臺灣博碩士論文加值系統

In this article, we present an electoral model containing positive campaign, negative campaign and partisans. Under the framework of signaling game, we analyze our model with the concept sequential equilibrium. Due to the competition of two senders, we can find some equilibria which are informative. But if there exists some positive proportion of partisans for one of the candidates, the informative equiilibria will not exist. Besides, the numbers of partisans will determine whether one candidate will adopt untruthful attack.

Contents
1.Introduction
2.Banks' Model
3.Harrington and Hess' model
4.A Signaling Model on Positive and Negative Campaigns with Partisans
5.Conclusion
6.Comparison with Banks' and Harrington and Hess' work
References

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