(3.235.191.87) 您好!臺灣時間:2021/05/13 15:12
字體大小: 字級放大   字級縮小   預設字形  
回查詢結果

詳目顯示:::

我願授權國圖
: 
twitterline
研究生:許雅芬
論文名稱:以權益代理問題觀點論經理人幹練程度、公司短視投資與公司監理機制
論文名稱(外文):Managerial seasoning、myopic investment and corporate governance:an empirical study from the aspect of agency problem for equity
指導教授:王元章王元章引用關係蔡柳卿蔡柳卿引用關係
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立嘉義大學
系所名稱:管理研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2004
畢業學年度:92
語文別:中文
論文頁數:95
中文關鍵詞:經理人幹練水準公司短視投資公司監理機制
外文關鍵詞:managerial seasoningmyopic investmentcorporate governance mechanism
相關次數:
  • 被引用被引用:8
  • 點閱點閱:177
  • 評分評分:系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔系統版面圖檔
  • 下載下載:0
  • 收藏至我的研究室書目清單書目收藏:3
以經理人的幹練程度來詮釋公司短視投資決策,有兩個預測結果相反的假說。本研究以台灣85至91年300家上市公司為研究標的,有效樣本為1212筆。實證結果為Narayanan (1985)的「薪資扭曲假說」較能解釋台灣公司經理人幹練程度與短視投資之間的關係,而不支持Noe and Rebello(1997)的「停滯損失假說」。當經理人愈精明幹練則愈不短視,表現在投資決策上,長期投資的部份將愈多。此外,以piece-wise regression結果證明經理人的幹練程度與研發支出之間不存在著非線性的關係,經理人的幹練程度與公司的研發支出之間的正向直線關係是強健的。
為探討公司治理變數是否能抑制Narayanan (1985)所預期的經理人自利動機,於原迴歸式中加入7個公司治理變數。實證結果發現Narayanan (1985)的「wage distortion」 依舊存在。此外,「機構法人持股」、「董監事持股」與研發支出呈負向顯著之關係;「職位雙重性」與研發支出呈正向顯著之關係;「董事會規模」、「經理人持股」、「外部大股東持股」、「財報透明度」與研發支出的關係皆為正向,但未達顯著水準。顯示上述公司治理因素的存在並無法解決經理人因為薪資及名望等自利動機而產生的短視決策,甚至適得其反。以Tobin’s Q值將樣本分群,發現只有在Tobin’s Q小於1的樣本中,才存在著Narayanan之「wage distortion」的問題;至於7個公司治理變數的迴歸係數及顯著水準與原迴歸是相去不遠。最後參照Wahal and McConnell(2000)做法,進行的兩階段最小平方法之結果,依然支持Narayanan (1985)的薪資扭曲假說。在其他公司治理變數上,與前段之結論相去不遠。更可確定「機構法人持股」、「董監事持股」對研發支出的負向顯著影響,「職位雙重性」對研發支出的正向顯著影響。
本研究對於「管理者的薪資及聲望考量」的文獻有所貢獻,因為本研究發現經理人的年齡與其投資決策間關係的重要證據;另一個重要的結論是,絕大多數的公司治理變數並沒有如預期般的,能在經理人的短視傾向上有所緩和;尤有甚者,反而加劇了經理人短視之壓力。
關鍵字:經理人幹練水準、公司短視投資、公司治理機制
There have been two competing hypotheses predict a distortion in investment policy, myopic investing, with respect to managerial seasoning. Intending to test which one can predict exactly and offer an empirical result , this research takes the companies which stock openly traded on the Taiwan Stock Market over 7 years period 1996-2002 as study object.
The empirical result, getting from the regression, supports Narayanan’s(1985)「wage distortion hypothesis」and rejects Noe and Rebello’s(1997)「hold-up loss hypothesis」.Myopia is decreasing in managerial seasoning, in another words, myopia declines and long-term investment rises as manager becomes more seasoned. Furthermore, this research uses a piece-wise regression to prove the positive linear relationship between long-term investment (R&D)and managerial seasoning(age of CEO)is robust, nonlinear relationship doesn’t exist.
In order to test whether corporate governance mechanism can assert managerial self-interest predicted by Narayanan(1985), this research adds 7 corporate governance variables to the original regression. However, the result shows that Narayanan’s(1985)「wage distortion hypothesis」still exist. Otherwise,「institutional shareholding」and「directors and supervisers’ shareholding」affect R&D negatively and significantly ;「dual leadership」affect R&D positively and significantly;「board size」、「manager’s shareholding」、「block holder’s shareholding」and「financial statement quality」positively affect R&D, but not significantly. According to these empirical results, we conclude that even control corporate governance variables, myopia induced from managers self-interest hasn’t been stopped, and to it worse, been exacerbated.
Dividing samples into two subgroups with Tobin’s Q, the result of regression shows that only in subgroup 「Tobin’s Q smaller than 1」supports 「wage distortion hypothesis」.Finally, following Wahal and McConnell(2000), this research perform 2SLS, and as the result, Narayanan’s(1985)「wage distortion hypothesis」still been supported. Comparing to the former regression result, the significant level of corporate governance variables doesn’t change much.
Because finding important evidence on the relationship between age of CEO and investment policy, this research contributes to the literature of “managers’ consideration on wage and reputation”. Furthermore, as we can see from this research, most corporate governance mechanism doesn’t release myopia, and to it worse, exacerbates pressure of managerial myopia.
Key words:managerial seasoning、myopic investment、corporate governance mechanism
第壹章緒論
第一節 研究背景與動機 1
第二節 研究問題 3
第三節 論文內容 5
第貳章文獻探討
第一節 代理問題 7
第二節 經理人短視之誘因 13
第三節 公司治理及相關之實證研究 19
第四節 公司治理機制與短視投資之相關實證研究 24
第參章研究方法
第一節 觀念性架構 35
第二節 研究假說 36
第三節 研究模型及變數定義 44
第四節 資料來源 52
第肆章實證結果分析
第一節 樣本篩選 53
第二節 敘述性統計 55
第三節 相關分析 57
第四節 迴歸分析結果 59
第五節 實證結果之分析與解釋 74
第伍章研究結論與建議
第一節 研究結論 80
第二節 研究限制 83
第三節 研究建議 84
參考文獻 88
中文部分
1. 王元章(2001),內部人持股、風險、股利、負債、投資與公司價值,證券市場發展季刊,第十三卷第三期,頁29-69。
2. 吳幸蓉(2003),公司治理與企業短視之行為關係之研究,逢甲大學會計與財稅研究所碩士論文。
3. 吳建頤(1996),董事會規模對公司價值的影響,中正大學財務金融研究所碩士論文。
4. 何里仁(2002),公司治理之資訊透明度與績效評核關聯性之研究,逢甲大學會計與財稅所碩士論文。
5. 何幸芳(2002),獨立董監事對公司價值與盈餘資訊內涵影響之研究,輔仁大學金融研究所碩士論文。
6. 邱炳乾(1996),公司所有權結構、資本結構與投資計畫關係之探討,中山大學財務管理研究所碩士論文。
7. 林穎芬(1998),台灣上市公司控管機制之研究-探討家族與非家族企業高階主管薪酬與離職的控管效果,中山大學企業管理研究所博士論文。
8. 林燈煤(1999),股權結構、投資與公司價值之關係----以台灣上市公司為例,中正大學財金所碩士論文。
9. 俞海琴&周本鄂(1994),台灣地區上市公司董監事、關係人持股比例與公司扥賓Q關係之研究,管理評論,第十三卷第一期,頁80-96。
10. 許淑鈴(2003),所有權集中程度、董監事會組成特質與公司績效關係之研究,嘉義大學管理研究所碩士論文。
11. 陳迪(2002),董事會、監察人特性與公司績效關聯之再探討,政治大學會計研究所。
12. 陳伯松(2002),「健全公司治理乃大勢所趨」,會計研究月刊,第205期,頁84-87。
13. 陳依蘋&李香瑩(2003),「回歸台灣環境思考公司治理的落實與執行」,會計研究月刊,第213期,頁28-30。
14. 陳依蘋&鄭惠之(2003),「微利時代企業獲利提昇術」,會計研究月刊,第215期,頁29-37。
15. 陳家慧(1999),我國上市公司管理機制與盈餘管理相關性之實證研究,政治大學會計研究所碩士論文。
16. 陳隆麒(1999),「當代財務管理」,華泰出版社。
17. 陳碧滋(2000),我國上市公司股價行為與董監因素關連性之探討,臺灣大學會計學研究所碩士論文。
18. 張詩玫(1998),董事會特性與公司經營績效關聯性之探討,臺灣大學財務金融學研究所碩士論文。
19. 黃榮龍(1992),股權結構與經營績效之研究,政治大學會計研究所碩士論文。
20. 菫秋梅(2000),機構投資人對企業R&D活動之影響,交通大學管理研究所碩士論文。
21. 楊俊中(1998),股權結構與經營績效之相關性之研究,台灣大學會計研究所碩士論文。
22. 葉銀華、李存修、柯承恩(2002),「公司治理與評等系統」,商智文化。
23. 葉銀華&邱顯比(1996),資本結構、股權結構與公司價值關聯性之研究:代理成本理論,台大法學論叢,第七卷第二期,頁57-87。
24. 劉兆宸(2003),研究發展支出與高階主管薪酬關係之研究-以台灣上市公司為例,中正大學會計與資訊科技研究所碩士論文。
25. 劉紹樑(2002),「公司治理的黑暗時代」,天下雜誌,第256期,頁112-113。
26. 劉紹梁(2002),「用高標準治理公司」,天下雜誌第288期,頁202-203。
27. 盧文聰(2003),「策略性成本控制」,會計研究月刊,第215期,頁48-50。
28. 鄭丁旺(2004),「從開發金控經營權之爭談健全公司治理」,會計研究月刊220期,頁13。
29. 謝文馨(1999),家族企業管制機制與盈餘管理之關聯性研究,東吳大學會計研究所碩士論文。
30. 謝淑娟(1994),以權益代理問題觀點探討股權結構與公司經營績效之關係-以台灣上市公司實證,交通大學管理研究所碩士論文。
31. 經濟日報社論(2003/11/29),「中華電信釋股務陷入民營化的迷思」。
32. 證券暨期貨市場發展基金會(2001),「我國公司治理」。
英文部分
1. Agrawal, A. and Knoeber, C.R., 1996. Firm performance and mechanisms to control agency problems between managers and shareholders, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31,377-397
2. Ambrose, B.W. and Megginson, W.L., 1992. The Role of Asset Structure, Ownership Structure, and Takeover Defenses in Determining Acquisition Likelihood, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 27, 575-590
3. Barnea, A., Haugen, R. and Senbet, L., 1980. A rationale for debt maturity structure and call provisions in agency theoretic framework, Journal of Finance 35,1223-1234
4. Baysinger, B. D., Kosnik, T. D. and Turk, T. A., 1991. Effects of board and ownership structure on corporate R&D strategy,Academy of Management Journal 34,205-214
5. Berger, P. G. and Ofek, E., 1995. Diversification’s effect on the firm value,Journal of Financial Economics 37, 39-65
6. Berger, P. G., Ofek, E. and Yermack, D. L. 1997.Managerial Entrenchment and capital structure decision, The Journal of Finance 52, 1411-1440
7. Berle, A. A. and Means G.C., 1932. The modern corporate and private property, Journal of Law and Economics 26,273-301
8. Bessembinder, H., 1991. Forward contracts and firm value: investment incentive and contracting effects, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 26,519-523
9. Bethel, J. E. and Liebeskind J., 1993. The effect of ownership structure on corporate structuring, Strategic Management Journal 14, 15-31
10. Brennan, M. J., 1995. Corporate finance over the past 25years, Financial Management 24, 9-22
11. Brickley, J. A. and James,C. M.,1987.The takeover market, corporate board composition, and ownership structure :the case of banking, Journal of Law and Economics 30,161-181
12. Brickley, J.A., Coles, J. L. and Jarrell, G..,1997.Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the board, Journal of Corporate Finance 3, 189-220
13. Brickley, J.A., Coles, J.L. and Terry, R.L., 1994. Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills, Journal of Financial and Economics 35, 371-390
14. Bushee, B. J., 1998. The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior, The Accounting Review 73, 305-333
15. Byrd, J.W. and Hickman, K.A.,1992.Do outside directors monitor managers? Evidence from tender offer bids, Journal of Financial and Economics 32,195-221
16. Carter, D. A., Simkins B. J. and Simpson W.G., 2003. Corporate governance, board diversity, and firm value, The Financial Review 38
17. Chevalier, J. and Ellison, G., 1999.Career concerns of mutual fund managers, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114,389-433
18. Cho, M. H., 1998. Ownership structure,investment,and corporate value:an empirical analysis, Journal of Financial Economics 47, 103-121
19. Chung, R., Firth, M. and Kim, J. B., 2002. Institutional monitoring and opportunistic earnings management, Journal of Corporate Finance 8, 29-48
20. Chung, K.H. and Pruitt, S.W., 1994. A simple approximation of Tobin’s q, Financial Management 23,70-74
21. Crutchley, C.E. and Hansen, R.S,1989.A test of the agency theory of managerial ownership,corporate leverage,and corporate dividends, The Financial Management 18, 36-46
22. Davis, E.P., 2002, Institutional investors, corporate governance and the performance of the corporate sector, Economic System 26, 203-229
23. Datta S. and Mai I. D., 1996.Takeover defends and wealth effects on security holders:the case of poison pill adoptions, Journal of Banking&Finance 20,1231-1250
24. Dechow, P. M. and Sloan, R.G., 1991. Executive incentives and the horizon problem:an empirical investigation, Journal of Accounting and Economics 14, 51-89
25. Demsetz, H. and Lehn, K., 1985. The structure of corporate ownership:causes and consequence. Journal of political economy 93,1155-1177
26. Dobrzynski, J., 1993. Relationship investing. Business Week 3309,68-75
27. Fama, E.F. and Jensen, M., 1983.Separation of ownership and control, Journal of Law and Economics 26, 301-325
28. Franko, L.G., 1989. Global corporate competition: who’s winning, who’s losing, and the R&D factor as one reason why, Strategic Management Journal 10,449-474
29. Froot, K., Perold A. and Stein J., 1992. Shareholder trading practices and corporate investment horizons, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance,42-58
30. Gavish, B. and Kalary, A., 1983. On the asset substitution problem, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 18, 21-30
31. Gordon, L.A. and Pound, J., 1993. Information, ownership structure, and shareholder voting: evidence from shareholder-sponsored corporate governance proposal, Journal of Finance 48,697-718
32. Graves, S., 1988.Institutional ownership and corporate R&D in the computer industry. Academy of Management Journal 31,417-428
33. Green, R.C. and Talmor, E., 1986. Asset substitution and the agency costs of debt financing, Journal of Banking&Finance 10, 391-400
34. Gugler, K., 2003. Corporate governance, dividend payout policy, and interrelation between dividends, R&D, and capital investment, Journal of Banking&Finance 27,1297
35. Hamilton, A., 1788. Advantages of single executive, Harvard University Press 1961, 451-458
36. Hansen, G. S. and Hill, C .W. L, 1991. Are institutional investors myopia?a time-series study of four technology-driven industries,Strategic Management Journal 12,1-16
37. Harris, M. and Holmstorm, B.,1982. A theory of wage dynamics, Review of Economics Studies 49, 315-333
38. Holderness, C.G. and Sheehan, D., 1985.Raider or saviors? The evidence on six controversial investors, Journal of Financial Economics 14, 555-579
39. Jacobs, M., 1991. Short-term America: the causes and cures of our business myopia. Boston, MA Harvard Business School Press
40. Jarrell, G.A. and Poulsen A.B., 1987.The effects of antitakeover amendments since 1980, Journal of Financial Economics 19, 127-168
41. Jarrell, G. and Lehn, K.1985. Institutional ownership,tender offer,and long-term investment,Washington D.C:Office of the Chief Economist,Securities and Exchange Commission
42. Jensen, M.C., 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems, Journal of Finance 48, 831-880
43. Jensen, M.C., 1986.Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeover, The American Economic Review 76 , 323-329
44. Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W. H., 1976. Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360
45. La Porta, R., Lope-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A, Vishny, R., 2000.Agency problems and dividend policies around the world. Journal of Finance 55,1-33
46. Linn, S.C. and McConnell J.J., 1983. An empirical investigation of the impact of antitakeover amendments on common stock price, Journal of Financial Economics 11, 361-399
47. Lipton, M and Lorsch, J. W., 1992. A modest proposal for improved corporate governance, Business Lawyer 48,59-77
48. Long, M.S., Malitz, I.B. and Sefick, S. E., 1994. An empirical examination of dividend policy following debt issues, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 29,131-144
49. Louis, A. M., 1984. Business is bungling long-term compensation, Fortune 106,64-69
50. Lundstrum, L. L., 2002.Corporate investment myopia:a horserace of the theories, Journal of Corporate Finance 8, 353-371
51. Malatesta, P. H. and Walking, R. A., 1988. Poison pill securities: stockholder wealth, profitability, and ownership structure, Journal of Financial Economics 20, 347-377
52. Martin, J. D. and Sayrak, A., 2003.Corporate diversification and shareholder value:a survey of recent literature, Journal of Corporate Finance 9, 37-57
53. McConnell, J. J. and Servaes, H., 1990. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value, Journal of Financial Economics 27, 595-612
54. Mello, R. and Mukherjee, T., 2001. Forced versus voluntary dividend reduction:an agency cost explanation, The Financial Review 36,1-22
55. Meulbroek, L. K., Mitchell, M. L. and Mulherin, J.H., 1990, Shark repellents and managerial myopia: an empirical test, Journal of Political Economy 98,1108-1117
56. Mikkelson, W. and Ruback, R., 1991. Targeted repurchases and common stock return, Rand Journal of Economics 20, 293-315
57. Mitton, T., 2002. A cross-firm analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the East Asian financial crisis, Journal of Financial Economics 64,215-241
58. Montgomery, C. A., 1994.Corporate diversification. Journal of Economic Perspectives 8 , 163-178
59. Morck, R., Nakamura, M. and Shivdasani, A., 2000.Bank,ownership structure, and firm value in Japan,Journal of Business73, 539-567
60. Morck, R., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., 1988. Management ownership and market valuation: an empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Economics 20, 293-315
61. Murphy, K.J. and Zimmerman, J, 1993. Financial performance surrounding CEO turnover. Journal of accounting and economics16, 273-315
62. Myers, S. C., 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing, Journal of Financial Economics5, 147-175
63. Nam, J., Ottoo, R. E. and Thornton J. H., 2003. The effect of managerial incentives to bear risk on corporate capital structure and R&D investment, The Financial Review 38, 77-101
64. Narayanan, M.P., 1985. Managerial incentives for short-term results,Journal of Finance 40,1469-1484
65. Noe, T. H. and Rebello, M. J, 1997. Renegotiation,investment horizon and managerial discretion, Journal of Business 70,385-407
66. Petersen, T. and Thomsen S., 2003. Ownership structure and value of the largest European firms: The importance of owner identity, Journal of management and governance 7,27-55
67. Porter M., 1992.Capital choice:change in the way America invest in industry, Boston, MA:council on competitiveness/Harvard Business School
68. Roe, M., 1994.Strong manager, weak owner: the political roots of American corporate finance. Princeton University Press
69. Rozeff, M. S., 1982. Growth,Beta and agency costs as determinants of dividend payout ratios, Journal of Financial Research 5 ,249-259
70. Shleifer,A and Vishny, R.W.,1997.A survey corporate governance, Journal of Finance52 ,737-783
71. Short, H. and Keasey, K., 1999. Managerial ownership and the performance of firms:evidence from the UK, Journal of Corporate Finance 5 ,79-101
72. Stein, J. C., 1988,Takeover threats and managerial myopia, Journal of Political Economy 96,61-80
73. Subrahmanyam, V., Rangan, N. and Rosenstein, S., 1997.The role of outside directors in bank acquisitions, Financial Management 26,23-36
74. Wahal, S. and McConnell, J. J., 2000. Do institutional investors exacerbate managerial myopia?Journal of Corporate Finance 6,307-329
75. Williamson, O.E., 1988. Corporate finance and corporate governance, Journal of Finance43, 561-591
76. Wright, P. and Ferris, S.P., 1996.Impact of corporate insider, blockholder , and institutional equity ownership on firm risk taking, Academy of Management Journal 39,441-463
77. Yermack D., 1996. Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors, Journal of Financial Economics 40,185-211
QRCODE
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
第一頁 上一頁 下一頁 最後一頁 top
系統版面圖檔 系統版面圖檔