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研究生:余歆儀
研究生(外文):Hsin-Yi YU
論文名稱:政權輪替對公股企業董監事改選與公司績效的影響
論文名稱(外文):The Effects of Powershift towards Re-election of Board and Firm Performance of State-owned Enterprises
指導教授:馬黛馬黛引用關係
指導教授(外文):Tai Ma
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中山大學
系所名稱:財務管理學系研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2002
畢業學年度:90
語文別:中文
論文頁數:100
中文關鍵詞:公司控制政黨輪董監事改選公司績效
外文關鍵詞:corporate governancepowershiftboard of director
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:8
  • 點閱點閱:591
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:138
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:2
民國八十九年三月十八日,民進黨的陳水扁先生當選中華民國第十屆總統,以近四成選票接掌國柄。台灣歷經了光復以來第一次的政黨輪替。新政黨執政後,從去年六月開始,多家公股行庫、國營企業和公股企業 即陸陸續續改選董監事,被視為「金融機構的第一波綠化」。有鑑於政黨輪替日後必定成為常態,因執政團隊的更迭而導致的公民營事業人事調動,包括公股代表或事業負責人、經理人的異動也勢必增加。因此本研究嘗試檢視是什麼因素造成政黨輪替後的大幅人事調動?政府入主公股企業的準則為何?董監事會結構改變或經理人調動之後,是否意味著企業經營的績效會有所提升?
因此本研究針對73家公股企業利用問卷以及統計方法進行質與量的雙向研究,實證之後的主要發現在於,在影響新政府入駐公股企業程度的因素上,以政策性因素最為顯著,也就是說新政府對於具有政策性指標意義或者是寡佔、獨佔的公股企業,入主意願較高。而在改選董監事之後,透過事件研究法與多元迴歸分析,我們發現累積異常報酬在董監事改選的一個月間呈現顯著持續下降的情況;且董監事專業素質的提高對於提昇公司經營績效來說並無顯著幫助。也就是說,新政府入駐程度較高、董監事專業知識提升的企業在績效的表現上,並沒有顯著的較其他企業為佳。因此此次政黨輪替整體而言並未使公股企業的經營績效有所提升。
On 18th Mar 2000, Mr. Chen, Shui-Bian in Democratic Progressive Party was elected to be the new president. Taiwan experienced the first powershift. However, many state-owned banks as well as some government-shared companies re-structured their board of directors continually. In the view of politics, the powershift will be normal in Taiwan in the future. So we try to survey the the effects of powershift towards re-elections of boards and firm performance of state-owned enterprises.
We discover that the major reason why government wants to intervene the operations of companies is policy. If this kind of industry is regulated or monopolistic, the government will has stronger motives to intervene its operation. On the other hand, after being intervened by the government, the cumulative abnormal return declined significantly from the event day to thirty days later. Besides, the firm performance didn’t improve significantly through the view of TobinQ, EPS and Market return. So we can say that this time of powershift didn’t improve the poor condition of corporate and firm performance significantly. So Taiwan corporate governance should abandon the relationship-based economic model and stride to the talent-based model.
第一章緒論………………………………………1
第一節研究動機與目的 ………………………1
第二節研究範圍與對象 …………………………..3
第三節研究流程 .………………………………...4
第四節論文架構 ……………………………….….5
第二章 政黨輪替後董監事會的變革與現況 ……..6
第一節 政黨輪替之後我國董監事會的變化情形 …6
第二節 董監事改選的異常報酬與綜合評析 ………12
第三章文獻回顧 ……………………………………22
第一節 公司控制與公司績效 ……………………22
第二節 政黨輪替與公司控制 ……………………27
第四章 研究假說 ……………………………………30
第一節 政治力介入程度與公司特徵的關係 ……30
第二節 政黨輪替對於公股企業經營績效的影響…32
第五章 研究方法 ……………………………………34
第一節 資料描述 …………………………………34
第二節 實證方法 …………………………………35
第三節 敘述統計 …………………………………45
第六章 實證結果分析 ………………………………64
第一節 政府入主公股企業因素之實證結果………64
第二節 董監事改選對公司績效的影響……………73
第七章 結論與建議 …………………………………88
第一節 研究結論 …………………………………88
第二節 後續研究建議 ……………………………90
附錄一 多重列聯表分析 ……………………………91
附錄二 問卷 …………………………………………..94
參考文獻 ……………………………………………………96
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