臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

國營事業民營化的議題涵蓋範圍甚廣，本論文討論的內容主要是針對政府在國營事業民營化的政策擬定、準備至執行等不同階段，分別從國營事業所處的競爭環境、組織治理及民營化方式等三個面向各選出一個主題，在第二、三、四章中各以單獨一章的篇幅深入探討。各章間對民營化時程、政府對國營事業的分權、公股釋出比例及國營事業員工的激勵與安置等議題的討論，均保持有其階段性與聯繫性。本論文的主要內容摘要如下：
在開放型經濟中，國營事業由原來的獨占經營，因為政府開放私有企業加入而形成混合寡占的經營型態。考慮到混合寡占市場裡的私有企業不一定全部侷限為本國廠商，並且這些來自國外的私有企業也不一定只會被動的接受本國政府的政策作為。本論文延伸過去混合寡占的研究，深入分析外國私有企業採取不同的經營方式及轉撥價格進入本國市場與本國國營事業競爭時，本國政府採行公股釋股比例、公司稅率及利潤匯回稅率等政策性措施，本國國營事業及外國私有企業在本國分公司間混合寡占的競爭情形，分析本國政府政策性措施或外國私有企業母公司不同經營方式下，對本國總社會福利、國營事業民營化之最佳釋股比例及外國私有企業總利潤的影響。
分析結果，發現：(1)本國政府當政策上決定開放外國私有企業進入本國市場後，不論是採行國營事業民營化、課徵公司稅或課徵利潤匯回稅等任何策略性措施，均無法有效、明確的最大化本國的總社會福利。(2)國營事業民營化的最佳策略有可能是局部民營化。(3)在本國的產業政策方面，由於公股釋出對國內、外產品的市場占有率有助漲助跌的效果，本國政府不宜以擴大民營化規模的手段，作為調節本國市場中國內外產品數量的政策工具。
當政府在政策上決定推動國營事業民營化後，從國營事業的治理角度觀察，政府首先面臨的就是如何重整國營事業及取得國營事業員工的支持。因此，國營事業本身進行民營化的能力及各國營事業內部員工支持民營化的意願程度，成為影響政府推動國營事業民營化能否成功的二個重要因素。然而政府透過國營事業來完成民營化的施政措施，不論是國營事業本身或其內部員工，二者均會產生代理問題。在此情況下，政府除了關心國營事業是否有足夠誘因積極辦理民營化的相關工作外，如何最有效的運用經費也是一個亟須考量的地方。
對於此議題，首先證明高能力執行民營化的國營事業與高支持民營化意願程度的國營事業員工能完成最高的公股釋出比例，據以針對這二類對象分別設計出不同特別經費投入的二期誘因契約，以分離出其各別不同的類型並提升公股釋出比例。當所設計的誘因契約可以達到最大的分離效果時，國營事業及其員工所能得到的資訊租愈低，完成的公股釋出比例愈高。在國營事業方面，本論文提出政府以直接投入可置信的專案經費來改善國營事業執行民營化的能力；在員工方面，則提出政府以間接提供訓練經費補助款的機制以揭露員工的支持民營化意願。兩者均是在第一期提供特別經費以鼓勵國營事業及其員工透露其私有資訊，並施予較慷慨的給付以產生足夠誘因，讓國營事業及其員工朝向創造高釋股比例的方向移動，政府利用此資訊在第二期則能準確有效的運用經費，提升公股釋出比例。最後，討論由於各國營事業類型的差異，專案補助的投入，改變了國營事業的類型，經由執行民營化之反效用函數的作用影響國營事業隱藏資訊的機會成本，進一步增強對各國營事業類型的分辨性。當投入專案補助愈多，其分辨效果愈強。是故，政府在推動民營化時，多使用專案補助經費，以增加國營事業類型的分辨性，只要再使用少量的誘因支出，就可讓國營事業正確的透露其私有資訊。
政府執行國營事業公司民營化的方式，在過去的文獻很少討論，即使偶有提及，也侷限在釋股方法的比較上。但是國營事業公司由於先天上組成原因特殊，再加上部分公司長期受到政府刻意保護，現有體質己無法自行獨立經營，勉強民營化恐將淪為加速結束營運的結果，而此亦是這些公司從業人員杯葛民營化的原因之一。這些公司由於長期績效不彰，股票亦很難獲得投資人的青睞。因此，洽尋具有能力吸收這些國營公司，從而發揮綜效的特定對象接手經營，愈來愈受到主管單位的重視。針對洽特定對象方式將國營事業公司民營化的議題，本論文導入誘因理論，分析特定對象所提出包括分紅入股的誘因內容，在不同資訊揭露程度下產生之結果；同時亦探討國營事業公司工會與特定對象談判民營化後的工作條件，並討論分紅入股的內容改變時，對工作條件的影響。
探討以洽特定對象方式將國營事業公司民營化，由分析結果發現：(1)在特定對象與國營事業員工間資訊完全的情況下，國營事業員工得不到任何的資訊租；特定對象可以透過適當的契約設計，不必監督與實施分紅入股計畫即能達到利潤最大化的目的。(2)在資訊不對稱的情況下，特定對象會提出分紅計畫，國營事業員工付出次佳之工作積極性；當特定對象有虧損可能時，國營事業員工會增加認購股票以作為願為公司努力工作的信號。(3)國營事業之工會與特定對象談判民營化後的工作條件時，工會為工資導向者。在談判時，特定對象提高分紅比例對工資水準沒有影響，但會減少留任人數；而當本購併案的平均投資報酬率為正時，國營事業公司員工增加認股比例，其談判結果是民營化後的員工工資減少，但增加留任人數。因此，如國營事業工會的談判目的在於爭取民營化後較多的留任人數，則國營事業公司員工應減少分紅比例，但增加認股比例。

This dissertation explores the issues of mixed oligopoly, restructuring, and M&A that occurs in turn on the stages of policy set-up, preparation, and performing when the government attempt to privatize the state-owned enterprises (SOEs).
On the policy set-up stage, private firms in domestic market are not necessary confined to originate at home country. Foreign private firms may establish an oversea subsidiary and create a mixed oligopoly market structure at home country. In addition, those foreign private firms may not passively accept all the trade policies that came from the government decision of home country. Mixed oligopoly competition between one domestic public firm and one subsidiary of foreign private firm is been formulated to investigate the following questions: (1) how the agents compete under the cases that home country government adopts policies such as corporate tax rate, repatriation tax rate, and partial offering public stocks; and the foreign private firm implements strategies such as vertical integration and transfer pricing; (2) the impact on social welfare and the decision of optimal public stock-offering ratio while home country government’s policies and foreign private firm’s strategies have changed.
New findings include (1) Home country government can not maximize social welfare by simply adopting strategic policies; (2) For home country government, the best strategy for privatizing SOEs maybe partial privatization; (3) For home country government, “mass privatization” should be avoided as the means of manipulating domestic market shares.
On the preparation stage, an incentive scheme model is designed to analyze the governance mechanism for improving SOEs’ situation. First, different types of SOEs are classified according to their own ability and the employees’ attitude for privatization. By offering a sound device of incentive scheme, the government is able to strengthen the SOEs’ ability and employees’ desirability. Within a one-stage symmetric information game framwork, it proves that SOEs with high ability and their employees with high privatization desirability can implement the highest amount of public stock offering ratio. Next, it utilizes a two-stage asymmetric game model for discussing how to improve the SOEs’ ability and how to encourage the employees to support privatization. By providing an incentive contract, the government not only can coerce the SOEs but also can inspire their employees to reveal their true information. The due process of public stock offering is able to strengthen the abilities of SOEs via “restructuring” on the one hand, and to facilitate the issue of “training subsidies” for hatching the entrepreneurship of employees on the other hand. Finally, it investigates the impact on public stock offering ratio for the amount of specific grants, and found that the more generosity of incentive contract, the higher the public stock offering ratio.
On the performing stage, it adopts the incentive theorem to analyze the outcome of SOEs’ privatization by inviting a named firm. The named firm takes over the SOEs through M&A for the purpose of long-term operation. In order to encourage the employees of the privatized company working more aggressively, the named firm comes up incentive schemes including bonus-sharing and Employees Stock Ownership Plan, ESOP. It found that whether there exists information asymmetry or not between the named firm and the employees of the privatized company will affect the following decision-makings: the level of the employees’ effort, the willingness of the employees’ stock-holding, and the achievement of the named firm’s profit maximizing objective. In particular, it shows that the change of the contents of the incentive schemes will affect the bargaining outcomes between the named firm and the trade union of the SOEs on the issue of working conditions after privatization.

論文摘要 I
Abstract IV
謝辭 VII
目錄 i
圖次 ii
表次 ii
第一章 緒論 1
1.1 前言 1
1.2 國營事業民營化的原因與目的 2
1.3 國營事業民營化的方式與過程 4
1.4 國營事業民營化的成果 6
1.5 本論文各章間之階段性與聯繫性 8
第二章 外國私有企業進入、混合寡占與民營化 10
2.1 前言 10
2.2 基本模型 14
2.3 外國私有企業直接出口最終產品銷售本國市場 17
2.4 外國私有企業出口中間原料在本國生產並銷售最終產品 24
2.5 本章結論 31
第三章 國營事業民營化之治理機制分析 33
3.1 前言 33
3.2 基本模型 35
3.3 對國營事業提出包含直接投入專案經費的誘因契約 40
3.4 對國營事業員工提出間接補助的誘因契約 48
3.5 專案補助與國營事業類型的分辨效果 51
3.6 本章結論 53
第四章 洽特定對象民營化之誘因機制分析 55
4.1 前言 55
4.2 基本模型 58
4.3 Firm1擁有Firm2之完全資訊 60
4.4 Firm1與Firm2間存在資訊不對稱 62
4.5 Firm1與Firm2之工會談判工作條件 66
4.6 本章結論 70
第五章 結論與建議 72
參考文獻 77
附錄一：比較靜態分析的數學運算 85

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