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研究生:陳瑞璽
研究生(外文):Ruey-Shii Chen
論文名稱:公司治理-股東利益權衡與投資人保護
指導教授:王元章王元章引用關係
指導教授(外文):Yuan-Jang Wang
學位類別:博士
校院名稱:國立中正大學
系所名稱:財務金融研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:財務金融學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2004
畢業學年度:92
語文別:中文
論文頁數:87
中文關鍵詞:公司治理最終控制投資人保護現金流量權控制權
外文關鍵詞:Corporate GovernanceUltimate ContorlShareholders ProtectionCash Flow RightsControl Rights
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股權結構透過代理問題對公司價值產生影響,良好的股權結構有助於公司內部治理減少代理成本並因而提升公司價值。本文在集中股權下,建立四個可驗證之假說,並以1999及2002年台灣上市公司資料進行實證,探討大股東與小股東間之代理問題。本文建立的四個假說為:(一)控制股東之現金流量權愈高有愈高的公司價值。(二)控制股東控制權與現金流量權分離程度愈大則公司價值愈低。(三)當控制股東掠奪時,控制權與現金流量權分離程度低的非控制股東會聯合以制衡掠奪,此時會增加公司價值。(四)不存在控制股東的公司,依控制權與現金流量權分離程度可形成掠奪與制衡兩群體,群體控制權相對大小會影響公司價值。
本文實證結果支持前三個假說,但不支持假說四,此表示增加直接持股有利於公司價值,間接持股則對公司價值不利,股東以交叉持股或金字塔結構等型式間接持股不但會增加控制股東掠奪公司資源以私用之行為,同時亦會減少非控制股東之制衡。
本文亦發現不同規模的公司其控制股東控制權之臨界值不同,大規模公司之股東其控制公司所需之最低控制權會較小規模的公司低。最後關於投資人保護之實證,本文並未得到1999至2002年台灣在改善投資人保護環境之相關努力具有顯著成效之證據
第一章緒論
第一節研究動機
第二節研究目的
第三節研究架構
第二章文獻回顧
第一節理理論
第二節公司治理機制
第三節控制股東
第三章資料與假說
第一節研究假說
第二節資料說明
第三節變數定義
第四章實證結果
第一節 實證說明
第二節定義控制股東
第三節具控制股東公司之實
第四節不具控制股東公司之實證
第五節投資人保護
第五章結論與建議
第一節結論
第二節研究限制與建議參考文獻附錄
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