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研究生:白峻宇
研究生(外文):Jiun-Yu Bai
論文名稱:技術選擇與垂直整合之策略分析
論文名稱(外文):Strategy Analysis in Technological Choice and Vertical Integration
指導教授:謝登隆謝登隆引用關係
指導教授(外文):Deng-Lung Shieh
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:東海大學
系所名稱:企業管理學系碩士班
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2002
畢業學年度:90
語文別:中文
論文頁數:80
中文關鍵詞:垂直整合市場封殺完全封殺部份封殺技術選擇
外文關鍵詞:Vertical IntegrationMarket ForeclosureComplete ForeclosurePartial ForeclosureTechnological Choice
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:33
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  • 下載下載:93
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:5
近年來不論何種產業皆遭受到購併(Merger&Acquisition,M&A)風潮的席捲,不論企業是基於何種原因與動機都紛紛投入購併的潮流中,企業的相互整併嚴然已成為公司追求成長的新利器。然而在眾多的企業購併案中約有30﹪∼50﹪的案例是失敗的,因此企業此種類似賭博式的公司成長策略亦吸引諸多學者先進投入相關的研究領域。
垂直整合策略在企業決定本身之垂直範圍時便占了極重要的地位,產業中一家廠商的垂直整合動作很可能會改變整個產業結構,因為整合廠商很可能在垂直整合後採取完全封殺或是部份封殺策略,透過市場機能運作後各廠商的市場力量(market power)亦會產生巨大的變化,進而影響到整合與非整合廠商的利潤水準。而廠商在採取垂直整合策略時不外乎是為了降低生產成本與確保關鍵零組件的來源或銷售通路,若上游廠商在整合後進一步採取市場封殺策略亦可能會提高下游競爭對手的成本使其處於不利的競爭地位。
在以往市場封殺的相關理論中皆著重於假設廠商採取垂直整合策略時只會整合一家不同產業層級的廠商,但在現實商業環境中整合廠商往往是大動作的整合多家廠商,在此情況下垂直整合策略除了可能存在Salinger(1988)所提出的「市場封殺的效果」與「節省成本的效果」之外,亦可能產生「市場力量的效果」,透過此三種效果的互相消長作用以達到提昇廠商利潤或是封殺競爭廠商的策略性目的。
本研究主要探討在一連續市場(successive market)中,上游的獨占廠商(monopoly firm)面臨了一家潛在競爭廠商進入市場的威脅,而此獨占廠商生產之財貨透過中間市場販售給下游n家獨立的廠商,且產業中存在著兩種技術─標準技術(standard technology)與非標準技術(nonstandard technology),整合廠商採取不同的技術也代表了其不同的策略性目的。我們分別分析上游現存廠商之最適技術與策略選擇,並進一步討論在廠商之各種技術、整合策略與整合下游獨立廠商家數選擇下,對整合與非整合廠商利潤變化和中間財貨與最終財貨市場之價格影響,並分析上游現存廠商之最適技術與策略選擇。
In recent years, M&A make big influence in all kinds of industries. No matter what are the motives of businesses, these businesses throw themselves into the trend of M&A. Integrate between businesses has already become a new method for business growth. In numerous cases about business merger, however, there are about 30 to 50 percent of these cases were failing.
Therefore, the growth strategies of business, which just like gamble, attract many scholars to research this issue.
Vertical integration plays an important role when firm decides its own vertical scope. Firm’s action in VI may change industrial structure wholly, because VI firm may adopt foreclosure or strategic purchase after VI. Through market mechanism, the market power of each firm may have tremendous changes which have influence on the profits of VI or non-VI firm. To cut down costs and to ensure the source of key factors are the motives for a firm to choose VI. If upstream firm adopt foreclosure after VI, this strategy may raise the cost of oppose firms in downstream and let them stay at a disadvantage situation.
In past theories about foreclosure which all emphasize the assumption about firm will just integrate one firm at different level when it adopt VI. In current situation, however, VI firm always integrate many firms on a grand scale. In this situation, VI may emerge “foreclosure effects” and “saving cost effects” just like what Salinger(1988) said, and it may also emerge “market power effects”. Through the interaction of these three effects, firm can achieve the strategic purpose of raise firm’s profits or foreclose oppose firms.
In this research, a successive market is our main subject. We discuss monopoly firm in upstream faces enter threaten of a oppose firm, and monopoly firm sales its product to n downstream firms through intermediate market. There are two kinds of technologies in industry--standard technology and nonstandard technology, VI firm adopts different technology means it has different purpose. We analyze the suitable technology and strategic choices of upstream incumbent, furthermore, we discuss the influence on the profits fluctuate and price fluctuate on intermediate and final goods market of VI and non-VI firms. Different technologies, VI strategy and the number of VI firms downstream are three important factors when we analyze upstream incumbent’s suitable technology and strategic choices.
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究範圍 3
第三節 研究目的 5
第四節 研究架構 5
第二章 相關文獻回顧 7
第一節 垂直整合之定義與分類 7
第二節 垂直整合誘因之相關理論 11
第三節 市場封殺之相關理論 23
第四節 整合廠商技術選擇之相關理論 30
第三章 研究設計 33
第一節 模型假設與模型設計 33
第二節 可能之垂直結構情況 37
第四章 COURNOT模型競爭分析 40
第一節 潛在廠商不進入市場 42
第二節 潛在廠商進入市場 45
第三節 垂直整合對市場競爭之影響分析 52
第五章 廠商之生產技術與策略選擇 62
第一節 潛在廠商不進入市場 62
第二節 潛在廠商進入市場 63
第三節 整合廠商的最適技術與策略選擇 70
第六章 結論與建議 72
第一節 研究成果彙整 72
第二節 未來研究方向 75
參考文獻 76
一、中文部份 76
二、英文部份 77
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