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研究生:陳盈如
研究生(外文):Ying-Ju Chen
論文名稱:國內企業與銀行借貸存續期間之研究
論文名稱(外文):The Study on the Lending Duration of Firms: Evidence from the Cases of Taiwan
指導教授:許培基許培基引用關係王健安王健安引用關係
指導教授(外文):Pei-Gi ShuChien-An Wang
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:輔仁大學
系所名稱:應用統計學研究所
學門:數學及統計學門
學類:統計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2003
畢業學年度:91
語文別:中文
論文頁數:103
中文關鍵詞:銀行往來關係存續期間存活分析經營績效聯立方程式
外文關鍵詞:Banking RelationshipDurationSurvival AnalysisPerformanceSimultaneous Equations
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傳統銀行理論認為,企業與銀行維持密切之往來關係,可以降低企業借款的資金成本與增加信用額度,特別是在艱困的財務時期,銀行較願意提供企業較優惠的放款,以幫助企業度過難關。亦有文獻指出,企業若與銀行有密切往來關係,容易被長期借貸往來的銀行鎖住,產生獨佔性的剝削成本,增加企業之融資成本。然而,過去文獻在探討企業與銀行往來關係之重要性時,都忽略了企業與銀行借貸往來存續關係之影響,因此,本研究試圖透過企業經營績效是否提升之觀點,探討影響存續期間之因素,並利用存續關係來衡量企業與銀行往來關係之淨價值。


本研究使用台灣上市企業之逐筆借款資料,首先以存活分析實證影響企業與銀行借貸往來存續期間長短之因素,再以多元迴歸分析探討企業與銀行借貸往來存續期間對企業經營績效之影響,最後再建立聯立方程式驗證兩變數互動的結果。研究的主要結果發現:

1.規模較小、成立期間較久、未來成長機會較大、負債比率較高、和單一銀行以及和新銀行有往來關係之企業,與銀行維持之借貸往來存續期間較短。

2.企業與銀行之借貸往來存續期間愈久,企業之經營績效愈差,因此較支持「剝削成本假說」。

3.在金融風暴發生前就和銀行建立借貸往來存續關係之企業,金融風暴發生後,企業之經營績效較佳。
In the traditional banking literature, strong banking relationships are generally regarded valuable assets of firms because they lower the funding costs and increase the credit availability. During the distressed shocks, it’s more worthy because banks are willing to make unprofitable loans to firms for firms’ survival. However, banking relationship has a cost as other arguments. According to those literatures, firms are more easily been “lock-in” through the strong banking relationships. It permits the banks to extract monopoly rents at the same time.

As proxing the strength of the banking relationships, many literatures ignored the importance of the lending duration. In this study, we analyze the duration of banking relationships using a unique panel data set of listed firms and their banks from the individual transaction loan data, use the survival analysis, multiple regression, and simultaneous equations model to infer the determinants of relationship duration, and examine the value of durable banking relationships in Taiwan during the 1991-2001 period.

Our research demonstrates the following results:

1.The characteristics of the smaller, older, more growth opportunities, higher leveraged capital structure, single-bank, and new-bank firms seem to maintain shorter banking relationships.

2.The longer the banking relationships are, the better the firms’ performances are.

3.If the banking relationships are built before the financial crisis, the firms’ performances are better as the financial crisis breaks out.
表次…………………………………………………...………Ⅱ
圖次………………………………………………………...…Ⅲ
第壹章 緒論………………………………….………………1
第一節 研究動機與目的……………………………………………3
第二節 論文架構…………………………………………………....6
第貳章 文獻回顧與評述…………………………………….8
第一節 企業與銀行往來關係密切與否之定義與衡量……………9
第二節 企業與銀行密切往來關係之效益………………………..18
第三節 金融風暴期間企業與銀行密切往來關係之效益………..24
第參章 研究設計…………………………………………...29
第一節 資料來源與變數之操作性定義…………………..………29
第二節 研究方法…………………………………………………..45
第肆章 實證結果與分析…………………………………...60
第一節 樣本資料之敘述統計……………………………….…….60
第二節 影響存續期間長短之變數之實證結果…………………..69
第三節 影響企業經營績效之變數之實證結果…………………..79
第四節 存續期間及企業經營績效之聯立方程式………………..86
第伍章 結論與建議………………………………………...89
第一節 研究結論…………………………………………………..89
第二節 後續研究之建議…………………………………………..93
參考文獻……………………………………………………...95
口試委員意見處理情況說明………………………………......i
中文部分

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黃登源,2002,市場調查分析講義。
褚堅訓,1998,存活分析模式之符合性檢定,國立台灣大學農藝所生統組碩士論文。
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陳盈樺,2000,台灣地區銀行與企業融資關係之探討—主力銀行機制,私立銘傳大學金融研究所碩士論文。
陳錦村,1997,銀行授信客戶之信用評等與模式比較,輔仁管理評論,頁145-172。
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