臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

本文主要探討在存在政治遊說的情況下，貿易政策與委外生產的相互關係。在本文中，
國內廠商以外包的形式向國外廠商購買所需之中間要素，且與國外廠商於最終商品市場進行Cournot數量競爭。
透過外包的形式，國內廠商與國外廠商的關係不僅止於最終商品的競爭者，且在中間要素的市場為上下游的供應關係。
本文證明，國內政府對中間要素的進口補貼及最終商品的進口關稅皆有利於國內廠商，然而，
貿易干預對國外廠商利潤的影響則需視直接效果和間接效果的大小才能決定。本文應用Grossman-Helpman (1994)的menu-auction模型，
進一步討論在外包的情況下，當國內廠商對政府遊說及國內外廠商均對政府遊說對均衡貿易政策的影響。
本文證明，當僅有國內廠商進行遊說,遊說後之中間要素補貼與最終商品關稅皆大於最適均衡政策下之中間要素補貼與最終商品關稅；
當國內外廠商皆進行遊說,遊說後之均衡政策與最適均衡政策之間則需視直接效果與間接效果之大小才能確定。
此外，本文亦討論政府有階級偏差的情況。本文證明，當政府對本國廠商所提供的政治獻金賦予較高的權重時，當直接效果大於間接效果時，
中間要素補貼(最終商品關稅)會小於(大於)不存在階級偏差下之中間要素補貼(最終商品關稅)。

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目錄
1 緒論 1
2 基本模型 5
3 均衡政策 13
3.1 僅有國內廠商進行遊說 14
3.2 不存在階級偏差 17
3.3 存在階級偏差 19
4 結論 23
參考文獻 25

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