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研究生:邵珮雯
研究生(外文):Pei-wen Shao
論文名稱:公司治理機制、代理成本與無形資產之關聯性研究
論文名稱(外文):The Relationship between Corporate Governance Mechanisms, Agency Costs, and Intangible Assets
指導教授:蔡柳卿蔡柳卿引用關係
指導教授(外文):Liu-Ching Tsai
學位類別:碩士
校院名稱:國立嘉義大學
系所名稱:管理研究所
學門:商業及管理學門
學類:企業管理學類
論文種類:學術論文
論文出版年:2004
畢業學年度:92
語文別:中文
論文頁數:133
中文關鍵詞:公司治理機制無形資產代理成本
外文關鍵詞:corporate governanceintangible assetsagency costs
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本研究旨在探討企業公司治理機制中的董事會特性、股權結構,是否能發揮監督效用,減少經理人與股東間的代理成本。此外,更進一步從長期價值創造的角度出發,探討治理機制的良窳是否會影響公司長期導向的無形資產投資。本研究以民國90至91年間國內上市公司為研究對象,有效樣本共814筆。研究設計以扣除廣告支出的銷管費用為代理成本的正向衡量指標、以總資產週轉率為代理成本的反向衡量指標。此外,更進一步將樣本以產業別(傳統、高科技產業)區分,探討不同產業類別下,治理機制與代理成本、無形資產之關聯性。
本研究結果主要發現為:(1)外部董事席次與經理人持股為有效治理機制,尤其是經理人持股不論在傳統或是高科技產業,都能有效連結股東與經理人利益。(2)董事會規模對無形資產有正面影響,但此正面效益多發生在傳統產業,推論是因為傳統產業對投資效益不確定的無形資產支出多持保留態度,故董事會規模愈大,成員的多樣性能夠給予經營團隊有效之策略建議,促使無形資產提昇,但對於高科技產業而言,大型董事會缺乏效率的決策速度與彈性,無法因應高度的環境變動,故使資產週轉率下降。(3)高科技外部大股東雖傾向將公司將資產分派至研發、廣告、人力的投資,但配適效率良好,故可同時提高無形資產綜合指標、資產週轉率。(4)傳統產業機構投資人對於總資產週轉率有正面作用,但對無形資產綜合指標與專利權卻有負面影響,顯示傳統產業機構投資人雖能有效抑制代理成本,但存在短視現象,並以短期獲利為目標,迫使經理人削減無形資產支出;反之,高科技公司以技術研發為生存利基的產業特性,使機構投資人不存在短視效果。(5)董監事持股質押顯著升高代理成本、減少無形資產,且此情況存在高度股權質押的傳統產業,顯示傳統產業之高度股權設質引發較大的潛在代理問題。
綜述全體樣本實證迴歸結果,發現總資產週轉率受治理機制的影響相較於銷售管理費用較強,與Singh and Davidson III(2001)的研究發現相似,推論因為銷售管理費用所造成之現金流量波動可觀察性,不如銷售、資產週轉率等會計指標,故較不受股東或是董監事的關注,容易導致股東忽略對費用的控制。此外,高科技產業之治理機制產生較多正向監督效果(包括:經理人持股比、外部大股東持股比、外部董事持股比),相較之下,傳統產業之治理機制存在較多負面影響(包括:內部董事持股比、外部董事持股比、機構投資人持股比、董監事持股質押)。推論是因為國內高科技產業之經營者知識教育背景平均較一般傳統產業之經營者佳,高科技產業在近30年蓬勃發展,不論在產業變動性與競爭強度上,普遍來說均較傳統產業大,故公司傾向專業化經營,使治理機制相對較能發揮效益。
This research is for the purpose of discussing the enterprise corporate governance mechanisms which include the board characteristics and the ownership structure, whether or not they can display the surveillance effectiveness and reduce agency costs between the manager and shareholders. In addition, this thesis discuss governance mechanisms whether they can increase the intangible asset investment which guides the company for a long time value. This sample consists of all public companies listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange Corpoate during 2001-2002,and the effective sample amounts to 814.We use two alternate measures of agency costs. The first is the ratio of selling.general administrative expenses to annual sales. The second is the ratio of annual sales to total assets which is an asset utilization efficiency ratio.
In addition, we further split the sample by the industry classification including the traditional industry and high tech industry. Then we investigate whether or not the relationship between the governance mechanism, agent costs and intangible assets would be different in two kinds of industry. Our main findings include (1)Both of outside directors and the CEO ownership are effective corporate governance mechanisms.(2) The board size has the positive influence to the intangible asset, but this influence occurs in the traditional industry. The deduction is that CEO hold the conservative attitude to invest intangible asset in the traditional industry. If the board size is bigger, the diversity of members will give the management team effective strategy to invest in intangible asset. On the contrary, the larger board in the high tech industry lacks the policy-making efficiency which is difficult to adapt to the high environment changes.(3) Both of outside directors and inside directors are conservative to invest intangible asset in the traditional industry. On the contrary, the high-tech company’s outside directors support CEO increase the long term value investment.(4)The blockholders in high tech industry although favor the company to distribute the property to the research development, the advertisement and the manpower investment, but the asset distribution is efficiency,and therefore cause a high asset utilization efficiency. (5) The institutional investors in the traditional industry has the positive influence to reduce agency costs, but institutional investors behave myopically to encourage the CEO to cut down the intangible asset investment. Otherwise, the high tech company take the technical research and development as the survival advantage, causes the institutional investors not to have the myopic behavior. (6) The supervisors’ stock mortgage raises the agency costs and reduces intangible assets in the traditional industry, demonstrates the supervisors’ stock mortgage exist the bigger agency question.
Viewing the research findings as a whole. We find that the relation between the governance mechanisms and the asset utilization is significant than the relation between the governance mechanisms and the selling, general administrative expenses. One possible reason is that general administrative expenses are not as visibly related to cash flows generated by firms as sales to assets ratios.(Singh and Davidson III, 2001)
In addition, governance mechanisms are more effective to reduce agency costs and promote intangible assets in the high tech industry. The deduction is that the high tech company’s CEOs are more well-educated and knowledgeable about professional business operation than the general tradition company’s CEO .Therefore the high tech company enables the governance mechanisms comparatively to display the benefit.
第壹章 緒論……………………………………………………………………………1
第一節 研究動機、目的與問題…………………………………………………..1
第二節 預期研究貢獻……………………………………………………………..5
第三節 論文架構…………………………………………………………………..6
第貳章 文獻回顧………………………………………………………………………9
第一節 代理問題與公司治理機制………………………………………………..9
第二節 公司治理機制與代理成本之關聯性文獻……………………………….28
第三節 公司治理機制與無形資產之關聯性文獻……………………………….34
第四節 研究延伸………………………………………………………………….46
第參章 研究方法……………………………………………………………………...49
第一節 研究觀念性架構………………………………………………………….49
第二節 研究假說………………………………………………………………….50
第三節 變數定義與實證模式…………………………………………………….59
第四節 選樣期間、標準與來源………………………………………………….68
第五節 資料分析方法…………………………………………………………….70
第六節 敏感性分析……………………………………………………………….72
第肆章 實證結果分析………………………………………………………………...79
第一節 敘述性統計……………………………………………………………….79
第二節 相關分析………………………………………………………………….83
第三節 迴歸結果分析…………………………………………………………….85
第四節 敏感性分析……………………………………………………………….94
第伍章 結論與建議………………………………………………………………….114
第一節 研究結論………………………………………………………………...114
第二節 研究限制………………………………………………………………...118
第二節 研究建議………………………………………………………………...119
參考文獻……………………………………………………………………………...121
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