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研究生:翁煥超
研究生(外文):Huan-Chao Wong
論文名稱:從目標公司的角度談公司合併-以賽局理論分析之
論文名稱(外文):How Should a Target Firm Find its M&A Partner? An Analysis using the Game Theory Approach
指導教授:邱顯比邱顯比引用關係陳業寧陳業寧引用關係
指導教授(外文):Shean-Bii ChiuYehning Chen
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:財務金融學研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2002
畢業學年度:90
語文別:中文
論文頁數:47
中文關鍵詞:賽局理論購併目標公司
外文關鍵詞:Game TheoryM&ATarget Company
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在這波全球化的購併潮流之下,主併公司的動作再度成為報章媒體上的焦點,然而,這是否表示目標公司就只能坐以待「併」呢?雖然目標公司在合併型式上似乎是扮演被動者的角色,但一個好的經營者若能善加利用情勢,反而能夠適時的為公司創造最大的價值,因此本篇論文希望提出一個貼近台灣目前購併環境的模型,以供本土企業及政府面臨類似決策環境時參考。
在研究方法上,本篇論文從目標公司經營決策者的角度,透過適當簡化的賽局模型分析這類公司在購併整合的風潮下所面臨的挑戰,如時間上的急迫性、換股比例、人事主導權…等問題,如何影響合併的成功與否,並比較“公開競標”與“私下談判”兩種常用的尋找合併對象的方式的優缺,得到以下結論:
當面對兩家收購公司,且外部股東與經營者之間沒有代理問題時,目標公司經營者的最適決策是選擇“公開競標”的方式,並訂一個最大化全體股東預期收入的保留價格。
在存在代理問題的模型架構下,本研究發現,當經營者考慮“合併成功時的私有利益”與“合併失敗時的私有利益”時,其最終策略與決策會被公司一般股東與經營者之間的代理問題扭曲。這時候,經營者的最佳選擇將不一定是“公開競標”的方式,而須視公司代理問題的嚴重性與合併時程的急迫度等客觀條件而定。
就政府政策目標而言,當政府的政策目標是保障小投資人、創造最大綜效且外部股東與經營者之間沒有代理問題的模型架構下,最適的結果是經營者選擇“公開競標”並訂一個極大化全體股東預期收入的保留價格,政府不加以干預;在考慮了代理問題的延伸模型架構下,由於沒有必然較佳的合併策略,在決定採行何種政策手段時,政府應先判別該產業的客觀條件較適合“公開競標”或是“私下談判”。
政府若欲藉由提高合併成功的機率來達到加速整合的目的,且沒有代理問題下,本研究發現政府將鼓勵採行“公開競標”,而一個理性的經營者也會選擇“公開競標”的方式;在經營者受到私人利益影響的延伸模型的結果可分為企業的決策與政府政策目標一致與不一致兩種情形。政府可先分析該產業或企業屬於哪一種情況,然後針對落在不同情況的產業或企業採行不同的政策工具,加速其整合與合併。
This thesis studies the optimal strategy for the controlling shareholder of a target firm to find the merger partner. In the model of the thesis, I assume there are two potential acquiring firms, and the acquiring firms’ reservation values on the target are their private information. Moreover, the controlling shareholder can use either bargaining or auction to decide which acquiring firm to merge with. I investigate how the controlling shareholder’s choice between these two alternatives will be affected by factors such as time pressure and the agency problem between the controlling shareholder and other shareholders. I find the following interesting results.
First, if there is no agency problem, the controlling shareholder will arrange an auction to decide which firm to merge with, and will set a reservation price maximizing shareholders’ welfare.
Second, if an agency problem does exist and the controlling shareholder can enjoy a private benefit either when the merger attempt succeeds or when the attempt fails, then the controlling shareholder may determine the merger partner either by an auction or through sequential bargaining with the acquiring firms whichever maximizes his own profit.
Third, suppose that the government’s objective is to protect small investors and maximize the synergy from the merger. If there is no agency problem, both the government and the controlling shareholder will prefer an auction to bargaining. In this case, the government need not interfere with the controlling shareholder’s choice. On the other hand, if an agency problem exists, then under some circumstances, government intervention may improve social welfare.
Fourth, suppose that the government’s objective is to maximize the probability that the merger attempt succeeds. If there is no agency problem, then both the government and the controlling shareholder will prefer an auction to bargaining. In this case, the government need not interfere with the controlling shareholder’s choice. On the other hand, if an agency problem exists, then under some circumstances, government intervention may improve social welfare.
第一章 緒論
第二章 文獻探討
第一節 出價與談判賽局
第二節 購併代理問題之研究
第三章 無代理問題下的基本模型
第一節 「公開競標」
第二節 「私下談判」
第三節 賽局比較
第四節 小結與問題探討
第四章 考慮代理問題的延伸模型
第一節 經營者考慮合併成功時的私有利益
第二節 經營者考慮合併失敗時的私有利益
第五章 政府的角色與目標
第一節 保障投資人、創造最大綜效
第二節 加速企業整合
第六章 結論
附錄一、符號說明
附錄二、延伸模型的比較靜態分析
中文部分
1.謝淑貞,民國八十八年,「賽局理論」
2.張維迎,民國八十九年,「賽局理論與信息經濟學」
3.林小娟,民國八十九年(2000年),「公司接管策略-以賽局理論分析」,政治大學國際貿易研究所碩士論文
4.民國九十年1月17日,「國內外企業併購發展動向」,經建會經濟研究處發稿www.cepd.gov.tw/service/news/2001/0117.htm
5.黃怡君,2002年,「寶來證、元京考慮嫁給外國人」,商業週刊第740期
英文部分
Books
1.Patrick A. Gaughan, “Mergers, Acquisitions, and Corporate Restructurings”, 1999 Second edition
2.Price Pritchett, “After the Merger: Managing the Shockwaves”, 1985
3.J. Fred Weston, Jusn A. Siu, Brian A. Johnson, “Takeovers, Restructuring, and Corporate Governance”, 2001 Third edition
Journals
1.Amihud, Y., and B. Lev. “Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers.” Bell Journal of Economics, 12 (Autumn 1981), 605-617
2.Bulow, Jeremy and Klemperer Paul, “Auctions Versus Negotiations,” American Economic Review, Vol.86(1), p180-94, March 1996
3.Cramton, Peter C., “Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty,” Review of Economic Studies(1984)LI, 579-593
4.Cramton, Peter C., “Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty,” Review of Economic Studies(1992) 59, 205-225
5.David P. Baron “Tender Offers and Management Resistance” Journal of Finance, Volume 38(May 1983), 331-343
6.Easterbrook, Frank H; Fischel, Daniel R. “Corporate Control Transactions” The Yale Law Journal. Vol. 91 (4). 698-737. March 1982
7.Fishman, Michael J., “A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding” RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 19, No. 1, Spring 1988
8.Fudenberg, D. and Tirole J., “Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information,” Review of Economic Studies, 1983, 2, 221-247
9.Jensen, M. “Agency Cost of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers.” American Economic Review Proceedings, 76(May 1986), 323-329
10.Joel Sobel, Ichiro Takahashi, “A Multistage Model of Bargaining” The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 50, Issue 3 (Jul., 1983), 411-426
11.Laffont, J. J. and Maskin. E., “Optimal Reservation Price in the Vickrey Auction,” Econ. Letters. 1980, 6(4), pp. 309-13
12.Mcafee R. Preston and Mcmillan John, “Auctions and Bidding,” Journal of Economic Literature Vol. XXV(June 1987), pp.699-738
13.McWilliams Victoria B “Managerial Share Ownership and the Stock Price Effects of Antitakeover Amendment Proposals” Journal of Finance Vol. 45, No. 5. (Dec., 1990), 1627-1640
14.Milgrom, P. R. and Weber, R. J., “A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,” Econometrica, Sept 1982a 50(5), pp. 1089-1122
15.Riley, J. and Zeckhauser Richard, “Optimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm,” The Quarterly Hournal of Economics, May 1983, pp267-289
16.Riley, J. G. and Samuelson W. F., “Optimal Auctions,” Amer. Econ. Rec., June 1981.71(3), pp. 381-92
17.Ronald M.Giammarino, Robert L. Heinkel, “A Model of Dynamic Takeover Behavior” Journal of Finance, Volume 41, Issue 2 (Jun., 1986), 465-480
18.Rubinstein, A.,(Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,” Econometrica, (1982), 50, 97-109
19.Rubinstein, A., “A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time Preferences,” Econometrica, (1985), 53, 1151-1172
20.Shleifer, A., and R. Vishny. “Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?” Journal of Finance, 45(March 1990), 31-48
21.Tiemann, Jonathan. “Exact Arbitrage Pricing and the Minimum-Variance Frontier” Journal of Finance. Vol. 43 (2). 327-38. June 1988
22.Wang, Fuqu. “Auctions versus Posted-price Selling,” American Economic Review, September 1993, 83(4), pp. 838-51
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