在現實世界的交易中，買賣雙方通常會為了使交易能夠順利達到雙方的需求，進而產生議價（Bargaining）與談判（Negotiation）的過程。議價與談判的過程中充滿了許多不確定性在裡面，一般來說是當交易雙方產生訊息不對稱、報酬不對稱或是某一方可能存在外在的機會（或威脅）時，將會影響到議價達成均衡的結果。故為了瞭解理性決策者在面臨這樣的不確定性下，會以何種方式來制訂自己的議價策略，將是本文探討的重心。
在議價賽局實驗文獻中，終止議價賽局（Ultimatum bargaining game）扮演了一個重要的角色，因此本文將以此議價模型作為基礎，探討在議價雙方訊息不對稱，且充滿外在機會（威脅）的情況之下，買賣雙方的價格制訂過程與議價方法，並藉由三種理論行為預期假設（子賽局完全均衡、均分差異模型與deal-me-out模型），驗證參賽者的決策行為路徑是否符合理論預期，最後再經由實驗法來驗證其結果。實驗證據顯示：(1)在三種理論假設下，只有deal-me-out的預測方式在雙方訊息對稱的情況下存在顯著，其它情形則均不準確；(2)買方存在外在提議時將對於參賽者的決策行為產生影響，尤其是當此提議期望報酬越高時；(3)訊息不對稱增加了議價談判時的不確定性；(4)存在某些參賽者偏好於作公平性的議價策略；(5)不充分訊息條件下自我學習效果並不顯著。

Any trading mechanism can be thought of as a bargaining process over the surplus generated from the exchange. The traders often stay in various situations among bargaining process and try to look for an optimum strategy. This research reports the results of an experiment in which anonymous subjects played a repeated ultimatum game.
The aim of the research is the presentation of experimental bargaining games and the bargaining behavior of rational players. The experiment controls the outside option of the buyer and the information condition in the game. Then we compare the predictions of three models called subgame-perfection, split-the-difference and deal-me-out, for these treatments. The experimental evidence shows: (1)The outcomes predicted by deal-me-out better than those by other two models, especially under perfect information assumption; (2)Outside option of the buyer indeed alters the seller’s strategies; (3)Asymmetric information between traders increases the prediction variations; (4)The results support that the role fairness plays in the ultimatum game; (5)Self-learning effect under insufficient information structure is not significant.

中文摘要 I
英文摘要 II
誌謝 III
目錄 IV
表目錄 VI
圖目錄 VII
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究架構 2
第二章 理論背景及相關文獻探討 4
第一節 實驗室實驗法 4
第二節 議價賽局實驗 6
第三章 研究方法 12
第一節 理論架構 12
第二節 實驗設計 19
第四章 實驗結果分析 22
第一節 實驗結果 22
第二節 參賽者行為分析 35
第五章 結論與建議 38
第一節 研究結語 38
第二節 後續研究與建議 40
參考文獻 42
附錄 47
附錄一：實驗說明 47

中文部分：
[1] 高亦勳，「存在預算限制之競標者於多個標的物拍賣行為研究－實驗法之應用」，國立台灣科技大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文，民國九十一年。
[2] 黃俊傑，「策略不確定性與協調失敗－沈默協調賽局的實驗結果」，國立台灣科技大學企業管理研究所碩士論文，民國八十七年。
[3] 張光第，「以實驗法研究購屋者之需求因素」，國科會研究專案，民國八十七年。
[4] 謝淑貞，賽局理論，民國八十四年。
英文部分：
[1] Abbink, Klaus, Bolton, Gary E., Sadrieh, A., Tang, Fang-Fang (2001), “Adaptive Learning versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining,” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 1-25.
[2] Bolton, Gary and Axel Ockenfels (2000) ‘‘ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and Competition,’’ American Economic Review, Vol. 90, pp. 166-193.
[3] Bolton, Gary and Rami Zwick (1995), “Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining,” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 10, 95—121.
[4] Binmore, K., Gale, J. and Samuelson, L. (1995), “Learning To Be Imperfect: The Ultimatum Game,” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 8, 56—90.
[5] Bolton, Gary (1991), “A Comparative Model of Bargaining: Theory and Evidence,” American Economic Review, Vol. 81, pp. 1096-1136.
[6] Binmore, K., Shaked, Avner and Sutton, John (1989), “An Outside Option Experiment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 104, Issue 4, pp. 753-770.
[7] Croson, Rachel T.A. (1996), “Information in Ultimatum Games: An Experimental Study,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Vol. 30, pp. 197-212.
[8] Carter, John R. and Irons, Michael D. (1991), “Are Economists Different, and If So, Why?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 5, Issue 2, pp. 171-177.
[9] Davis, Douglas D. and Holt, Charles A. (1999), “Equilibrium Cooperation in Two-Stage Game: Experimental Evidence,” International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 28, pp. 89-109.
[10] Duffy, John and Feltovich, Nick (1999), “Does Observation of Others Affect Learning in Strategic Environments? An Experimental Study,” International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 28, pp. 131-152.
[11] Davis, Douglas D. and Holt, Charles A. (1993), Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press.
[12] Forsythe, Robert, Horowitz, J.L., Savin, N.E. and Sefton, M. (1994). “Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments,” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 6, pp. 347—369.
[13] Fudenberg, Drew and Tirole, Jean (1992), Game Theory, the MIT Press.
[14] Forsythe, Robert, Kennan, John and Sopher, Barry (1991), “An Experimental Analysis of Strikes in Bargaining Games with One-Sided Private Information,” American Economic Review, Vol. 81, Issue 1, pp. 253-278.
[15] Guth, W., Huck, S. and Muller, W. (2001), “The Relevance of Equal Splits in Ultimatum Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 37, No. 1, pp. 161-169.
[16] Guth, W., Schmittberger, R. and Schwarze, B. (1982), “An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 3, pp. 367-388.
[17] Hoffman, Elizabeth, Kevin McCabe, Keith Shachat and Vernon Smith (1994), “Preferences, Property Rights and Anonymity in Bargaining Games,” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 7, pp. 346-380.
[18] Hoffman, Elizabeth and Spitzer, Matthew L. (1985), “Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects’ Concepts of Distributive Justice,” Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 14, pp. 259-297.
[19] Kagel, John H., Chung Kim and Moser, Donald (1996), “Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs,” Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 13, pp. 100-110.
[20] Kreps, David M. (1992), Game Theory and Economic Modeling, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
[21] Kahneman, D., Knetsch, Jack L. and Thaler, Richard H. (1986), “Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics,” Journal of Business, Vol. 59, Issue 4, pp. 285-300.
[22] Moore, Michael R., Gardner, Roy and Walker, James M. (1997), “Governing a Groundwater Commons: A Strategic and Laboratory Analysis of Western Water Law,” Economic Inquiry, Vol. 35, Issue 2, pp. 218-234.
[23] Nagel, Rosemarie and Mitzkewitz, Michael (1993), “Experimental Results on Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information,” International Journal of Game Theory, 22, 171-198.
[24] Nash, John (1950), “The Bargaining Problem,” Econometrica, XVIII, 155-162.
[25] Osborne, Martin J. and Rubinstein, Ariel (1990), Bargaining and Markets.
[26] Ochs, Jack and Roth, Alvin E. (1989), “An Experimental Study of Sequential Bargaining,” American Economic Review, Vol. 79, pp. 355-384.
[27] Prasnikar, Vesna and Roth, Alvin E. (1992). “Considerations of Fairness and Strategy: Experimental Data from Sequential Games,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 107, pp. 865-888.
[28] Rami Zwick and Lee, Ching Chyi (1998), “Bargaining and search: An experimental Study,” Working paper by the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
[29] Rasmusen, Eric (1991), Games and Information - An Introduction to Game Theory.
[30] Slembeck, Tilman (1999), “Low Information Games: Experimental Evidence on Learning in Ultimatum Bargaining,” Discussion Paper, No. 9903.
[31] Slembeck, Tilman (1999), “Reputations and Fairness in Bargaining: Experimental Evidence from a Repeated Ultimatum Game with Fixed Opponents,” Discussion Paper, No. 9904.
[32] Smith, Vernon L. (2000), Bargaining and Market Behavior.
[33] Smith, Vernon L. (1994), “Economics in the Laboratory,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 8, Issue 1, pp. 113-131.
[34] Smith, Vernon L. (1991), Papers in Experimental Economics.
[35] Smith, Vernon L. (1990), Experimental Economics.
[36] Selten, Reinhard (1965), “Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfragetragheit,” Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 301-324, 667-689.
[37] Tullberg, Jan (1999), “The Ultimatum Game Revisited,” SSE/EFI working papers series in Business Administration, No. 1999: 2.