臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本研究以Ricardo貿易模型為經濟環境假設基礎，在兩國進行貿易交易行為之經濟體系下，首先以Nash’s Bargaining模型就純私有財經濟體系，從消費層面針對私有財專業化生產之商品市場作模型化一般均衡分析；隨後探討在可排他性公共財之假設下，公共財的存在不再造成市場失靈，同時解決生產者融資的問題，正式進入經濟貿易公共財實質市場之主題研究。在Ricardo貿易模型的經濟環境假設基礎下，引進Nash’s Bargaining模型，從生產層面作適當修正，探討兩國人民效用函數與兩商品消費之結構，針對大國可能專業化或非專業化生產基礎下，說明其要素生產稟賦的分配情形。
當實質商品市場達成均衡後，針對雙方最適貿易條件與兩商品提供水準之影響關係進行探討，並導入古典學派貨幣數量說之Fisher交易方程式，從實質商品市場均衡分析進入名目貨幣市場達成均衡之全面均衡探討。最後針對兩商品皆為私有財與一為公共財、一為私有財之市場體系，作比較性分析，並說明兩商品之提供水準與貿易條件對均衡匯率之影響，並且針對各國貿易條件均衡下，探討在商品市場與貨幣市場中，經濟變數達成均衡後所隱含之經濟涵義。
關於總體均衡模型中商品市場與貨幣市場之連動關係，本研究試圖證明在商品市場上之重要因素，諸如產出決策、效用函數結構等變數，將如何影響貨幣市場上匯率的決定與均衡匯率之調整結構。此外，更說明調整後均衡匯率之建立，並決定出透過調整之均衡匯率所揭露之總體資訊。不同於傳統總體模型，本研究透過個體分析基礎來決定總體均衡匯率。貨幣市場名目變數在本研究中被直接引入個體貿易模型，以建構出商品市場與貨幣市場之總體均衡狀態，並加入公共財商品之探討，透過簡單Nash’s Bargaining模型來分析公共財之商品市場均衡，進而說明貨幣市場之匯率與調整後均衡匯率之結構。此修正結果在總體均衡模型中，對於匯率決定，以及透過均衡匯率的調整所揭露之總體資訊與建立調整後匯率指標之方式，其間關聯性將釋出重要的經濟內涵。
整個經濟體系中必須在需求與供給二方面互相配合下才可能達到最適境界，尤其針對公共財生產之探討，需求面偏好之顯示問題一直是造成無法有效率生產之主因。過去研究中各模型在決定最適公共財生產時，又必須面臨以下問題：個人偏好無法得知、社會福利函數不易求得、事前最適所得無法決定等，因而模型分析上只限於理論上之探討，對於公共財最適生產之問題終究無法獲得解決。因此有待更新發展之研究方法來解決此難題，如果偏好問題可以解決，則公共財之生產必然有效率。

The study is principally based on Ricardian Model to construct a general equilibrium model with both the commodity market and money market. At first, we probe into the solution to the equilibrium of the pure private goods market according to the paper writed by Chunyuan Chen. And the modified model with a point of view about the consumption show that each nation will specialize in producing goods which it has the comparative advantage in this paper. When the commodity market reaches to the equilibrium, money will be introduced into the Ricardian Model. Immediately, exchange rates and prices have been used to construct a variety of indexes such as effective exchange rates and real exchange rates to reveal important economic information.
Under the trade between two nations, we want to probe into the linkage between the commodity and money market of the public goods. And we revise the model appropriately by illustrating the production structure of one of two nations which it may either specialize or unspecialize in producing goods. It places restrictions on the economical conditions of Ricardian Model and Fisher transaction equation. By Nash’s bargaining Model, the study is in order to analyze the economical implication includes the optimum terms of trade and a condition of their consumptions and import and export in the commodity market. In addition, the results as well be derived in the general equilibrium model will shed some important insight into the determination of the exchange rate and the linkage between the information revealed by adjusted exchange rates and the ways adjusted exchange rates are constructed. In the end, we make the statement to compare the market of the public goods and private goods.

目錄
第一章 緒論……………………………...………………….….1
第一節 研究動機與目的……………….…………………………1
第二節 研究方法與架構……………….…………………………4
第三節 研究假設與符號定義…………………………………….8
第二章 文獻探討………………………………………….12
第三章 私有財市場之均衡連動關係…………………….23
第一節 私有財商品市場均衡分析……………………………...23
第二節 私有財貨幣市場均衡分析……………………………...35
第四章 公共財市場之均衡連動關係…………………….42
第一節 公共財商品市場均衡分析……………………………...42
第二節 公共財貨幣市場均衡分析……………………………...52
第三節 公共財產出國之生產結構分析………………………...64
第四節 模型比較………………………………………………...75
第五章 結論與建議……………………………………….82
附錄一………………………………………………………...90
附錄二……………………………………………………….103
參考文獻…………………………………………………….119
圖表目錄
圖1-1 研究架構………………………………………………………....7
表 4.1.1 影響公共財共同使用權之實質價值變動方向的因素…..…50
表 4.2.1 影響兩國貨幣交易存量變動方向之因素…………………..55
表4.2.2 影響兩國境內物價水準變動方向之因素……………………59
表 4.3.1 從市場偏好型態與A國生產結構的調整來判斷兩國對於私
有財相對生產能力的大小…………………………………..74
表4.4.1 純私有財之市場均衡…………………………………………75
表4.4.2 存在公共財之市場均衡………………………………………76

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