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研究生:陳佳斌
研究生(外文):Chia-Ping Chen
論文名稱:董事會之政治角色-以100家上市公司為例
論文名稱(外文):The political directors in board —The evidence of 100 firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange
指導教授:馬黛馬黛引用關係
指導教授(外文):Tai Ma
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立中山大學
系所名稱:財務管理學系研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2002
畢業學年度:90
語文別:中文
論文頁數:90
中文關鍵詞:董事會規模股權結構績效獨立性政治董事
外文關鍵詞:BoardPoliticsOwnership structurePerformanceBoard sizeIndependence
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:29
  • 點閱點閱:464
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:1
本研究認為政治在董事會中的運作是影響公司價值的關鍵,因此本文主要研究目的在於觀察董事會中具有政治影響力的董事如何影響公司績效,本文有別於先前對董事會文獻的地方,在於將政治議題加入董事會的效率之中;此外本研究亦特別使用了三階段最小平方法(Three-stage Least Square),針對政治與董事會獨立性(外部董事佔董事會的比例)和績效之間作了因果的分析,並和一般加權平均最小平方法(Weighted Least Square)做比較。觀察的樣本為各產業上市公司100家,1999年為基準,以前後各一年的EPS、ROA、ROE和Tobin 為績效變數進行實證。發現公司規模愈大(政治對公司重要性越高),則有政治董事的人數會增加;且公司政治董事人數愈多,則公司績效愈差。
In this study, we examine the impact of political factors in corporate governance on the performance of firm. The major difference between this study and other corporate governance studies is use of three stage least square method, which can estimate the cause and effect between endogenous variable. Our sample consists of 100 firms listed in Taiwan Stock Exchange. We find that the political directors harm the performance of firm.
第一章 緒論 ------------------------------------------------1
第一節 研究動機與目的-------------------------------------1
第二節 研究流程與研究限制-------------------------------4
第二章 文獻回顧-------------------------------------------6
第一節 與董事會組成相關之文獻探討-------------------6
第二節 與股權結構相關之文獻探討---------------------10
第三節 與董事會規模相關之文獻探討------------------15
第四節與董事會政治議題相關之文獻探討------------17
第五節總結---------------------------------------------------18

第三章 研究方法-------------------------------------------20
第一節 研究假說---------------------------------------------20
第二節 資料與樣本------------------------------------------24第三節 實證方法---------------------------------------------38
第四章 實證結果-------------------------------------------40
第一節 迴歸結果分析----------------------------------------40
第二節 綜合分析----------------------------------------------72
第五章 結論與建議----------------------------------------79
第一節 研究結論---------------------------------------------79
第二節 後續研究建議---------------------------------------80
參考文獻-------------------------------------------------------81
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