論文摘要
在這篇論文中，我們針對2001年中華開發工業銀行採取公開收購方式收購大華證券公司個案進行探討與研究。
首先，我們認為中華開發工業銀行欲進入證券產業的原因包括：因應未來金融產業競爭的需要、政府對於金融產業內合併與收購的正面鼓勵態度、為強化自身的證券業務發展、當時進入證券產業的成本較低以及為獲得進入證券產業所可能產生的綜效。然而，在綜效的分析上，我們認為中華開發工業銀行進入證券產業所可能產生之綜效應來自於營收的增加及財務綜效，而成本降低的綜效應不明顯。
其次，我們認為大華證券公司會成為該敵意收購目標的原因包括：其在證券承銷業務與固定收益商品業務上的優勢、完整的證券事業群、財務績效表現的滑落、強大的資本基礎、穩定的財務結構、非為特定家族掌控以及便利性因素。
第三，我們認為中華開發工業銀行採取公開收購作為一股權收購的手段原因包括：大華證券公司大股東對收購案的排斥態度、中華開發工業銀行先前公開市場收購計劃的失敗以及大華證券公司的所有權結構特性所致。
最後，我們針對該公開收購個案發展過程中的重大事件進行事件研究法的實證分析，獲致以下結論：
1. 由於變異性效果、套利機會的預期以及不確定性因素籠罩於中華開發工業銀行等理由，致使公開收購宣告對大華證券公司股價報酬產生正向異常報酬以及中華開發工業銀行股價產生負向異常報酬。
2. 由於訊息釋放效果、大華證券公司經營層將集中控制權的預期以及中華開發工業銀行收購大華證券公司困難度將提高等理由，致使大華證券公司經營層抗拒的宣告對大華證券公司股價報酬產生正向異常報酬以及中華開發工業銀行股價產生負向異常報酬。
3. 由於套利機會的預期、市場對大華證券公司管理者將採取抵抗的預期以及不確定性因素籠罩於中華開發工業銀行等理由，致使證期會對公開收購案的核准對大華證券公司股價報酬產生正向異常報酬以及中華開發工業銀行股價產生負向異常報酬。
4. 由於市場對公開收購案結果的失望，致使公開收購後，中華開發工業銀行欲入主大華證券公司意圖失敗對大華證券公司股價報酬產生負向異常報酬以及中華開發工業銀行股價產生負向異常報酬。
5. 由於市場對收購案成功對未來經營績效的正向預期、較一年前公開收購案為少的不確定性以及較少的抵抗反收購成本花費等理由，致使公開收購案一年後中華開發工業銀行成功獲得大華證券公司經營權宣告對大華證券公司股價報酬產生正向異常報酬以及中華開發工業銀行股價產生正向異常報酬。

Abstract
In this article, we focused on the case that China Development Industrial Bank (CDIB) bid for Grand Cathay Securities Corporation (GCSC) by means of the tender offer in 2001.
First, we thought the reasons why CDIB desired to bid for a securities corporation included responding to requirements of future competion, the encouraging attitude of the government towards M&A of financial institutions, strengthening CDIB’s securities businesses, low cost-of-entry of securities industry at that time and generating synergy. However, in the analysis of sources of synergy, we thought that there was little cost-reducing synergy but much possibly coming from revenue-enhancing and financial synergy.
Second, we thought the reasons why GCSC became a target of hostile takeover included its advantage on the businesses of securities underwriting and bonds trading, complete securities businesses, declining financial performance, huge capital base and stable financial structure, not being controlled by a certain family and convenience.
Third, we thought the reasons why CDIB adopted the tender offer as a tool for taking control of GCSC included opposed attitude of GCSC’s blockholders, the failure of previous plan of open market sweep and the characteristics of ownership structure of GCSC.
Finally, we examined the effect of important events on stock returns of both CDIB and GCSC and found:
1. Because of variance effect, arbitrage chance, and uncertainty problems of CDIB, tender offer announcement had a positive effect on GCSC’s stock returns but a negative one on CDIB’s stock returns.
2. Because of signaling effect, expectation of control right concentration, and increasing difficulty of taking control for CDIB, management resistance announcement had a positive effect on GCSC’s stock returns but a negative one on CDIB’s stock returns.
3. Because of arbitrage chance, expectations of management resistance, and uncertainty problems of CDIB, tender offer approval by SFC had a positive effect on GCSC’s stock returns but a negative one on CDIB’s stock returns
4. Because of disappointment to the result, tender offer failure had a negative effect on GCSC’s stock returns and a negative one on CDIB’s stock returns.
5. Because of positive expectations of acquisition, less uncertainty, and less anti-resistance cost to be spent, subsequent success of CDIB’s taking control of GCSC one year later had a positive effect on GCSC’s stock returns and a positive one on CDIB’s stock returns, too.

Chapter 1 Introductions
1.1 Motivations and Purpose 1
1.2 Framework of This Study 2
Chapter 2 Literature Review
2.1 Rationales of Mergers & Acquisitions 4
2.2 Characteristics of Targets in Hostile Takeovers 12
2.3 Determinants of Bid Premiums in Takeovers 14
2.4 Means of Payment in Takeovers 16
2.5 Announcement, Managerial Resistance and Abnormal Returns 19
2.6 Unsuccessful Control Contests and Target Firms Shareholders’ Wealth 23
Chapter 3 Tender Offers
3.1 Definition of Tender Offers 24
3.2 Tender Offers Compared with Other Ways to Take Control of Targets 26
3.3. Regulations of Tender Offers in Taiwan 29
Chapter 4 Data and Methodology
4.1 Data 34
4.2 Methodology 34
Chapter 5 A Tender Offer Event Study: China Development Industrial Bank (CDIB) Tender Offering for Grand Cathay Securities Corporation(GCSC)
5.1 Background 62
5.2 Acquiring Company: China Development Industrial Bank (CDIB) 92
5.3 Target Company: Grand Cathay Securities Corporation (GCSC) 105
5.4 Strategic Analysis 115
5.5 Empirical Results 147
Chapter 6 Conclusions 161
References 163

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