本研究針對中國大陸國有企業改革中，管理階層的持股比例、經營能力及政府當局之間的代理問題作探討。在財務管理理論下，公司管理階層之目標是追求公司價值最大化，但在國有企業下，由於政府賦予的社會責任，且政府當局掌握國有企業的控制權，導致公司經營權與管理權無法分離，使得國有企業管理階層無法達成公司價值最大化目標。本文透過代理問題，探討主理人委託的監督者(政府當局)及代理人(國有企業管理階層)在國家社會福利及國有企業價值雙重目標函數下，分析不同控制權結構下，政府當局及國有企業管理階層間最適契約之制定方式及管理階層持股比例、經營能力及政府當局本身亦存在補償性剩餘行為對主理─監督─代理關係之影響。本文試圖連結賄賂、共謀與營運績效間的關係，以中國大陸國有企業改革的過程為例，分析其在下放企業人事權，並給予經理人盈餘分配權的所有權結構的調整下，官員與經理人間的互動變化及其對整體國有企業營運績效的影響。本研究企圖連結文獻中較欠缺的績效與賄賂間之關係，對大陸國有企業改革成果，提出佐証並預測未來成果，希望透過模型證明：減少行政官員在企業中的作用，方能提高現存國有企業的績效，分析討論增加經理人或員工配股，使企業獲利與經理人（員工）之效用相連結時，對國有企業營運績效提升的助益，以便能進一步看出一般公司體制中代理關係的獎酬機制，在大陸國有企業改革中所引發的效果。
本研究結果發現在修正移轉支出、調整官員與經理人的效用，並加以考量非政府與經理人持股比例之影響後，經理人與職工的持股比例會影響企業承擔冗員數額，而非政府與非經理人的持股比例與經理人的持股比例皆會影響企業爭取政府補貼的數額。意即增加非官員與非經理人持股，可有助於減緩國有企業受政府官員的影響，雖然此舉可能會使企業受政府的補貼減少，但也因此使企業承受的社會責任因官員的干預減少而減少，經理人勢必付出更多的心 力來增加企業的獲利，以獲得股東的信任。至於賄賂數額與經理人持股比例的關係，本研究由於重新調整了經理人與官員的效用函數，使得經理人對官員的賄賂數額會受企業獲利高低的影響。

This study aims to investigate the corruption and collusion problems occurring in the reforms of state-owned enterprises in China, and to analyze how this problem affects the performance of state firms. Using the idea of principal-supervisor-agent relationships, we analyze the decay of officials control over state-owned enterprises resulting from the change that employees, managers and the public are now allowed to hold shares of state-owned enterprises, and they can claim the residual rights of the enterprises. The corruption and collusion between officials and managers may not become less serious. The performances of state-owned enterprises will not be improved even after the introduction of the shareholder system. We use game model involving public, government officials and enterprise managers, focusing on political considerations to study the effect of ownership structure of state-owned enterprises.
This research concludes that the percentage of shares held by managers and employees affects the number of corporations’ redundant employees. It also concludes that the percentage of shares held by non-government and non-managers holders and the percentage held by managers affect how much subsidies a corporation can win from government. To be specific, in this model, α representing the shares of institution investors and individual investors, increasingαis helpful to reduce officials’ influences on companies. Although this could possibly cause a reduction of subsidies from the government, the extra social responsibilities would be decreased, and the inefficient policies demanded by officials could be avoided. Managers have to input more effort to win the trust of small investors with the increases of α.

Chapter 1 Introduction ……………………………………………. 1
Ⅰ Motivation and Objectives-------------------------------- 1
Ⅱ Social Burden of State-Owned Enterprises----------------- 4
Ⅲ Literature Review---------------------------------------- 8 Ⅲ.1 Corruption and Ownership Structure-------------------- 8 Ⅲ.2 Performance and Ownership Structure-------------------13
Ⅳ Research Method and Contributions------------------------14 Ⅳ.1 Research Method---------------------------------------15 Ⅳ.2 Contributions-----------------------------------------16
Chapter 2 Phases of Reforms in State-Owned Enterprisesin China
Ⅰ State-owned Enterprises under the Planned Economy--------19 Ⅰ.1 Establishment of the State-Owned Enterprise-----------19 Ⅰ.2 Development of the State-Owned Enterprise under the Planned Economy
Ⅰ.3 Principal-Supervisor-Agent Relationships and Manager’s Behavior in State-Owned Enterprise under the Planned Economy-24
Ⅱ State-Owned Enterprise under Power-Releasing Policy------27
Ⅱ.1 Background for the Power-Releasing Policy-------------27
Ⅱ.2 Power-Releasing Policy--------------------------------30
Ⅱ.3 Origin and Operation of “Tax for Profit”------------32 Ⅱ.4 contract System----------------------------------------34
Ⅱ.5 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Power-Releasing Policy-------------------------------------------------------36
Ⅲ State-Owned Enterprises under the Shareholder System------41Ⅲ.1 Meaning and Practice of the Shareholder System---------41
Ⅲ.2 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Shareholder System-43
Chapter 3 Collusion and Performance in the Principal-Supervisor-Agent Relationships of State-Owned Enterprises in China..……47
Ⅰ Basic Model ---------------------------------------------50
Ⅱ Behavior of Managers and Government Officials without Corruption---------------------------------------------------58
Ⅱ.1 The Government Official Decides the Level of Redundant Employees--60
Ⅱ.2 The Manager Decides the Level of Redundant Employees---60 Ⅱ.3 Cooperation between the Manager and Official ----------61
Ⅲ Bargaining with Corruption between Manager and Government Official-----------------------------------------------------62
Ⅲ.1 The Government Official Controls over L----------------63
Ⅲ.2 The Manager Controls over L----------------------------65
Ⅳ Analysis and Comparative Statics-------------------------66
Chapter 4 Conclusions and Future Research………………………85
Ⅰ Conclusions ----------------------------------------------85
Ⅱ Influences on Taiwanese Investors-------------------------87
Reference…………………………………………………….…………...89

*Acemoglu, D. and T. Verdier, “Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach,” Economic Journal, 108 (1998), 1381-1403.
*Andvig, J.C., and K.O. Moene, “How Corruption may Corrupt,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 13 (1990), 63-76.
*Bac, M., “Corruption and Supervision Costs in Hierarchies,” Journal of Comparative Economics, 22 (1996a), 99-118.
*Bac, M., “Corruption, Supervision and the Structure of Hierarchies,” Journal of Law, Economics and Qrganization, 12 (1996b), 277-298.
*Bac, Mehmet. “The Scope, Timing, and Type of Corruption,” International Review of Law & Economics. 18 (1998), 101-120.
*Banerjee, A.V., ”A Theory of Misgovernance,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (1997), 1289-1332.
*Banfield, Edward, “Corruption as a Feature of Government Organization,” Journal of Law and Economics, 18 (1975), 587-605.
*Basu, Kaushik; Sudipto Bhattacharya, & Ajit Mishra, “Notes on Bribery and the Control of Corruption,” Journal of Public Economics, 48 (1992), 349-359.
*Beck, Paul J., & Michael W. Maher, “Competition, Regulation and Bribery,” Managerial & Decision Economics, 10 (1989), 1-12.
*Becker, G., “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,” Journal of Political Economy, 76 (1968), 169-217.
*Becker, Gary S., & George J. Stigler, “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and the Compensation of Enforcers,” Journal of Legal Studies, 3 (1974), 1-19.
*Berlle,A., & Means,G., “The Modern Corporation and Private Property ”,Macmillan, New York, (1932).
*Besley, T., & J. McLaren, “Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives,” Economic Journal, 103 (1993), 119-141.
*Cadot, O., “Corruption as a Gamble,” Journal of Public Economics, 33 (1987), 223-244.
*Carrillo, Juan D., “Graft, Bribes, and the Practice of Corruption,” Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 9 (2000), 257-286.
*Chang, Chu-Yun, “The Contributions of 15th Party National Assembly Report in Economic Theory,” [in Chinese], Economic Research, 354 (1997), 7-15.
*Chang, Run-Kun, “The Active Carrying Out of the Stock Share System to Deepen the Reforms of the State-Owned Enterprises,” [in Chinese], Economic Research, 355 (1997), 9-15.
*Chang, Wei-Yin, “The Non-Compensation of the Control Right Loss and the Property Right Barrier of the Merge in the State-Owned Enterprises,” [in Chinese] Economic Research, 363 (1998), 3-14.
*Chang,Wei-Yin, & Ma, Jei, “The Property Right Basis in the Vicious Competition,” [in Chinese] Economic Research, 369 (1999), 11-20.
*Chang,Wei-Yin, “The Power Struggle of the Property Right in the State-Owned Enterprise,” [in Chinese] Economic Research, 386 (2000), 41-50.
*Chen, In-tau, & Zhan, Chuan-po, “ The Report on State-owned Enterprises and Their Operations (1996-2001)” [in Chinese] Reform, 112 (2001), 25-28.
*Chen, Tsun-Bin, & Chan, Chin-Yung, “Research on the State-Owned Enterprises Reforms in China,” [in Chinese] Communist Research, 26(1)(2000), 44-50.
*Chen, Tun-Chi, The Global Enterprise Development-New Thinking for Enterprise Reform and Methods [in Chinese], Ton-Bei Financial University, (December 1998), 257-267.
*Chen Xiao, & Jian, Dong,” The Diversity of Stocks, Company Performance and Competition,” [in Chinese] Economy Study, 8 (2000), 28-35.
*Cho, Myeong-Hyeon, “Ownership Structure, Investment, and the Corporate Value: An Empirical Analysis, ” Journal of Financial Economics, 47(1998), 103-121.
*Cho, Yin-Gung, “The Against Theory Behavior in the State-owned Enterprises Investment,” [in Chinese] Chinese Economic Problems, 4 (April 1997), 11-15.
*Chun, Hung-Chin, “Control Right, Corruption and Enterprise Reforms,” [in Chinese] Economic Research, 366 (1999), 9-19.
*Fama, E., “Agency Problem & the Theory of the Firm”, Journal of Political Economy, 88, (1980), 288-307.
*Feng, Lan-Rei, & Thau, Lui-Kwan, The Employment and Wage of the State-Owned Enterprise, [in Chinese] Beijing People’s Publishing Company, 1982.
*Frank, Bjorn, & Gunther G. Schulze, “Does Economics Make Citizens Corrupt?” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 43 (2000), 101-113.
*Grossman, Sanford J., & Oliver D. Hart, “The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration,” Journal of Political Economy, 94 (1986), 691-719.
*Her, Jun, “The Analysis of Governance of Corporations,” [in Chinese] Economy Study, 5 ( 1998), 50-57.
*Hey, Ai-Tung, “The State Has to Create a Good External Environment,” [in Chinese] Economic Researcher’s Study Materials, 74 (1995), 2-9.
*Holderness, C. and Sheehan, D., “The Role of Majority Shareholders in Publicly Held Corporations,” Journal of Financial Economics, 20 (1988), 317-346.
*Holderness,C., Droszner,R., & Sheehan,D., “Were the Good Old Days that Good? Changes in Managerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression”, Journal of Finance, 54(1999), 435-469.
*Horn, Hwei, “The Share Holding Cooperated System in the Town-Based Enterprises,” [in Chinese] China Research, 39(1996), 7-8.
*Hu, Pei-Chou, “The Trap in the Practice of the Stockholding System,” [in Chinese] Economic Theory and Economic Management, 3 (1999), 14-17.
*Huang,Chau-Han, & Yang, Mu, “Corporation Reform, Redundant Employees and Unemployment of its Workers,” [in Chinese] Reform, 99(1999), 25-31.
*Jensen, M., & W. Meckling, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure”, Journal of Financial Economics, 3(1976),305-360.
*Kofman, Fred, & Jacques Lawarree, “On the Optimality of Allowing Collusion,” Journal of Public Economics, 61 (September 1996) 383-407.
*Krueger, Anne P., “The Political Economy of a Rent-Seeking Society,” American Economic Review, 64 (1974), 291-303.
*Kuo, Chien-Yin, “Three Prices and its Change in Proportion,” [in Chinese] Prices in China, 11 (1995).
*Kuo, Kung-Yin, & Chin, Pin, “The Shareholder System and the Reform of State-Owned Enterprises,” [in Chinese] Economic Theory and Economic Management, 1 (1998), 73-74.
*Laffont, J.J. “Analysis of Hidden Gaming in a Three Level Hierarchy.” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 6 (1990), 301-324.
*Laffont, J.J. and Jean Tirole, A theory of Incentives in Regulation and Procurement (Cambridge, MA:MIT Press 1993).
*Lardy, N.R., China’s Unfinished Economic Reform, Brookings Institution, (1997).
*Lenin, The Biography of Lenin, [in Chinese] People’s Publishing Company, (1975).
*Li, Chi-Pin, “The Thinking of the State-Owned Enterprises in China,” [in Chinese] Economic Theory and Economic Management, 1 (1997), 1-7.
*Li, Dau-Kwe, “The Blurred Property Right Theory in the Transformational Economy,” [in Chinese] Economic Research, 4 (1995), 42-50.
*Lin, Yin-Fu, Tsai, Feng, & Li, Cho, The Reform of the State-owned Enterprise in China [in Chinese], Chinese University, Hong Kong, (1990).
*Lian, Jong-Tarng, “End the Hesitation of the Reform in State-Owned Enterprises,” [in Chinese] Economiist, 2 (1999), 29.
*Lui, F.T., “A Dynamic Model of Corruption Deterrence,” Journal of Public Economics, 31 (1986), 215-236.
*Manion, Melanie, “Corruption by Design: Bribery in Chinese Enterprise Licensing,” Journal of Law Economics & Organization, 12 (April 1996) 167-195.
*Marx and Angels, Communist Manifesto [in Chinese], People’s Publishing Company, (1978).
*McConnell, J. J., & Servaes, H., “Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value”, Journal of Financial Economics, 27 (1990), 595-612.
*Myerson, Roger B., “Effectiveness of Electoral Systems for Reducing Government Corruption: A Game-Theoretic Analysis,” Game and Economic Behavior, 5 (1993), 118-132.
*Rasmusen, Eric, & J. Mark Ramseyer, “Cheap Bribes and the Corruption Ban: A Coordination Game among Rational Legislator,” Public Choice, 78 (1994), 305-327
*Rofman, Fred, & Jacques Lawarree. “Collusion in Hierarchical Agency.” Econometrica, 61 (1993), 629-656.
*Rose-Ackerman, Susan, “The Economics of Corruption,” Journal of Public Economics, 4 (1975), 187-203.
*Shavell, S. “A Note on Marginal Deterrence” International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (1992), 345-355.
*Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny, “Pervasive Shortages under Socialism,” Rand Journal of Economics, 23 (1992), 237-246.
*Shleifer, Andrei, & Robert W. Vishny, “Corruption,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108 (1993), 599-618.
*Shleifer, Andrei, & Robert W. Vishny, “Politicians and Firms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (1994), 995-1025.
*Shleifer, Andrei, “State versus Private Ownership,” Journal of Economic Perspective, 12 (1998), 133-150.
*Tirole, J., “Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2 (1986), 181-214.
*Tirole, J. “The Internal Organization of Government.” Oxford Economic Papers, 46 (1994), 1-29.
*Tirole, J., “A Theory of Collective Reputations with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality, “ Review of Economic Studies, 63 (1996), 1-22.
*Tun, Fu-Chi, “Reform the State-Owned Enterprise under the Base of the Enterprises’ Function,” [in Chinese] Reform, 72 (1995), 40-47.
*Wang, Hon-Lin, Lee, Dau-Kuei, & Lei, Ding-min, “Why the Government Abandoned the Ownership of State-owned Enterprises?” [in Chinese] F13 Theory and Practice of Socialist Economy, 12 (2001), 47-56.
*Wilde, L.L. “Criminal Choice, Nonmonetary Sanctions, and Marginal Deterrence: A Normative Analysis.” International Review of Law and Economics, 12 (1992), 333-344.
*Wilson, J.Q. Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, New York, Basic Books, (1989).
*Wu, Chin-Line, The Reform in Medium and Large Enterprises, [in Chinese], Tien-Chin People’s Publishing Company, (1993).
*Xu, Xiao-Nien, “Set up Company Governance and Capital Market Mechanism Based on Corporations,” [in Chinese] Reform, 5 (1997), 28-34.
*Yeh Chang-Mei, “The Reforms of the State-owned Enterprises after 15th National Party Congress,” [in Chinese] Mainland Chinese Research, 41 (April 1994), 3-16.
*Zho, Yie-Han, “The Survey on the Impact of Financial Control on Chinese Corporations’ Loaning Ability” [in Chinese] Economy Study, 2 (1999), 13-20.