臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

在高度競爭的現今社會，技術創新與擴增分支部門是廠商成長最重要的因素之一，其中技術創新更是扮演至為關鍵的角色。現存市場中，常常可以發覺某些產業，存在很多品牌擁有者有其若干家的直營店。上游之品牌擁有者從事研究與發展，下游之直營分支部門則是銷售其產品。本文以Ziss (1998) 為模型基礎，進一步探討品牌擁有者從事研究與發展，在研發確定且不具外溢效果下，希望透過三個階段的賽局，以理論分析找出研發投入與品牌家數、產品差異化和研發的效率係數等外生變數的關係。至於賽局的程序，首先，各品牌擁有者各自決定其研發投入。其次，品牌擁有者決定其下游分支數。最後，所有下游分支數於產品市場從事 Cournot 競爭。在假設同一品牌之分支部門的產品為同質的，而不同之品牌擁有者其所屬分支部門間的產品為異質，以比較靜態分析得到如下結論：研發投入水準，將隨品牌家數之增加或研發的效率係數上升而下降。在研發投入水準與產品差異化之間的關係，存在當品牌家數數目大（等）於4家，隨著產品差異化愈小，研發投入愈少。但是，當品牌家數數目為2家或3家時，產品差異化程度愈小，也就是產品間愈趨於完全替代時，廠商勢必投入更多的資源從事研發，以取得技術上的優勢。

In this intense competitive society, the important factors of the firm’s growth are the technology innovation and the development of divisionalization. The technology innovation, especially, plays the key role in this growth. Therefore, a situation could be found in some industries is the brand’s owners always have a lot of divisions in the exist market. Moreover, the brand’s owners have to focus on research and development and the part of divisions have to focus on selling and extend market share. As above, this dissertation is based on the model of Ziss (1998) to discuss the brand’s owners’ research and development. Under the corroborate results with no spillover effect, this dissertation is relied on three-stage game to analyse the relation of exogenous factors, which are the R&D investment, the number of brands in market, product differentiation and the efficient of research. In the process of game, the first stage is each brand owner has to make decision for the R&D investment. And then, the brand’s owners should to make sure the number of divisions. At last, all divisions should competitive by Cournot in market. The assumption of this dissertation is that products are differentiated across brands but not across divisions. Comparing by the static analysis can be gotten these results which they are as follow: the level of the R&D will decrease because of the increase of the brands number or the increase of the efficiency coefficient of the R&D. According to the relationship between the level of R&D investment and product differentiation, if the exist brands are equal or over 4 brands, the less the products differentiation, the fewer resources are inputted. However, if the brands are 2 or 3, the level of product differentiation will be less and it means that the products can be completed substitution. When the situation happened, the firm has to make an effort on R&D to get the advantage of the skill.

目錄
中文摘要 I
英文摘要 Ⅱ
目錄 Ⅲ
表目錄 Ⅳ
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與的 1
第二節 研究方構 2
第二章 文獻回顧 5
第一節 直營分支部門的獻 5
第二節 授權與垂直整合的獻 6
第三章 模型與均衡分析 8
第一節 基本模型 8
第二節 下游產品市場之競爭 10
第三節 決定下游的分支數 11
第四節 決定研發投入量 13
第四章 比較靜態分析 15
第五章 結論與建議 24
第一節 結論 24
第二節 建議 25
參考文獻 27

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