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研究生:沈享民
研究生(外文):Shen, Hsiang-Min
論文名稱:知態評價、智的德性與格物致知――論德性知識論之兩個進路,並論朱熹格物致知哲學之智的德性的基礎
論文名稱(外文):Epistemic Evaluation, Intellectual Virtue, and Ko-wo Chih-chih (Investgation-of-Things Extention-of-Knowledge)
指導教授:林正弘林正弘引用關係張永儁張永儁引用關係
指導教授(外文):Cheng-hung LinJun-chun Chang
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:哲學研究所
學門:人文學門
學類:哲學學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2002
畢業學年度:90
語文別:中文
論文頁數:233
中文關鍵詞:德性知識論德性透視主義動機為本智的德性格物致知
外文關鍵詞:virtue epistemologyvirtue perspectivismmotivation-basedintellectual virtueko-wu chih-chih
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德性知識論有兩大進路,分別以Ernest Sosa與Linda Zagzebski 為代表;前者自稱其知識理論為「德性透視主義」,後者提出「動機為本」的德性知識論。本論文闡釋與批評這兩個理論進路的內容,並將德性知識論的核心概念――「智的德性」――應用在朱熹哲學,將格物致知奠基在智的德性的基礎之上。
本論文首先論述Sosa與Zagzebski各自的理論中,對於知識論與倫理學兩者之間「平行」的見解。Sosa認為無論是知識論還是倫理學,都是對評價原理或規範原理的研究,皆以「形式的基礎主義」為依據;Zagzebski則論述知識論與倫理學具有共同的模型與架構,指出德性知識論的特殊地位。其次,我試圖從基礎主義與融貫主義的爭議、可靠主義的三個難題、與葛棣爾問題等方面,論證「證成」――討論最多的知態評價概念――的困境。
克就Sosa的德性透視主義,我展示Sosa對智的德性的定義,說明知態透視的作用,德性透視主義如何回應可靠主義的三個難題,並討論其他知識論學者對Sosa理論的反對異議。再者,針對動機為本進路,我論述了Zagzebski的德性理論,闡明智的德性與道德德性的關係,以及探討智的德性的真理傳導性問題,等等,並展示Zagzebski如何由德性概念來定義證成――知態義務概念。我更論證Zagzebski以「智的德行」來定義知識是一項不成功的嘗試。
最後,我全面重新詮釋朱熹的格物致知學說,指陳格物致知預設了「理一分殊」與心之虛靈知覺,並論證格物致知之智的德性的基礎。
There are two approaches in virtue epistemology. One is led by Ernest Sosa and the other Linda Zagzebski. The former names his theory of knowledge as virtue perspectivism. The latter develops a motivation-based virtue epistemology. In this thesis, I will explicate, and criticise, these two approaches. I will also apply the key concept of virtue epistemology──intellectual virtue──to Chu Hsi''s philosophy and to establish the "ko-wu chih-chih (格物致知)" on the basis of the intellectual virtue.
First, this thesis deals with the claim that epistemology and ethics are parallel. According to Sosa, both epistemology and ethics study the evaluative and normative principle. And both are based on formal foundationalism. In contrast, Zagzebski claims that epistemology and ethics share the same model and framework and thus that virtue epistemology enjoys a special status. Next, I will look at the predicament of justification──the most discussed notion of epistemic evaluation──through three different issues: the dispute between foundationalism and coherentism, the three difficulties facing reliablism and, lastly, the Gettier problem.
On Sosa''s virtue perspectivism, I will firstly illustrate his definition of intellectual virtue and the function of epistemic perspective. Next, I will apply his theory to deal with the three difficulties facing reliablism. Other epistemologists'' criticism on Sosa will also be discussed here. Then, I will move to Zagzebski''s motivation-based approach. I will, following Zagzebski, explicate the relation between intellectual virtue and moral virtue as well as the truth conduciveness of intellectula virtue. After that I will show how Zagzebski defines justification in terms of the concept of virtue. I will argue, however, that the attempt to define knowledge in term of act of intellectual virtue is not successful.
Finally, I present my interpretation of the doctrine of ko-wu chih-chih in Chu Hsi’s philosophy , point out its presupposition on the thesis that “principle is one but its manifestations are many (理一分殊),” and establish ko-wu chih-chih on the basis of the intellectual virtue.
目錄 i
1 導論 1
1.1 序論 3
1.2 Sosa論形式基礎主義 5
1.3 Zagzebski論知識論與倫理學的「平行」 16
2 證成的困境 27
2.1 基礎主義vs.融貫主義 30
2.2 基礎主義證成理論之困境 36
2.3 論證型證成與工具性證成 42
2.4 證成作為可靠性:論可靠主義的三個難題 46
2.5 論證成之六義:尋找證成的必要條件? 57
2.6 證成無所逃於葛棣爾式反例 65
3 德性透視主義 71
3.1 智的德性之初步建立 73
3.2 智的德性之定義 83
3.3 論知態透視 87
3.4 德性透視主義vs.可靠主義及其三個問題 90
3.5 德性透視主義與其異議 98
4 「動機為本」德性知識論 109
4.1 德性理論 111
4.1.1 Zagzebski論德性與善 (好) 的關係 111
4.1.2 德性與技術、自然能力之不同 116
4.1.3 德性與習慣 120
4.1.4 德性與感受、動機、動機傾向 121
4.1.5 小結:通釋德性 127
4.2 道德德性與智的德性 129
4.3 智的德性與真理傳導性 140
4.4 智的德性之價值 146
4.5 Phronesis 149
4.6 義務概念――證成 154
4.7 德行、智的德行與知識 159
5 論朱熹格物致知哲學之智的德性的基礎 173
5.1 李侗之教 175
5.2 合格物窮理與理會分殊以判儒佛、斥雜學 178
5.3 論格物窮理 183
5.4 論致知 189
5.5 理一分殊與格物致知 193
5.6 心之虛靈知覺與心具眾理 201
5.7 格物致知與智的德性 207
5.7.1 知覺是智德 207
5.7.2 仁含智德與仁為心之德 210
5.7.3 敬:認知活動與道德實踐的共同德性 213
5.7.4 從讀書法看智的德性 218
結論 223
引用書目與論文 229
引用書目與論文
Alston, William P. 1985. "Concepts of Epistemic Justification." Monist 68 (Jan.): 57-89.
―― 1988. "The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification." In Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 2, Epistemology, ed. James Tomberlin, Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Press. In Alston 1989.
―― 1989. Epistemic Justification, Cornell University Press, 1989.
―― 1993."Epistemic Desiderata." Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53, no. 3 (Sept.): 527-51.
―― 2000. “Virtue and Knowledge,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LX, no.1 (Jan.): 185-185.
Axtell, Guy. 1996. "Epistemic-Virtue Talk: The Reemergence of American Axiology?", The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 10, 3 (1996):172-198.
BonJour, Laurence. 1978. “Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?” American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1978): 1-13. In Moser 1986, pp. 95-115.
―― 1980. "Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge." In Studies in Epistemology, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. 5. Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press.
―― 1985. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
―― 1995. “Sosa on Knowledge, Justification, and Aptness,” Philosophical Studies 78 (June): 207-220.
Chisholm, Roderick. 1964. “The Myth of the Given,” Philosophy, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1964, pp. 261-86. In Moser 1986, pp.55-75.
―― 1969. Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Code, Lorraine. 1987. Epistemic Responsibility, Hanover: University Press of New England and Brown University Press.
Dancy, Jonathan. 1995. "Supervenience, Virtues, and Consequences: A Commentary on Knowledge in Perspective by Ernest Sosa." Philosophical Studies 78 (June): 189-205.
Dancy, Jonathan, and Ernest Sosa. eds. 1992. A Companion to Epistemology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Davidson, Donald. 1983. “Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge”
Feldman, Richard. 1985. “Reliability and Justification,” The Monist 68 (1985), pp. 159-74.
Foley, Richard. “The Epistemology of Sosa,” Philosophical Issues, 5. (1994).
pp. 1-14.
Foot, Philippa. 1978. "Virtues and Vices." In Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Goldman, Alvin I. 1979. “What Is Justified Belief?” in Goerge Pappas, ed., Justification and Knowledge (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1979).
―― 1986. Epistemology and Cognition. Cambridge: Harvard .University Press.
―― 1988. “Strong and Weak Justification,” Philosophical Perapectives 2: 51-69.
―― 1992. "Epistemic Folkways and Scientific Epistemology," in Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sceinces. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Greco, John. 1992. "Virtue Epistemology." In Dancy and Sosa 1992.
―― 2000. “Two Kinds of Intellectual Virtue,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LX, no.1 (Jan.): 179-184.
Hoodway, Christopher.1994. "Cognitive Virtues and Epistemic Evaluations." International Journal of Philosophical Studies 2, no. 2: 211-27.
MacIntyre, Alasdair. 1984. After Virtue. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press.
―― 1993. Epistemic Virtue and Doxastic Responsibility. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.
McDowell, John. 1978, “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperative?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, suppl. Vol. 52, pp.13-29.
Moser, Paul K. 1986. Empirical Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Rowman & Littlefield, Publishers.
Nagel Thomas,. 1979, “Moral Luck,” In Mortal Questions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Plantinga, Alvin. 1988. "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function." In Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 2., Epistemology, ed. James Tomberlin. Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Press.
―― 1993a. Warrant and Proper Function, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
―― 1993b."Why We Need Proper Function," Nous 27, 1: 66-82 .
Sosa, Ernest. 1980a. “The Foundations of Founsationalism,” Nous 14 (1980). Reprinted in Sosa 1991.
―― 1980b. "The Raft and the Pyramid: Coherence versus Foundations in the Theory of Knowledge," Midwest Studies in Philosophy V: 3-25. Reprinted in Sosa 1991.
―― 1985a. "The Coherence of Virtue and the Virtue of Coherence: Justification in Epistemology," Synthese 64: 3-28. Reprinted in Sosa 1991.
―― 1985b. “Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue,” The Monist 68 (1985): 224-45.
―― 1988. “Beyond Skepticm, to the Best of our knowledge,” Mind 97 (1988): 153-89.
―― 1991. Knowledge in Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
―― 1991a. “Reliabilism and Intellectual Virtue.” In Sosa 1991.
―― 1991b. “Intellectual Virtue in Perspective.” Drawn in part from “Knowledge in Context, Skepticism in Doubt,” Philosophical Perapectives 2: Epistemology (1988): 139-57; and in part from “Beyond Skepticism, to the Best of Our Knowledge,” Mind 97 (1988): 153-89.
―― 1993. "Proper Functionalism and Virtue Epistemology," Nous 27, 1: 51-65.
―― 1994. “Virtue Perspectivism: A Response to Foley and Fumerton,” Philosophical Issues, 5. (1994).
―― 1995. “Perspectives in Virtue Epistemology: A Response to Dancy and BonJour,” Philosophical Studies 78 (June): 221-235.
Steup, Matthias. 1996. An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, Prentice Hall, Inc., 1996.
Zagzebski, Linda. 1996. Virtues of the Mind, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
―― 1999. "What is Knowledge?", in Greco, John and Sosa, Ernest, eds., The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology, Oxford: Blackwell, 1999.
―― 2000. “Responses,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. LX, no.1 (Jan.): 207-219.
朱熹哲學部分之引用書籍與論文﹕
一、朱熹之著作﹕
《朱文公文集》(上)(下)。臺北﹕臺灣商務印書館,民國六十九年,四部叢刊集部,上海涵芬樓影印明嘉靖本, 臺一版。
《朱子語類》,全八冊。臺北﹕文津出版社,民國七十五年十二月。
《四書章句集注》。包括《大學章句》、《中庸章句》、《論語》、《孟子集注》。臺北﹕長安出版社,點校本,民國八十年二月。
《論語或問》,《朱子遺書》本,第三、四冊。臺北﹕藝文印書館,民國五十八年五月。
《孟子或問》。《朱子遺書》本,第五冊。
《大學或問》。
《中庸或問》。
《太極圖說解》、《通書解》。見《周子全書》。
二、其它原始文獻﹕
《上蔡語錄》,朱熹編訂。臺北﹕廣文書局,《上蔡語錄》與《延平答問》 合刊本,民國六十一年五月。
《延平答問(附補錄)》朱熹編訂。同《上蔡語錄》。
《周子全書》,董榕輯。臺北﹕廣學社印書館,民國六十四年六月。
《二程集》。臺北﹕漢京文化事業有限公司,點校本,民國七十二年九月。
三、研究專著與論文(以姓名筆劃為序)
牟宗三,《心體與性體》,全三冊。臺北﹕正中書局,民國五十七年五月臺初版。
沈享民,《朱熹理一分殊哲學之溯源與開展》。臺灣大學哲學研究所碩士論文,民國八十三年六月。
金春峰,《朱熹哲學思想》。臺北﹕三民書局,八十七年五月。
陳來,《朱熹哲學研究》。臺北﹕文津出版社,民國七十九年十二月。
──,《朱子書信編年考證》。上海﹕上海人民出版社,西元一九八九年四月第一版。
──,〈朱子《仁說》新論〉。朱杰人主編,《邁入21世紀的朱子學》。華東師範大學出版社,2001年。頁15~29。
陳榮捷,《朱學論集》。臺北﹕臺灣學生書局,民國七十七年四月增訂再版。
──,《朱熹》,傅偉勳、韋政通主編,「世界晢學家叢書」,臺北﹕東大圖書公司,民國七十九年二月。
──,《新儒學論集》。臺北:中央研究院中國文哲研究所,民國八十四年四月。
──,〈論朱子之仁說〉。收在陳榮捷《朱學論集》,頁37~68。
──,〈儒家之兩輪哲學與現代化〉。收在陳榮捷《新儒學論集》。
──,〈宋明理學中的「格物」思想〉。收在陳榮捷《新儒學論集》。
勞思光,《中國哲學史(三上)》。臺北﹕三民書局,七十年二月。
劉述先,《朱子哲學思想的發展與完成》。臺北﹕臺灣學生書局,七十三年八月增訂再版。
錢穆,《朱子新學案》,全五冊。臺北﹕三民書局,民國七十八年十一月三版。
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