  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:2

通路的擴展是現代廠商銷售商品以獲取利益的重要作為。然自1980年代起,國內便利商店業者為了確保其通路優勢,而不斷的擴充其零售據點,以期盼藉由時間、空間、及地點的配合,來提供顧客最迅速完整的產品與服務。而國內連鎖便利商店的蓬勃發展,其不外乎是希望藉由統一進貨、統倉、共同配送、新產品研發與引進等效益,來達到擴充經濟規模以降低營運成本之目的。而國內連鎖便利商店之展店模式,初期多採直營店之方式來擴展其連鎖商店之規模,並藉此累積know-how。之後,再將展店方式轉為委託或特許加盟的連鎖經營方式。
事實上,不同連鎖商店之擴展方式,終將因連鎖主體(總公司)與各店經營者所面對經營環境之時空差異,而出現資訊不對稱以及對風險認知差異等問題。而本研究乃在探討連鎖商店之不同展店方式中,於直營店之展店方式下,總公司如何藉由紅利比例的設定來激勵經理人;亦或是在加盟經營之情況下,總公司如何設定一個合理的權利金比例,來擴展連鎖商店之規模。
本研究發現:一、在以代理人之機會成本為參與限制條件下,直營店展店方式之最適均衡將恰好落在該參與限制條件上,而使代理人之最終利潤為零。二、隨著紅利比例或權利金比例愈大,總公司將愈傾向利用加盟來經營門市,直到業者之利潤轉為負,總公司才又重新考慮是否採取直營。三、在訊息對稱下,總公司將完全掌握經理人之作為,因而沒有激勵誘因,故可透過給付經理人一固定效率工資,來強制要求其提供最適的努力水準。四、在訊息不對稱下,總公司唯有透過紅利制度來激勵經理人提供更多的努力。五、當門市經營條件變差,總公司若仍想藉直營店方式來進行銷售,則須提高紅利比例才能維持門市經營的意願。


The extension of sale channel is still a key factor to create profit for enterprise under the modern business environments. Since 1980s’, the convenience store companies have eagerly engaged in expanding their scales of chain store in order to keep the leading place in the market by integrating the benefits of purchase, warehousing, delivery, distribution and innovation. The type of company-owned store has been intensively utilized to enlarge the scale of the chain store at the initial expansion stage. After accumulating more knowledge on managing the chain, the type of expansion will be shifted to franchised store system gradually.
Due to the difference between principal and agent on the timing and surroundings of making decisions, the problems on the asymmetric information and the attitude on risk will be considered in the analysis. This study has focused on analyzing how the principal to manipulate the bonus and royalty fees to induce the agent’s effort on the company-owned and franchised store system, respectively.
The findings in this study include: 1. With introducing the opportunity cost of agent to be the constraint equation, the optimal solution is found as no excessive profit earned by agent while the constraint being binding. 2. With the raising of the bonus and royalty fee, the principal is likely to utilize the franchising system to expand the scale of chain stores until no more excessive profit earned by the agent. Otherwise, the company-owned system will be favored to expand the system. 3. Due to no incentive factor, a fixed wage rate will be paid to agent under the symmetric information condition. 4. The bonus fee is an effective mean to encourage the agent’s efforts under the asymmetric information condition. 5. While the market condition falls down, to increase the bonus fee is the only way to keep the company-owned system to operate continuously.


中文摘要I
ABSTRACTII
誌謝IV
目錄V
圖目錄VII
表目錄VIII
第一章 緒論1
1.1研究背景與動機1
1.2研究目的2
1.3研究範圍與對象3
1.4研究限制4
1.5研究架構4
第二章 文獻探討6
2.1垂直關係的定義6
2.1.1垂直整合的原因7
2.1.2垂直分離的原因10
2.2企業經營型態及選擇因素13
2.2.1連鎖企業經營型態13
2.2.2企業經營型態之考量因素15
2.2.3影響加盟比例的原因17
2.2.4代理問題18
2.3實例簡介20
2.3.1統一企業經營目標21
2.3.2加盟契約21
第三章 模型分析24
3.1 模型基本假設24
3.1.1直營門市利潤函數25
3.1.2加盟門市利潤函數30
3.2紅利比例與權利金比例變動對利潤的影響33
3.2.1直營門市33
3.2.2加盟門市39
3.3整合分析比較44
3.3.1假設條件44
3.3.2比較分析46
3.4小結50
第四章 靜態模型分析51
4.1模型假設51
4.2努力水準 可觀察52
4.3努力水準 不可觀察55
4.4小結59
第五章 結論與建議60
5.1結論60
5.2未來研究建議62
參考文獻63


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