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研究生:傅皓政
研究生(外文):Hao-Cheng Fu
論文名稱:內在實在論
論文名稱(外文):Internal Realism
指導教授:林正弘林正弘引用關係
指導教授(外文):Cheng-Hung Lin
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:哲學研究所
學門:人文學門
學類:哲學學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2002
畢業學年度:90
語文別:中文
中文關鍵詞:普特南科學實在論內在實在論工具論
外文關鍵詞:PutnamScientific RealismInternal RealismScientific instrumentalism
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摘 要
本篇論文的目的,在於分析普特南提出的「內在實在論」(internal realism),並用來支持科學實在論的立場。普特南的觀點是:雖然我們無法發現獨立於認知之外的事實,基於實用上的目的,實在論是目前能夠不使科學成功成為奇蹟的唯一選擇。
本文以普特南的想法為架構,分為四章。
第一章對人能夠認知到獨立於心靈之外存在的世界的觀點提出駁斥。這只能是形上學的假設,因為就算有這樣的世界,人類也無法認知到。第二章對於工具論與相對主義提出駁斥。工具論者無法說明語意問題,因為可觀察與不可觀察之間的界線並不清楚。相對主義的問題是,科學的發展是非理性的,理論的選擇沒有理性的根據。第三章以「內在實在論」的主要觀點回答上述兩者造成的問題。內在實在論顯得簡單許多,不會遭遇語意上的問題,也能夠說明為什麼科學是成功的、進步的。在指稱方面,普特南採取固定指稱理論來說明理論詞項的指稱;在意義方面,則以社會語言學分工的概念來說明理論詞項的意義。第四章討論勞登和海金對普特南的批評,我試圖對這些批評提出澄清與回應。
關鍵詞:普特南、科學實在論、內在實在論、工具論。

Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to present the position provided by Professor Hilary Putnam named “internal realism”. The main viewpoint of internal realism is saving the success of science. As Putnam pointed out, realism is the only philosophy that makes no miracle of the world.
We firstly point out that the main arguments provided by Kant, Carnap and Putnam are opposite to the worldview of traditional realists. Traditional realists insist that the content of a true statement corresponds with the fact or state of affair (the given from world). In fact we suffer a struggle with two ideas that we have doubtless flourish knowledge of science on one hand and we haven’t an appropriate method to prove that what we talk about is concern with objective world on the other. In a word the traditional realists hold that a mind-independent world exists and what the scientists want to do is to discover the laws of the objective world.
Secondly, we analyse Putnam’s anti-realism. Anti-realists claim that human cannot discover the objective world behinds the phenomenon. The aim of scientific activity is not finding out the objective laws of the world but merely organizing the disordered phenomena. Scientific theories are the tools for understanding and the aim of science is saving the phenomena. Relativism is also a current of the last century. According to relativism, scientists have no strike rules for theory choosing. Putnam applies his causal theory of name to natural kind terms and theoretical terms. He also divides the meaning of these terms into four parts: syntactic marker, semantic marker, stereotype and extension. Although the stereotypes of entities referred by theoretical term might be incorrect but the theoretical terms still refer. Putnam proposes the division of socio-linguistic labor to be criteria for the use of words. A person may know how to use a word in many situations without knowing the best criteria for the application of the word. We must rely on experts to know the best criteria and their application.
Thirdly and finally, we try to defend Putnam’s position against Laudan’s and Hacking’s criticisms.
Key Word:Putnam、Scientific realism、Internal realism、Scientific instrumentalism

目 錄
Abstract
摘 要
前言 1
第一章 傳統實在論所遭遇的挑戰 5
第一節 康德的原始問題 5
第二節 邏輯經驗論的反形上學態度 11
第三節 普特南的反形上學實在論 20
第二章 工具論與相對主義 27
第一節 范‧弗拉森的建構經驗論 27
第二節 反對基本定律的克特萊特 37
第三節 孔恩的歷史主義觀點 49
第四節 費耶阿本的多元論 58
第三章 普特南的內在實在論 69
第一節 工具論與相對主義的問題 69
第二節 普特南的指稱理論 77
第三節 為何採取「最佳說明的推論」的策略 84
第四節 科學的成功與輻輳 97
第四章 內在實在論面臨的挑戰 109
第一節 勞登對輻輳實在論的反駁 109
第二節 海金對意義理論的質疑 117
結 論 125
附錄A 131
附錄B 133
參考資料 137

參考資料
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Concepts”, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science,
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--- The Logical Structure of the World. translated by Rolf. A.
George, Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1967
--- “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” in his Meaning and
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Cartwright, Nancy. How the Laws of Physics Lie, Oxford
University Press, 1983
---“Fundamentalism vs. The Patchwork of Laws”, Proceeding of
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Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1996
Copleston, Fredrick. A History of Philosophy, Vol. I: GREECE
AND ROME, The Newman Press, 1946
Dray, William. Laws and Explanation in History, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1957
Devitt, Michael. Realism and Truth, Princeton University Press,
1984
Devitt, Michael & Sterelny, Kim. Language & Reality: An
Introduction to the Philosophy of Language, The MIT Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1997
Duhem, Pierre. To Save the Phenomena, translated by Edmund
Doland and Chanenah Maschler, Chicago: University of
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Feyerabend, Paul. K. “An attempt at a realistic interpretation
of experience” in his Realism, Rationalism & Scientific
Method: Philosophical Papers Volume 1, Press Syndicate of
the University of Cambridge, 1981
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---“The problem of the existence of theoretical entities”, in
his Knowledge, Science and Relativism: Philosophical Papers
Volume 3, translated by Daniel and Eric M. Oberhiem,
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Hacking, Ian. Representing and Intervening, Cambridge
University Press, 1983
Hempel, Carl. G. Aspects of Scientific Explanation, The Free
Press, 1965
Kant, Immamuel. Prolegomena To Any Future Metaphysics That Will
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Ellington, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1985
Kuhn, Thomas. S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd
ed., Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1970
---“The Historical Structure of Scientific Discovery” in his
The Essential Tension, Chicago: Chicago University Press,
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Tension, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1977
---“Afterworld” in World Change: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature
of Science, edited by Paul Horwich, The MIT Press, 1993
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Empiricism? Van Fraassen and the Metaphysics of Modality”,
British Society for the Philosophy of Science, 2000
Laudan, Larry. “A Confutation of Convergent Realism”
Philosophy of Science, 48 (1981): 19-48. reprinted in The
Philosophy of Science, edited by David Papineau, Oxford:
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Aristotelian Society, 93/2 (1993): 89-104. reprinted in The
Philosophy of Science, edited by David Papineau, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1996
Newton-Smith, W. H. The Rationality of Science, RKP, 1981
Popper, Karl. Conjectures and Refutation:The Growth of
Scientific Knowledge, Harper&Row, 1965
--- The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Harper&Row, 1968
Putnam, Hilary. “What is Mathematical Truth?” in his
Mathematics, Matter and Method: Philosophical Papers,
Volume 1, Cambridge University Press, 1975a. Pp.60-78.
---“The meaning of ‘meaning’”, in his Mind Language and
Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2, Cambridge
University Press, 1975b. Pp. 215-271.
--- Reason Truth and History, Cambridge University Press, 1981
---“Three Kinds of Scientific Realism”, The Philosophy
Quarterly, vol.32, July 1982
---“What's Realism” in Scientific Realism, edited by Jarrett
Leplin, Berkeley:University of California Press, 1984
Quine, Willard. V. O. “On What There is” in his From a
Logical Point of View, 2nd ed. Cambridge, Mass: Havard
University Press, 1980
Salmon, M. H. [et al.] Introduction to the Philosophy of
Science, New Jersey:Prentice Hall, 1992.
van Fraassen, Bas. C. The Scientific Image, Oxford:Clarendon
Press, 1980
Ⅱ、中文部分:
吳以義《庫恩》,台北市:東大1996。
林正弘《伽利略‧波柏‧科學說明》,台北市:東大1988。
傅大為 <H2O的一個不可共量史-重論「不可共量性」及其與意義理論之
爭>,《第四屆美國文學與思想研討會論文選集:哲學篇》,台
北市:中央研究院歐美研究所,1995。

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