臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

庫藏股制度在國外已行之有年，但台灣於民國89年才正式啟動，且與國外的制度也不盡相同，因此本研究以89至91年國內實施庫藏股之上市公司為對象，首先以事件研究法探討庫藏股宣告之市場反應，接著以「橫斷面與時間序列合併資料」（Panel data）之迴歸模型探討庫藏股與員工分紅配股之間的關係，並進一步對影響公司實施庫藏股的相關因素進行實證。最後，探討企業實施庫藏股是否會對投資支出造成排擠效果。

在市場反應方面，實證結果發現：（1）國內上市公司宣告買回庫藏股後，股價有顯著正向的反應，且宣告買回後第一日之異常報酬達到最大；（2）在產業別之比較上，電子業的宣告效果最不明顯，而金融業有資訊洩露的跡象；（3）在不同買回目的方面，目的三（維護股權）的宣告效果大於目的一（轉讓員工），但目的一的效應期間卻較目的三為長；（4）不同實施次數比較方面，結果並不顯示宣告效果會隨著次數的增加呈現遞增或遞減的現象，但實施次數愈多的公司有部分提前反應的現象。若與金融業的結果對照，更能說明實施次數愈多，訊息洩露的情形愈明顯。

在影響公司買回庫藏股之因素方面，實證結果顯示，公司當年度若有實施員工分紅配股，則當年度庫藏股買回總額會相對減少，但當年度以前若連續三年皆有實施分紅配股，則買回庫藏股總額愈多，符合盈餘稀釋假說與經理人動機假說。至於其他公司特性方面，規模愈大、投資機會愈小，公司愈可能買回庫藏股。

在投資支出排擠效果之實證結果發現，買回庫藏股對企業長期投資並無影響，但對短期投資、資本支出及研發費用皆為負相關，表示將資金挪用於庫藏股的買回，除了長期投資之外，會使企業的短期投資、資本支出與研發費用相對減少，故實施庫藏股對企業投資支出具有排擠作用。

Share repurchase system has been implemented abroad for years, but it was formally implemented in Taiwan until 2000. However, the system in Taiwan is different with it in other countries. Therefore, this study take public listed companies implementing share repurchase system during 2000 to 2002 in Taiwan as samples. First, we use event study to investigate the market reacts on the announcement of share repurchase, and then we use regression model with panel data to explore the relationship between share repurchase and employee stock ownership, and we investigate the related factors influencing the implementation of share repurchase. Finally, we explore whether the implementation of share repurchase will cause the reduction in investing expenditure or not.

Referring to market reacts, we find that (1) when the public listed companies announce to repurchase shares, stock price revealed positive reaction significantly, and the abnormal returns are maximized on the day after announcement day, (2) To compare with different industries, unapparent announcement effect are showed in electronic industries and the facts of information leakage in financial industries, (3) on aspects of the different purposes of repurchasing, the announcement effect for firms aimed at retaining the interests of shareholders’ equity as buyback purpose is found to be larger than that for transfer to employees as purpose, but transfer to employees as purpose has longer lasting span than retain the interests of shareholders’ equity as purpose, (4) on the comparison of different implementation times, the results didn’t show announcement effect accelerate or diminish along with the augmentation of implementation times, but those companies which implements more showed anticipated reaction. If comparing with financial industries, this explains more implementation times results in significant information leakage.

Referring to the factors influencing companies to repurchase shares, we find if a company implements employee stock ownership in the same year, the total amounts of share repurchases will be decreased, but if a company implements employee stock ownership for three consecutive years before repurchase, the total amounts of share repurchases will increase. It is consistent with the earning diluted hypothesis and management incentive hypothesis. As for other company features, the larger the company is, the less the investment opportunities will be, the company is more inclined to repurchase shares.

On the part of investing expenditure, we find that share repurchase can not influence companies’ long-term investment but has negative relationship with short-term investment, capital expenditure and R&D expense, which reveals that diverting funds to share repurchase will cause the decrease of short-term investment, capital expenditure and R&D expense except for long-term investment, hence the implementation of share repurchase will cause the reduction in investing expenditure.

《目　錄》
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究目的 3
第三節 研究流程與論文結構 4
第二章 文獻探討 6
第一節 庫藏股之相關文獻探討 6
第二節 員工分紅入（配）股之相關文獻探討 15
第三節 企業投資排擠效果之相關文獻探討 20
第三章 研究方法 24
第一節 研究架構與假說 24
第二節 事件研究 26
第三節 關聯性研究 31
第四節 研究對象與資料來源 45
第四章 實證結果與分析 47
第一節 樣本敘述性統計 47
第二節 庫藏股宣告之市場反應 50
第三節 分紅配股對庫藏股買回之影響 64
第四節 庫藏股買回對企業投資與支出之影響 69
第五章 結論與建議 77
第一節 研究結論 77
第二節 研究限制 80
第三節 建議 81
參考文獻 82
附錄一　 各國庫藏股制度比較表 89
附錄二　 員工獎酬制度比較表 90

《表目錄》
表2.1 影響公司買回庫藏股之公司特性 14
表3.1 假說H2與H3之變數衡量 44
表3.2 各假說之樣本數 46
表4.1.1 實施庫藏股產業別統計件數 47
表4.1.2 實施庫藏股目的別統計件數 48
表4.1.3 上市公司產業別與目的別之各年度實施件數統計 48
表4.1.4 上市公司各產業實施庫藏股次數比較 49
表4.2.1 全體樣本標準化平均異常報酬及累計平均異常報酬 51
表4.2.2 不同產業之標準化平均異常報酬 54
表4.2.3 不同產業之標準化累計平均異常報酬 55
表4.2.4 不同買回目的之標準化平均異常報酬 57
表4.2.5 不同買回目的之標準化累計平均異常報酬 58
表4.2.6 不同實施次數之標準化平均異常報酬 61
表4.2.7 不同實施次數之標準化累計平均異常報酬 62
表4.2.8 各樣本別事件窗口之標準化累計平均異常報酬 63
表4.3.1 各研究假說之實證模式檢定 65
表4.3.2 假說H2實證結果 68
表4.4.1 對長期投資影響之實證結果 71
表4.4.2 對資本支出影響之實證結果 72
表4.4.3 對短期投資影響之實證結果 74
表4.4.4 對研發費用影響之實證結果 75
表4.4.5 假說H3之變數方向彙整 76

《圖目錄》
圖1.1 研究流程 5
圖3.1 研究架構 24
圖3.2 假說H1之各時間參數關係 27
圖4.2.1 全體樣本標準化平均異常報酬及累計平均異常報酬 52
圖4.2.2 不同產業之標準化平均異常報酬 53
圖4.2.3 不同產業之標準化累計平均異常報酬 53
圖4.2.4 不同買回目的之標準化平均異常報酬 59
圖4.2.5 不同買回目的之標準化累計平均異常報酬 59
圖4.2.6 不同實施次數之標準化平均異常報酬 60
圖4.2.7 不同實施次數之標準化累計平均異常報酬 60

一、中文部分
(1)丁幼泉，1977，「謳歌與期待－略論分紅、入股辦法的制訂與實施」，中國勞工，第417期，頁3-7。

(2)王世榕，1991，「公民營事業單位實施勞工分紅入股與年終獎金制度之研究」，台灣省政府研究發展考核委員會。

(3)王俊傑，2001，「台灣高科技中小企業融資之研究－以電子製造業為例」，長榮管理學院經營管理研究所未出版碩士論文。

(4)毛治文，1998，「內部關係人持股比例及其變動與上市公司購回庫藏股之關連性研究」，中國文化大學會計研究所未出版論文。

(5)李田樹、李芳齡譯（Gary Hamel著），2000，啟動革命，臺北：天下遠見出版社，頁58-60。

(6)李永全，1994，「員工入股計畫之租稅效果、分配效果及可行性研究」，中山大學財務管理學系未出版碩士論文。

(7)沈中華、李建然，2000，事件研究法：財務與會計實證研究必備，臺北：華泰書局。

(8)巫素玫，2002，「影響員工分紅入股高低之因素及宣告時市場反應」，東海大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。

(9)林玉成，2001，「上市公司庫藏股宣告資訊內涵及及操作策略之分析」，高雄第一科技大學財務管理系未出版碩士論文。

(10)林秀蓉，2001，「我國上市公司購回庫藏股宣告效果之實證研究」，台北大學企業管理學系未出版碩士論文。

(11)吳家聲，1988，「員工分紅入股制度之研究」，行政院勞工委員會綜合規劃處，頁1-7。

(12)邱煥堯，2001，「台灣股票市場庫藏股行情之實証研究」，中央大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。

(13)邱鍵麟，2001，「台灣上市公司實施庫藏股制度對股價影響之研究」，長庚大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。

(14)孫浩翔，1995，「融資順位理論之實證研究」，中央大學企業管理系未出版碩士論文。

(15)孫鑑吾，2001，「企業實施庫藏股動機之研究」，逢甲大學會計與財稅研究所未出版碩士論文。

(16)陳隆麒、翁霓，1992，「員工持股計畫與公司績效關係之研究」，管理評論，頁81-102。

(17)陳安斌、王信文，2001，「台灣高科技奇蹟之國家競爭力泉源探尋－台式員工分紅入股制度之研究」，ITIS產業論壇，第三卷第2期。

(18)馬黛，1994，「我國實施員工入股計畫之研究」，行政院勞工委員會。

(19)陸光，1978，「國外分紅入股簡介」，中國勞工，第528期，頁40-51。

(20)許兆億，2001，「我國上市公司實施庫藏股之研究」，成功大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。

(21)黃世欣，2001，「庫藏股制度對台灣股票市場之影響」，淡江大學財務金融學研究所未出版碩士論文。

(22)黃美娟，2003，「多次購回庫藏股訊號效果之研究」，長庚大學企業管理研究所未出版碩士論文。

(24)張天開，1983，「分紅入股的基本概念及範例」，華岡社會學報，第2期，頁139-149。

(25)張淑雯，2000，「員工分紅入股資訊之市場反應－以台灣上市電子公司為例」，東吳大學會計學研究所未出版碩士論文。

(26)張俊彥、游伯龍，2001，活力：台灣如何創造半導體與個人電腦產業奇蹟，臺北：時報文化，頁77-138。

(27)張傳章，2002，「庫藏股制與員工認股權證」，企業金融的12堂課，臺北：天下遠見出版社，頁150-164。

(28)楊琬婷，2001，「庫藏股制度對台灣股市的影響」，臺灣大學財務金融學研究所未出版碩士論文。

(29)趙曉玲，2002，「員工分紅入股制度對組織績效的影響」，中央大學人力資源管理研究所未出版碩士論文。

(30)鄭桂蕙，2002，「公司買回庫藏股之資訊內涵：投資人觀點」，政治大學會計學系未出版博士論文。

(31)劉維琪、劉玉珍，1989，「融資順位理論之發展與實證」，管理評論，頁7-22。

(32)謝育政，2001，「實施庫藏股制度對公司股價影響之研究」，國防管理學院資源管理研究所未出版碩士論文。

(33)薛居發，2002，「員工紅利配股對除權行情之實證分析－以台灣上市電子公司為例」，銘傳大學金融研究所未出版碩士論文。

二、英文部分
(1)Asquith, P., and D. W. Mullins, 1986, “Signaling with Dividends, Stock Repurchases, and Equity Issues,” Financial Management 15, 27-44.

(2)Bagwell, L. S., and J. B. Shoven, 1989, “Cash Distribution to Shareholders,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, 129-140.

(3)Bagwell, L. S., 1991, “Share Repurchase and Takeover Deterrence,” Journal of Economics 22, 72-88.

(4)Bajaj, M., and A. Vijh, 1990, “Dividend Clienteles and the Information Content of Dividend Changes,” Journal of Financial Economics 26, 193-219.

(5)Baltagi, B. H., 2001, Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, 2ed, New York: John Wiley & Sons.

(6)Barth, M. E., and R. Kasznik, 1999, “Share Repurchases and Intangible Assets,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 28, 211-241.

(7)Bens, D. A., V. Nagar, and M. H. F. Wong, 2002, “Real Investment Implications of Employee Stock Option Exercises,” Journal of Accounting Research 40, 359-393.

(8)Bhagat, S. and I. Welch, 1995, “Corporate Research & Development Investments, International Comparisons,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 19, 443-470.

(9)Brigham, E. F. and D. H. Woods, 1964, “Stockholder Distribution Decisions: Share Repurchase or Dividends,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 1, 15-28.

(10)Cheng, Jo-Hui and M. Williams, 1999, “The determinants of business failures in the US low-technology and high-technology industries,” Applied Economics 31, 1551-1563.

(11)Comment, R. and G. A. Jarrell, 1991, “The Relative Signalling Power of Dutch-Auction and Fixed-Price Self-Tender Offers and Open-Market Share Repurchases,” The Journal of Finance 46, 1243-1271.

(12)Dann, L. Y., 1981, “Common Stock Repurchases: An Analysis of Returns to Bondholders and Stockholders,” Journal of Financial Economics 9, 113-138.

(13)Davidson, W. N., I. Chhachhi, and J. L. Glascock, 1996, “A Test for Price Pressure Effects in Tender Offer Stock Repurchases,” The Financial Review 31, 25-49.

(14)DeFusco, R. A., R. R. Johnson, and T. S. Zorn , 1990, “The Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on Stockholders and Bondholders,” Journal of Finance 45, 617-627.

(15)Denis, D., D. Denis, and A. Sarin, 1994, “Information Content of Dividend Changes: Cash Flow, Signaling, Overinvestment, and Dividend Clienteles,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 29, 567-587.

(16)Dittmar, A. K., 2000, “Why Do Firms Repurchase Stock?” Journal of Business 73, 331-355.

(17)Donaldson, G., 1961, “Corporate Debt Capacity: A Study of Corporate Debt Policy and the Determination of Corporate Debt Capacity,” Boston, Division of Research, Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration.

(18)Donaldson, G., 1985, “Financial Goals and Strategic Consequences,” Harvard Business Review (May-June), 56-66.

(19)Dunsby, A., 1994, “Share Repurchases, Dividends, and Corporate Distribution Policy,” Working paper, Philadelphia: The Warton School.

(20)Easterbrook, F., 1984, “Two Agency-Cost Explanations of Dividends,” American Economic Review 74, 650-659.

(21)Fama, E. F., 1970, “Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work,” Journal of Finance 25, 323-346.

(22)Fenn, G. W., and N. Liang, 1997, “Good News and Bad News about Share Repurchases,” Working paper, Washington D.C.: Board of Covernors of the Federal Reserve.

(23)Fenn, G. W., and N. Liang, 2001, “Corporate Payout Policy and Managerial Stock Incentives,” Journal of Financial Economics 60, 45-72.

(24)Jensen, M. C., 1978, “Some Anomalous Evidence Regard Market Efficiency,” Journal of Financial Economics 6, 95-102.

(25)Jensen, M. C., 1986, “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,” American Economic Review 76, 323-329.

(26)Jolls, C., 1996, “The Role of Compensation in Explaining the Stock-Repurchase Puzzle,” Working paper, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard Law School.

(27)Kahle, K. M., 2002, “When a Buyback Isn’t a Buyback: Open Market Repurchases and Employee Options,” Journal of Financial Economics 63, 235-261.

(28)Kaplan, S., and D. Reishus, 1990, “Outside Directorships and Corporate Performance,” Journal of Financial Economics 27, 389-410.

(29)Lang, L. H. P., R. M. Stulz, and R. A. Walking, 1991, “A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis: The Case of Bidder Returns,” Journal of Financial Economics 29, 315-335.

(30)Lambert, R. A., W. N. Lanen, and D. F. Larcker, 1989, “Executive Stock Option Plans and Corporate Dividend Policy,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 24, 409-425.

(31)Lehn, K., and A. Poulsen, 1989, “Free Cash Flow and Stockholder Gains in Going Private Transactions,” Journal of Finance 44, 771-787.

(32)Masulis, R.W., 1980, “Stock Repurchase by Tender Offer: An Analysis of the Causes of Common Stock Price Changes,” Journal of Finance 35, 305-321.

(33)McGough, R., S. McGee, and C. Bryan-Law, 2000, “Buyback Binge Now Creates Big Hangover,” Wall Street Journal 18: C1.

(34)Medury, P., L. Bowyer, and V. Srinivasan, 1992, “Stock Repurchases: A Multivariate Analysis of Repurchasing Firms,” Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics (Winter), 21-44.

(35)Myers, S. C., and N. S. Majluf, 1984, “Corporate Financing and Investment Decision when Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have,” Journal of Financial Economics 13, 187-221

(36)Netter, J. M., and M. L. Mitchell, 1989, “Stock-Repurchase Announcements and Insider Transactions after the October 1987 Stock Market Crash,” Financial Management 18, 84-96.

(37)Opler, T. and S. Titman, 1996, “The Debt-Equity Choice: An Analysis of Issuing Firms,” Working paper, Columbus: Ohio State University.

(38)Park, S. and M. H Song, 1995, “Employee Stock Ownership Plans, Firm Performance, and Monitoring by Outside Blockholders,” Financial Management 24, 52-65.

(39)Rappaport, A., 1999, “New Thinking on How to Link Executive Pay with Performance,” Harvard Business Review (March-April), 91-101.

(40)Rosenberg, M., and A. Young, 1978, “Firms Repurchasing Stock: Financial Security Market and Operating Characteristics,” University of Michigan Business Review 30, 17-33.

(41)Ross, S., 1977, “The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signaling Approach,” Bell Journal of Economics (Spring), 209-243.

(42)Ryan, H. and R. Wiggins, 2001, “The Influence of Firm- and Manager-specific Characteristics on the Structure of Executive Compensation,” Journal of Corporate Finance 7, 101-123.

(43)Ryan, H. and R. Wiggins, 2002, “The Interactions between R&D Investment Decisions and Compensation Policy,” Financial Management 31, 5-29.

(44)Scott, J., 1977, “Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure,” Journal of Finance 32, 1-20.

(45)Shyam-Sunder, L., and S. C. Myers, 1999, “Testing Static Tradeoff Against Pecking Order Models of Capital Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics 51, 219-244.

(46)Thonandar, R. V., 1973, Variation of the Profit Sharing Theme, In Guide to Modern Profit Sharing, Profit Sharing Council of American.

(47)Tsetsekos, G., D. Kaufman, and L. Gitman, 1991, “A Survey of Stock Repurchase Motivations and Practices of Major U.S. Corporations,” Journal of Applied Business Research 7, 15-21.

(48)U.S. General Accounting Office, 1987, “Employee Stock Ownership Plans: Benefits and Costs of ESOP Tax Incentives for Broadening Stock Ownership,” Washington, D. C.

(49)Vermaelen, T., 1981, “Common Stock Repurchases and Market Signaling－An Empirical Study,” Journal of Financial Economics 9, 139-183.