(18.206.177.17) 您好!臺灣時間:2021/04/23 03:37
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果

詳目顯示:::

我願授權國圖
: 
twitterline
研究生:李文傑
研究生(外文):Lee, Wen-chieh
論文名稱:To"Make"orto"Buy"?InnovationandVerticalIntegrationinVertically-relatedMarkets
指導教授:溫偉任溫偉任引用關係
指導教授(外文):Yang , Connie Guang-Hwa
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立政治大學
系所名稱:國際貿易研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:貿易學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2004
畢業學年度:92
語文別:英文
論文頁數:40
中文關鍵詞:賽局理論上游廠商下游廠商研發活動反拖拉斯法double marginalizationspillover
外文關鍵詞:game theoryupstreamdownstreamR&Dantitrust
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:0
  • 點閱點閱:112
  • 評分評分:系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:0


本文以一個簡單賽局理論模型為分析依據,探討企業間的自製或是外包策略對整體社會福利的影響。 傳統經濟理論分析告訴我們自製策略可以解決雙重邊際化的問題。但在本文我們舉出一個反例,亦即當存在研發的可能及上下遊市場的研發外溢效果時,垂直整合可能會造成廠商過度研發的情形,最終產生整體社會福利不效益情形。



In this paper, we set up a game-theoretic model, in which the whole industry is composed of a downstream monopolist and two upstream firms. This paper discusses the major debate in a firm’s market strategy: to make or to buy the components it needs. Traditionally, economic theories told us that vertical integration strategy (make strategy) can solve the problem of double marginalization and hence increase profits as well as social welfare. Nevertheless, this result does not necessarily hold when R&D possibility is introduced. We show that when there is downstream to upstream R&D spillover, vertical integration may result in an over-investment in R&D from the social standpoint. This result may shed some light on the rationale behind recent antitrust rulings.



1 Introduction.....................................1
2 Competition in Upstream Market...................5
2.1 The Model....................................5
2.2 The parametric Constraint....................8
2.3 Price Competition...........................13
3 Vertical Integration............................16
3.1 Integration Incentives......................19
4 Social Welfare Comparison.......................22
5 Comparative Statics.............................24
6 Conclusion......................................28
7 Reference.......................................30
8 Appendix........................................32
8.1 Proof.......................................32



1.Areeda, Phillip, Kaplow, Louis., 1997, ``Antitrust Analysis
5th edition," Aspen Law and Business.
2.Choi, J.P., 1989, ``An Analysis of Cooperative R&D,"
Working Paper, Development of Economics, Harvard University.
3.Choi, J.P., 1993, ``Cooperative R&D with product market
competition," International Journal of Industrial
Organization,11, 553-71.
4.Choi, J.P., Gwanghoon Lee and Christodoulous Stefanadis,
2002, ``The Effects of Integration on R&D Incentives in
Systems Markets," Payment System Studies, Research Dept.,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
5.d'Aspremont, C. and A.Jacquemin, 1988, ``Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers," American
Economic Review, 5, 1133-7.
6.Damiano Bruno Silipo, and Avi Weiss, 2001, ``Cooperation and
Competition in R&D with Uncertainty and Spillovers," Report
of research project supported by Science Technology and the
Economy Program, (STE), at the Samuel Neaman Institute for
Advanced Studies in Science and Technology.
7.Gellhorn, Ernest, Kovacic, William E., 1994, ``Antitrust Law
and Economics 4th\quad edition," St. Paul,Minn.
8.Katz, M.L., 1986, ``An analysis of cooperative research and
development," European Journal of Political Economy, 4,
527-43.
9.Marjit, S., 1991, ``Incentives for cooperative and non-
cooperative R and D in Duopoly," Economics Letters, 37,
187-191.
10.Motta, M., 1992, ``Cooperative R&D and vertical product
differentiation," International Journal of Industrial
Organization, 10, 643-61.

11.Suzumura, K., 1992, ``Cooperative and Non-cooperative R&D
in a Oligopoly with Spillovers," American Economic Review,
82, 1307-20.
12.Tirole,J., 1988, ``The Theory of Industrial Organization,"
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
系統版面圖檔 系統版面圖檔