跳到主要內容

臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

(44.220.255.141) 您好!臺灣時間:2024/11/04 02:55
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果 :::

詳目顯示

: 
twitterline
研究生:張培真
研究生(外文):Chang, Pei-Chen
論文名稱:員工分紅入股與公司特質之關係及其對公司績效之影響
論文名稱(外文):Determinants of Employee Stock Grants and Their Impact on Firm''s Performances
指導教授:蔡彥卿蔡彥卿引用關係
指導教授(外文):Tsai, Yann-Ching
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立臺灣大學
系所名稱:會計學研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:會計學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2003
畢業學年度:91
語文別:英文
論文頁數:55
中文關鍵詞:員工股票紅利分紅入股公司特質公司績效
外文關鍵詞:employeeemployee stock grantsbonusfirm characteristicsperformances
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:113
  • 點閱點閱:713
  • 評分評分:
  • 下載下載:140
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:6
本研究以所有上市、上櫃之資訊電子公司自民國八十年至民國九十年止之資料為樣本,旨在探討影響員工分紅入股數量多寡之公司特質、以及員工分紅入股對公司績效之影響。
研究結果發現當公司有較高的成長機會、或其吸引員工留任之必要性較高時,會傾向於配發較多的股票給員工;但並沒有明顯的證據顯示公司在面對較高的財務困境時其以股票派發員工紅利的程度會較高;不過,大公司的員工分紅入股程度似乎的確比小公司來得高。
實證資料顯示員工分紅入股之激勵效果確實存在,員工分紅入股的程度與公司的績效表現呈正向關係,本研究中以公司股價異常報酬、平均股價、資產報酬率、淨值報酬率、以及Tobin’s Q比率等五項指標來衡量公司的績效。此外,我們發現若只是單純的配發高額員工股票紅利,其本身並無法為公司帶來更好的績效表現;當公司為了其較高的成長機會或為了吸引員工留任而配發較多的員工股票紅利時,其激勵效果更為明顯,可使公司績效表現更好;但若公司的槓桿程度較高,即其負債比率較高時,其配發之高額員工股票紅利,反而對公司績效產生不利之影響。而高額的員工股票紅利能夠為小公司相對於大公司帶來更大的激勵效果。
To examine the impact of the magnitude of employee stock grants on firm’s performances, about 300 electronic and information firms whose stocks are traded in markets of TSE or OTC are selected to make up the sample.
The employee stock grants means actually to distribute the bonuses to employees in common form of stock shares. This special compensation system is quite different from the employee stock option system, which has been popular in U.S.A., for it doesn’t need any cost from employees. I have found that firms tend to grant more employee stocks when they have more growth opportunities or greater needs to hire and retain employees. There is weak evidence supporting that firms augment the magnitude of employee stock grants when facing financial constraints. Besides, larger firms tend to grant more employee stocks than smaller firms do.
Empirical results reveal that higher magnitude of employee stock grants have positive impact on firm’s performances, which is captured by abnormal returns, average stock prices, return on assets, return on equities, and Tobin’s Q ratio in this research, though the positive impact on abnormal returns is not quite significant. Furthermore, there are also evidences in favor of the hypothesis that greater employee stock grants in response to the firm’s more growth opportunities or higher needs of retaining employees induce even better firm performances. However, greater employee stock grants of high-leveraged firms are harmful to firm’s performances. Lastly, high magnitude of employee stock grants is proved to create more value in smaller firms than in larger firms.
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION.........................................1
1.1 Foreword...................................................1
1.2 Issues Concerned...........................................2
1.2.1 What Is The Granting Standard?...........................2
1.2.2 Motivation Effect........................................3
1.2.3 Dilution Effect..........................................3
1.3 Organization Of The Thesis.................................4
CHAPTER 2 SURVEY OF PAST RESEARCH..............................5
2.1 Meanings of Employee Stock Grant...........................5
2.1.1 Qualified Employees......................................5
2.1.2 The Approval Of Employees'' Stock grant...................6
2.1.3 The Amount Of Earnings Distribution To Employees.........6
2.1.4 Market Value Or Par Value?...............................7
2.1.5 Comparison Of Ways that Employees Get Common Stocks From Their Company..................................................7
2.2 Measurements Of Firm’s Performance And Value.............10
2.2.1 Tobin’s Q Ratio........................................10
2.2.2 Book value and Market value.............................11
2.2.3 Alternative Information Other Than Accounting Earnings..11
2.3 Dilution Or Motivation Effect of Employee Stock Grants....12
2.3.1 Dilution Effect.........................................12
2.3.2 Motivation Effect.......................................13
2.4 Issues On The Employee Stock Options......................13
2.4.1 Determinants Of Employee Stock Option Grants............13
2.4.2 Performance Impact Of Employee Stock Options............15
2.4.3 Economic Dilution of Employee Stock Options.............15
CHAPTER 3 DESIGN OF RESEARCH..................................17
3.1 Hypotheses Development....................................17
3.1.1 Determinants of employee stock grants...................17
3.1.2 Impact Of Employee Stock Grants On Firm’s Performance..18
3.1.3 Source Of Better Performance............................19
3.2 Research Method And Variables Definition..................19
3.2.1 Variable Definition.....................................20
3.2.2 Research Method.........................................26
3.3 Sample Selection and Data Description.....................28
3.3.1 Employee Stock Grant Activities.........................28
3.3.2 Firm Characteristics....................................29
3.3.3 Firm Performances.......................................29
CHAPTER 4 ANALYSIS OF EMPERICAL RESULTS.......................33
4.1 Firm Characteristics And The Magnitude Of Employee Stock Grants........................................................33
4.1.1 Correlations Between The Variables......................33
4.1.2 Explanatory Power of The Determinants...................34
4.2 Impact Of Employee Stock Grants On The Firm’s Performances..................................................37
4.3 Sources Of Better Performances............................40
4.3.1 Employee Stock Grants In Response To Financial Constraints...................................................40
4.3.2 Employee Stock Grants In Response To Growth Opportunities.................................................41
4.3.3 Employee Stock Grants In Response To The Need Of Retaining Employees...........................................42
4.3.4 Employee Stock Grants Of Larger Firms...................42
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE WORKS...........49
5.1 Conclusions...............................................49
5.2 Limitations Of Research...................................50
5.3 Future Works..............................................51
姚鷺 (Yao, L.),2002年,「員工分紅配股對股東權益的影響」,國立台灣大學財務金融學研究所碩士論文
馬嘉應、薛明玲、黃志雄 (Ma, C. Y., M. L. Hsueh, and C. H. Huang),「員工分紅入股之會計處理與財稅影響﹙上﹚」,2000年,會計研究月刊第178期,頁134-139
馬嘉應、薛明玲 (Ma, C. Y. and M. L. Hsueh),「員工分紅入股之會計處理與財稅影響﹙下﹚」,2000年,會計研究月刊第179期,頁67-71
陳建忠 (Chen, C. C.),2001年,「員工分紅對企業價值的影響」,國立政治大學經營管理碩士學程碩士論文
張淑雯 (Chang, S. W.),2000年,「員工分紅入股資訊之市場反應-以台灣上市電子公司為例」,國立東吳大學會計學研究所碩士論文
鄭淑芬 (Cheng, S. F.),1999年,「員工最適配股率之研究-以台灣上市電子公司為例」,國立中山大學財務管理學系碩士論文
Barber, B. M. and J. D. Lyon. 1997. “Detecting Long-Run Abnormal Returns: The Empirical Power and Specification of Test Statistics.” Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 43:341-372.
Ittner, C. D., R. A. Lambert, and D. F. Larcker. 2002. “The Structure and Performance Consequences of Equity Grants to Employees of New Economy Firms.” Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 34, 2003:89-127.
Core, John, and Wayne Guay. 1999. “The Use of Equity Grants to Manage Optimal Equity Incentive Levels.” Unpublished paper, University of Pennsylvania Wharton School, June.
Core, John, and Wayne Guay. 2000. “Stock Option Plans for Non-Executive Employees.” Unpublished paper, University of Pennsylvania Wharton School, January.
Core, J. E. and W. R. Guay. 2002. “The Economic Dilution of Employee Stock Options: Diluted EPS for Valuation and Financial Reporting.” The Accounting Review, vol. 77, No. 3, July 2002:627-652.
Fairfield, P. 1994. “P/E, P/B and The Present Value of Future Dividends.” Financial Analysts Journal, Jul/Aug 1994: 23-31.
Fama, E. and K. French. 1992. “The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns.” Journal of Finance, June 1992:427-465.
Mehran, Hamid, and Joseph Tracy. 2001. “The Effect of Employee Stock Options on the Evolution of Compensation in the 1990s.” FRBNY Economic Policy Review, December 2001.
Henry David, Lavelle Louis. 2003. “Exploring Options.” Business Week, 2/3/2003 , Issue 3818:78-79.
Kulatilaka, Nalin, and Alan J. Marcus. 1994. “Valuing Employee Stock Options.” Financial Analysts Journal, 50 (November/ December): 46-56.
Kormendi, Roger and Robert Lipe. 1987. “Earnings Innovations, Earnings Persistence, and Stock Returns.” Journal of Business, vol. 60, No. 3, July 1987:323-345.
Lambert, Richard, David F. Larcker, and Robert E. Verrecchia. 1991. “Protfolio Considerations in valuing Executive Compensation.” Journal of Accounting Research, 29 (spring):129-149.
Lindenberg, E. B. and S. A. Ross. 1981. “Tobin’s Q Ratio and Industrial Organization.” The Journal of Business, vol. 54, issue 1, Jan. 1981:1-32.
Lipe, Robert. 1990. “The Relation Between Stock Returns and Accounting Earnings Given Alternative Information.” The Accounting Review, vol. 65, No.1, January 1990: 49-71.
Murphy, K. J. 2002. “Stock-Based Pay in New Economy Firms.” Journal of Accounting and Economics, vol. 34, 2003:129-147.
Simi Kedia and Abon Mozumdar. 2002. “Performance Impact of Employee Stock Options.” Working paper, Harvard University and Boston University.
Tobin, J. 1969. “A General Equilibrium Approach To Monetary Theory.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, vol.1, Feb.1969:15-29.
Tobin, J. 1978. “Monetary Policies and The Economy: The Transmission Mechanism.” Southern Economic Journal, vol. 37, April:421-431.
Yermack, David. 1995. “Do Corporations Award CEO Stock Options Effectively?” Journal of Financial Economics, 39, No. 2: 237-269.
QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top