臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

許多策略性環境政策的相關文獻普遍強調，當兩國廠商在商品市場選擇以數量為競爭變數時，兩國政府傾向設定較寬鬆的環境政策標準；若兩國廠商選擇以價格為競爭變數，則兩國政府會傾向設定較嚴格的環境政策標準。不過，這些文獻大多只著重在廠商競爭模式具對稱性的情況。但在現實生活中，是有可能會出現一家廠商選擇價格契約，另一家廠商則選擇數量契約的情形。
因此本文欲以過去這些理論作為基礎，建構一非對稱的寡佔市場模型，對此時兩國政府的策略性環境政策做比較和探討。接著再引進若兩國政府決定在環境政策上採行合作時，對兩國的環境政策水準又分別有何影響。最後本文會得出以下三個結論：
一、 若兩國政府在決策時，進行非合作的策略性行為：在此情況下，廠商採行Bertrand競爭的本國政府會選擇低於環境最適的環境政策水準；廠商進行Cournot競爭的外國政府則偏好高於環境最適的環境政策水準。此結論與先前關於對稱競爭模式文獻所得到的結論形成一個有趣的對比：若兩廠商均以價格為變數進行競爭，則會得到兩國政府均會採取緊縮環境政策的對稱性結果；若兩廠商均以數量為變數進行競爭，則兩國政府會偏好較寬鬆的環境政策。
二、 若兩國政府協議在決策時，均以追求最大的兩國總福利水準為目標來分別選擇各自最適的環境水準：這種合作形式會導致兩國政府會設定較非合作時更嚴格的環境政策，此舉能使兩國的環境水準均獲得改善。
三、 若兩國政府協議自原先非合作的環境水準，做同向且同量的政策變動：這種合作模式同樣地，會導致兩國政府更嚴厲地執行環境政策，進而使環境污染問題能獲得改善。

The existing literature on strategic environment policy shows that the exporting country will set the environmental regulation less stringent than the optimal policy under the Cournot competition, which is know as the “ecological dumping”; the regulation will be set more stringent than the optimal policy under the Bertrand competition. However, these conclusions are derived under the symmetric competition, i.e., the choice variables for the firms are the same ---either quantity or price.
This thesis investigates the strategic environmental policy in an asymmetric duopoly situation, that is, the choice variable is the price for the domestic firm and quantity for the foreign firm. We find that the domestic country will set the environmental regulation less stringent than the optimal policy, but the foreign environmental regulation is more stringent than its optimal level. The cooperation between the two countries is discussed as well.

目錄
第一章 緒論…………………………………………… ………………. .1
第一節 研究動機與目的………………………………………… …..1
第二節 研究方法與限制…………………………………………… ..2
第三節 章節架構…………………………………………………… ..3
第二章 相關文獻回顧…………………………………… …………….. 4
第一節 策略性貿易………………………………………………… ..4
第二節 策略性環境政策..………………………………………… …6
第三節 環境政策合作…………………………………………………10
第三章 兩國政府對污染作直接管制的情形…………………………… 12
第一節 基本模型設定…………………………………………………12
第二節 廠商策略性行為………………………………………………13
第三節 政府策略性行為………………………………………………17
第四章 兩國政府課污染稅的情形……………………………… ………20
第一節 基本模型設定…………………………………………………20
第二節 廠商策略性行為………………………………………………20
第三節 政府策略性行為………………………………………………24
第四節 與對稱寡占競爭市場的情形作比較…………………………28
第五章 環境政策合作的情形…………………………………………… 29
第一節 考慮兩國總福利水準的結果…………………………………29
第二節 兩國環境政策同向且同量變動的結果………………………36
第六章 結論與建議……………………………………………………… 41
參考文獻………………………………………………………… ………..43

一、中文部分：
王嘉慧(2002)，貿易自由化環境政策暨福利效果之探討，未出版碩士論文，政治大學財政研究所碩士論文。
二、英文部分：
Barrett, Scott (1994), Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade, Journal of Public Economics, 54, 325-338.
Brander, James A. and Barbara J. Spencer (1985), Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry, Journal of International Economics, 18, 83-100.
Conrad, Klaus (1993), Taxes and Subsidies for Pollution-Intensive Industries as Trade Policy, Journal of Environmental economics and Management, 25, 121-135.
Conrad, Klaus (1996), Choosing Emission Taxes under International Price Competition, in Carlo Carraro, Yiannis Katsoulacos and Anastasios Xepapadeas (eds), Environmental Policy and Market Structure, Dordrecht：Kluwer, 85-98.
Eaton, J. and Gene M. Grossman (1986), Optimal Trade and Industry Policy under Oligopoly, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 383-406.
Kennedy, Peter W. (1994), Equilibrium Pollution Taxes in Open Economics with Imperfect Competition, Journal of Environmental Economics and Mangement, 27, 49--63.
O’ Hare,M. (1977), Not on My Block You Don’t：Facility Siting and the Strategic Importance of Compensation, Public Policy, 24(4), 407-458.
Rauscher, M. (1994), On Ecological Dumping, Oxford Economic Paper, 46, 822-840.
Singh, N. and Xavier Vives (1984), Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly, Rand Journal of Economics, 15(4), 546-55.
Symeonidis, George (2003), Comparing Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria in a Differentiated Duopoly with Product R&D, International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21, 39-55.
Ulph, Alistair (1996a), Environmental Policy and International Trade when Governments and Producers Act Strategically, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30, 265-281.
Ulph, Alistair (1996b), Strategic Environmental Policy and International Trade─the Role of Market Conduct, in Carlo Carraro, Yiannis Katsoulacos and Anastasios Xepapadeas (eds), Environmental Policy and Market Structure, Dordrecht：Kluwer, 99-127.
Ulph, Alistair (1997a), Environmental Policy and International Trade, in Carlo Carraro and Domenico Siniscalo (eds), New Directions in the Economic Theory of the Environment, Cambridge：Cambridge University Press, 147-192.
Ulph, Alistair (1997b), International Trade and Environment：A Survey of Recent Economic Analysis, in Wallace E. Oates and Henk Folmer (eds), Trade and the Environment：Selected Essays of Alistair M. Ulph, Cheltenham, UK：Edward Elgar, 3-40.
Ulph, Alistair (1999), Ecological Dumping：Harmonization and Minimum Standards, in Emmanuel Petrakis,Eftichios S. Sartzetakis and Anastasios Xepapadeas (eds), Environmental Regulation and Market Structure：Competition, Time Consistency and International Trade, Cheltenham, UK：Edward Elgar, 233-250